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SPECTERS OF THE UNSPEAKABLE: 
THE RHETORIC OF TORTURE IN GUATEMALAN LITERATURE, 1975-1985 
 
This dissertation examines the ways in which torture was imagined and narrated in 
Guatemalan literature during the Internal Armed Conflict. For nearly four decades, 
Guatemala suffered one of the longest and most violent wars in Latin America. During 
that time, it is estimated that more than 100,000 people were tortured at the hands of the 
Guatemalan military. Torture, as suggested by Ariel Dorman, is most fundamentally “a 
crime committed against the imagination” (8), disrupting and often dissolving the 
boundaries between fact and fiction, the real and the unreal. The Introduction and 
Chapter One of this study explore the destabilization of this boundary by examining the 
historical and theoretical context for torture in Guatemala. The ubiquity and normality of 
torture was so terrible that, for many, it became “unspeakable”—an atrocity that defied 
language. Chapters Two through Four study three different literary modes of countering 
the state’s rhetoric of torture, probing the possibility of narrating torture despite its 
seemingly unsayable nature. Examining works by Rigoberta Menchú (chapter two), 
Marco Antonio Flores and Arturo Arias (chapter three), and Rodrigo Rey Rosa (chapter 
four), and aided by current theories and studies of torture, this dissertation investigates 
the ways in which these Guatemalan authors have sought not only to re-present torture, 
but also to explore and sometimes question the possibility of bearing witness to that 
torture in literature. 
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Chapter One: Introduction: Specters of the Unspeakable 
No more torture, but … go on torturing just 
the same. (Colonel Marcel Bigeard)
1
 
 
Torture is banned absolutely by international law: “No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture” (Convention against 
Torture Art. 1). And though most will agree that torture has no place in modern liberal 
democracies, it continues to be practiced with alarming frequency. Indeed, torture has 
become the topic of heated debate in the United States, and recent years have witnessed a 
proliferation of articles, books, and editorials treating the theme of torture. Discussions of 
torture increased following September 11, 2001
2
 when the war on terror once again raised 
questions concerning the lengths to which the United States was willing to go not only to 
find those responsible for the attacks, but also to prevent future acts of terrorism.
3
 The 
forced detention of those suspected of terrorism and the use of coercive interrogation to 
extract information have heightened the public’s awareness that such tactics continue to 
be practiced despite official assertions to the contrary. The debate was substantially 
amplified in 2004 after the release of the photos from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Images 
of Private Lynndie England standing beside Iraqi prisoners who had been stripped and 
bound flooded news channels and became the topic of much discussion. Her later 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in Rita Maran, Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War. 
2
 That is not to suggest, of course, that torture was not a topic of interest prior to September 11, 2001. 
Nevertheless, the last 10 years have witnessed a dramatic increase in publications dealing with torture, the 
vast majority of which examine the relationship between torture and law, as well as questions of how we 
might better “define” torture. For an excellent and succinct examination of the various types of torture as 
well as a philosophical analysis of the standard reasons for which states continue to use torture, see Tindale 
“The Logic of Torture.” 
3
 For a thorough and well-crafted treatment of the U.S. response to 9/11 and the subsequent creation of a 
“state of emergency” in which torture became not only possible, but necessary, see Parry 166-195.   
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statement that “[i]t was just for fun” (qtd in Parry) revealed the frequency with which 
such practices were performed, as well as the soldiers’ attitudes regarding violent 
interrogation. Of course, the immediate response of the U.S. government was that this 
had been an aberration, and that such actions run contrary to standard interrogation 
policies. Nevertheless, as John Parry has demonstrated in his book Understanding 
Torture: Law, Violence, and Political Identity (2010), we cannot conclude that such 
photos reveal random or aberrational violence (193).
4
 Instead they reflect a wider trend in 
detention and interrogation techniques and “sits on a continuum of violent state practices” 
(12). Clearly, the continued use of torture throughout the world should produce outrage. 
But it should not evoke wonder; it is not “special” (Parry 193). And we must be careful 
not to suggest that torture “is particularly horrible” or that it might be abolished with 
“better laws and better enforcement” (Parry 12). As Parry argues, “[t]his kind of 
argument treats torture as a separate, universally prohibited, egregious form of conduct 
that is categorically different from other forms of state violence” (12). To single torture 
out as particularly horrible runs the risk of treating its existence as aberrational and thus 
somehow contrary to the functions of state power.
5
 Rather than treating torture as “a 
separate, universally prohibited, egregious form of conduct” (Parry 12), it is much more 
accurate to explore the ways in which torture fits into a broader understanding of state 
                                                 
4
 Drawing on U.S. reports about Abu Ghraib, Parry notes the marked similarity between what happened at 
Abu Ghraib and previous torture practices in Brazil and Vietnam. He claims, therefore, that “the guards did 
not make up all of their methods on the spot; they had a source—perhaps military intelligence personnel—
for some of them. Thus, whether or not all of the abuses had a formal relationship to interrogation, one 
easily could conclude that many of them had some relationship to it” (193). 
5
 In fact, in his study, Parry highlights the relationship between torture and contemporary national and 
international law, suggesting that torture is consistent with liberal democracy and the modern notions of 
human rights. Regarding the problematic conception of torture as “aberrational,” Parry argues that “the 
control over people’s lives exercised by the modern state—including sometimes violent domination—is 
consistent with and perhaps even the fulfillment of rights discourse and liberal ideology” (96). For a more 
in-depth treatment of pervasive versus aberrational views of torture in the “war on terror,” see Parry 187 ff.  
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power and violence, specifically the ways in which it “relates to interrogation, detention 
and confinement, war, and the broader question of how much control governments have 
or should have over our bodies” (Parry 12). Conceiving of torture as it fits on a broader 
spectrum of state violence can grant us a more complete understanding as to how torture 
can be used against the enemies of the state. 
My project will examine narratives that reflect the use of torture during the 
Internal Armed Conflict
6
 in Guatemala, exploring specifically its location on the larger 
continuum of state power and violence, as well as the methods employed by the victims 
of that violence in order to resist the state’s project of social control. For nearly four 
decades, Guatemala suffered one of the longest and most violent wars in Latin America. 
From 1960 until the signing of a “Firm and Lasting Peace” in 1996, war and violence 
ravaged the entire country.
7
 While the exact number of deaths remains uncertain, 
conservative estimates suggest that over the course of Guatemala’s 36-year armed 
conflict, more than 250,000 people were either killed or disappeared. During that same 
period, it is believed that over 100,000 people were abducted and tortured. In many 
instances, their bodies were marked and mutilated, presumably in order to extract 
information, but ultimately to serve as a reminder of what the government would do to 
those who opposed them. In some cases, citizens were dragged from their homes in the 
middle of the night; in others, they were abducted during broad daylight. Torture, rape, 
                                                 
6
 The phrase “Internal Armed Conflict” is the most widely-accepted terminology for discussing the 36-year 
civil war in Guatemala. In order to denote that it was not a war per se—since much of the violence targeted 
guerrillas, revolutionaries, as well as the wider civilian population—“armed conflict” has been used by 
many to describe the violence. Other terms have been used, of course, including the term “dirty war”—
which describes the situation in several Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s. For more 
information on this terminology, see Jonas (1991) and Sanford (2003). 
7
 Although the year 1960 is generally established as the beginning of the Internal Armed Conflict, it is 
certainly true that the violence began before then. Indeed, for many Guatemalans, the Intervention in 1954 
remains a much more important date for marking the beginning of the violence.  
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and murder became part of daily life. Such violence produced a profound and ever-
present sense of terror throughout the country. Torture and the implementation of severe 
pain became not only a standard practice with prisoners, but also spilled over into civil 
society.  
This terror reached its high point in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Referred to 
simply as “La Violencia” (“The Violence”), the years 1978-1983 were a time of extreme 
violence and frequent acts of torture, not only in clandestine detention centers, but also in 
public spaces. It was during those years that the military implemented its scorched-earth 
campaigns, in which entire villages in the largely indigenous highlands of Guatemala 
were massacred and destroyed.
8
 It was later determined that the police and military had 
received not only aid, but also direct military training during that period (CEH, REMHI). 
Despite the incredibly sophisticated techniques of psychological torture adopted by the 
United States in the 1940s and 1950s—which were later published in the KUBARK 
Counterintelligence Interrogation manual in 1963
9
—the training manuals produced by 
the U.S. for distribution in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s were decidedly violent 
and did not emphasize the more psychological (and presumably less coercive) 
interrogation techniques. These manuals, particularly the Handling of Sources manual 
that remained in use until 1991 (Parry 150), emphasized “motivation by fear, payment of 
bounties for enemy dead, beatings, false imprisonment, executions and the use of  truth 
                                                 
8
 For more specific information on the scorched earth massacres, see especially Ricardo Falla’s Massacres 
in the Jungle: Ixcán, Guatemala, 1975-1982.  
9
 After World War II, CIA officials began gathering information regarding interrogation techniques abroad. 
Since they were “convinced that Russian and Chinese intelligence services had developed sophisticated 
tactics—such as brainwashing—that could undermine U.S. intelligence-gathering efforts” (Parry 142), the 
CIA also began research into more sophisticated interrogation methods, particularly psychological 
approaches (Parry 142). The KUBARK report included a section titled “The Non-Coercive 
Counterintelligence Interrogation,” and though it did not assume that all interrogation should be free of 
pain, it did assume that “indiscriminate use of force is irrational” (Parry 143). For more on the KUBARK 
report and its findings regarding the use of pain and coercion in torture, see Parry 141-145. 
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serum” (Werner E. Michel, qtd in Parry 150).
10
 As these spectacles of power moved from 
the prisons to the public spaces, torture became a public phenomenon, the goal of which 
was silence and social control.  
 
  
                                                 
10
 Five Latin American countries received these manuals: Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, and 
Guatemala (Parry 150). Regarding the distribution of these torture manuals in Latin America, Parry also 
notes that “[a]lthough there appears to have been a hiatus during the Carter administration, the manuals 
were available in 1977 by mail order” (Parry 150).   
6 
 
‘Un vacío colmado’: Violence and the Unspeakable in Guatemala 
…esa pura violencia que no puede ser dicha 
ni nombrada del todo, el exceso de realidad 
que colma el vacío y que nos desborda hasta 
vaciarnos.
11
 
 
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must 
be silent.
12
 
 
The Guatemalan is, above all, silent.  
(Pierro Gleijeses) 
 
This project began to attain its final theoretical framework after I read two 
seemingly unrelated texts. The first was “La guerra de los nombres: Una historia de la 
rebelión, el genocidio y el ojo del poder soberano en Guatemala” (“The War of Names: A 
History of Rebellion, Genocide, and the Eye of Sovereign Power in Guatemala”), an 
article published in 2009 by Guatemalan sociologist Juan Carlos Mazariegos. The second 
was Elizabeth Loevlie’s Literary Silences in Pascal, Rousseau, and Beckett (2003). In his 
article, Mazariegos explores questions of historical memory, focusing especially on 
reasons why the Internal Armed Conflict continues to evoke disagreement and debate. 
The primary difficulty in talking about the war, he suggests, is that we lack the language 
to name those horrific acts of violence and genocide. Indeed, he discusses at length the 
difficulty of narrating the violence. Drawing on the testimonies of various indigenous 
people who witnessed firsthand the massacres in the early 1980s, Mazariegos attempts to 
explore what many other critics refer to as the unsayable aspects of the war (17). Because 
the massacres were so horrific, they defied all efforts at narration, and thus he asserts that 
many Guatemalans have come to believe that their language is simply incapable of 
saying what happened during La violencia. Mazariegos’ exploration into this 
                                                 
11
 Mazariegos 34. 
12
 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 
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impossibility concludes that a principal difficulty resides in language itself, arguing that 
in the naming of the violence in Guatemala we find “el vacío que desborda toda nuestra 
realidad” (“the void that overflows all of our reality” [15]). In other words, the 
combination of the extremity of the violence and our incapacity to talk about it creates 
not a void within society, but a void that “overflows reality.” That is, its pervasiveness is 
so extreme that society and the void become coterminous.
13
 And because the horrors of 
La violencia exceed our abilities to name them, the most frequent response to the “void” 
has been silence. He writes, “Ese vacío demanda silencio y olvido, nos pide deponer 
nuestra mirada: es la dificultad de nombrar el horror” (“That void demands silence and 
forgetfulness; it asks us to lay down our gaze: it is the difficulty of naming the horror” 
[15]). Our inability to see the true horror of the military’s crimes thus renders all attempts 
to narrate the violence problematic. He suggests that even those who have seen the 
violence firsthand—both the witnesses and the victims themselves—remain unable to 
narrate those experiences directly.  
Thus Mazariegos argues that perhaps even more so than the violence itself, “es 
esta experiencia de la casi imposibilidad de nombrar la que nos rompe, nos escinde y nos 
fractura: lo más real de nuestra realidad es el horror, el exceso de una violencia sacra y 
mítica que da pie a la ignominia del genocidio Maya” (“it is this experience of the almost 
impossibility of naming that breaks us, splits us and fractures us; the most real of our 
reality is horror, the excess of a sacred and mythical violence that gives rise to the shame 
                                                 
13
 Victoria Sanford reaffirms the violence of language in her book Buried Secrets (2004). She writes, “The 
language itself is a part of the genocide. The legacy of trauma is embedded in the language, just as it is 
embedded in other structures of the culture. The language is one of extremity, of surviving a violence so 
extreme that it falls into the category of what many have called ‘limit events’” (Sanford 18). For a 
treatment of limit events and their relation to violence and historical memory, see LaCapra History and 
Memory after Auschwitz. 
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of Mayan genocide” [15]). In other words, the essential reality of Guatemalan society 
during the war was horror. And thus in addition to the violence of the massacres and the 
very public nature of torture in Guatemala, the other face of the war was its normality—
the moment when the exception became the norm. Mazariegos suggests that one of the 
most “unspeakable” aspects of the war was the moment not only when the generals and 
torturers sat down to eat a meal despite the carnage around them, but when the average 
citizen did so as well.
14
 The most frightening aspect of the unsayable horror was its 
daily—and seemingly ubiquitous—presence: 
Lo más horroroso de ese horror puro es el testimonio intestimoniable que debe 
decir que, en ese instante en el que todo esto ocurría, la sociedad pudo tener 
cotidianidad, las familias podían sentarse a comer y a platicar a la mesa, los 
jóvenes pudieron seguir yendo al cine, tener novia o novio, hijos, etc.: ésos son 
los ojos de los muertos, los que ahora nos miran, los que ahora devuelven la 
Mirada a los que seguimos aquí, cargando sus nombres, sus historias… 
escuchando el testimonio de lo intestimoniable. (52)
15
  
 
For most Guatemalans, he suggests, the immediate reaction to these specters—the “eyes 
of the dead” who continued to speak—was feigned blindness and silence. That silence, in 
many ways, arose not only of fear, but also because of frustrations in attempting to name 
the violence. In fact, Mazariegoes suggests that in order to narrate the atrocities of the 
armed conflict, Guatemalans require a new type of language. To explore more precisely 
why these experiences escape our ability to name them, he draws on the theories of 
                                                 
14
 At this point in his analysis, Mazariegos includes a brief excursus on Kierkegaard and the horror of the 
unspeakable (52). This prefigures the connection to my use of Elisabeth Loevlie and her concept of 
“literary silence,” which I include in the section below.  
15
 “The most horrifying of that pure horror is the untestimoniable testimony that must say that, in that 
instant in which all this was occurring, society was able to continue having its daily routine, families could 
sit down to eat and talk at the table, youth could continue going to the movies, could have a girlfriend or a 
boyfriend, children, etc.: those are the eyes of the dead, those who now look at us, those who now return 
the gaze to those of us who continue here, carrying their names, their stories… listening to the testimony of 
the untestimoniable.” 
9 
 
Giorgio Agamben, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Lacan.
16
 These theorists 
in particular reveal new ways to listen to and name that “exceso de realidad” (“excess of 
reality” [34]) that permeated Guatemalan society during the war. Because of the 
“unsayable” nature of the atrocities, attempts to narrate the violence of the war must 
necessarily resort to what Agamben refers to as a “non-language” (Remnants 39). Since 
language ultimately fails to name the horrors of torture and massacre in Guatemala, 
bearing witness is no longer a possibility (Agamben, Remnants 39). Naming the violence 
of the war must somehow seek to find a language that “no longer signifies” (Remnants 
39).  
Though Mazariegos does not address the literary representations of torture during 
the war, his treatment of the “intestimoniable” does provide important insight into how 
we might approach literature about the war. Most importantly, in addition to summarizing 
some of the theoretical difficulties in narrating violence, his article reveals the dangers of 
silence and posits the need to explore alternative forms of talking about the violence. 
According to Pierro Gleijeses, silence was the not only the easiest, but also the safest 
reaction to the violence of the state. He writes, “In this intolerant society, silence is the 
best defense. Silence permeates the political realm. … The silence flows into the social 
and the professional realm. … Just as the culture of fear is the keynote of the cacophony 
of the many Guatemalan cultures, so its effects—the silence, the servility, the mistrust—
unite the Guatemalan people” (4). United in silence, however, Guatemalans were unable 
to resist the state’s mechanisms of terror, but rather became silent accomplices of the 
regime’s power. Of course, Mazariegos is not the only critic to draw attention to the role 
of silence in recent Guatemalan history. This emphasis on silence has been a popular 
                                                 
16
 I draw on many of these same theorists throughout the course of my study. See especially Chapter 1.  
10 
 
rhetorical tool in Guatemala for decades. Indeed, I would argue that few concepts have 
been more seductive in discussing the violence in Guatemala. Not only authors, but also 
literary critics have frequently resorted to this idea of silence in order to note the 
“unsayable” nature of the violence of the war.
17
  
  
                                                 
17
 See, for example, the collection Voices from the Silence: Guatemalan Literature of Resistance (1998), 
edited by Marc Zimmerman and Raúl Rojas. 
11 
 
Literary Silence: Language and the Non-Symbolic 
There can be no pure opposition to power, 
only a recrafting of its terms from resources 
invariably impure. (Judith Butler)
18
 
 
Despite its appeal, however, silence can be a problematic concept in situations of 
war and violence, which brings me to the second work that has greatly informed the 
theoretical framework of my current project: Elizabeth Loevlie’s Literary Silences in 
Pascal, Rousseau, and Beckett (2003). Loevlie’s text wrestles with the most basic of 
questions: what is silence and how do we understand its relationship to language? 
Though a seemingly simple question, Loevlie posits that silence continues to challenge 
our imaginative capacities. What we often take to be “silence”—often presumed to 
denote “the absence of noise” (10) or “the opposite of language” (11)—does not exist. 
According to John Cage, silence as “absence” is impossible:  
In fact, try as we may to make silence, we cannot. For certain engineering 
purposes, it is desirable to have as silent a situation as possible. Such a room is 
called an anechoic chamber, its six walls made of special material, a room without 
echoes. I entered one at Harvard University several years ago and heard two 
sounds, one high and one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, 
he informed me that the high one was my nervous system in operation, the low 
one my blood in circulation. Until I die there will be sounds. (Cage 8) 
 
Yet this conception of silence as “absence” continues to have great “seductive appeal” 
(Loevlie 10). Rather than leading to a rejection of the dualistic conception of silence as 
the opposite of language, the impossibility leads to a “mystique of silence. Although 
scientifically unfeasible, silence is poetically still a possible reality, still an ideal to be 
                                                 
18
 Butler, qtd in Nelson, Finger in the Wound 41.  
12 
 
sought. It is still talked of, still dreamt of, still largely a romanticized notion” (Loevlie 
10). Silence, she suggests, captivates our imaginations and stirs our desires.
19
  
According to Loevlie, silence is seductive primarily because “it is seen as an 
alternative to what is increasingly experienced as an impoverished state of language” 
(12). What George Steiner, in 1961, termed the “retreat of the word” (qtd in Loevlie 12) 
has only been amplified with the advent of the digital age and the possibility of instant 
communication. Loevlie notes the frequent disappointment with such an overabundance 
of words: “The broadcasted word, the televised word, and the electronic word literally 
permeate the atmosphere. But rather than make language richer, this proliferation of 
words points towards an impoverished and simplified language” (12). The continued 
devaluation and simplicity of language is accompanied by an increasing acceptance of the 
value of the image. This tendency to posit silence as the other of language is described by 
Loevlie as the “Dream of Silence”:  
By it I designate the tendency exactly to evoke silence as a beyond that is the 
realm of the unsayable, and to rely on silence as an unverifiable conclusion that 
leaves nothing more to be said. By calling it a Dream I hope to indicate that this 
silence cannot be verified or measured, but rather adheres to different categories 
of experience. The Dream of Silence transcends the silence sought in the silent 
chamber as it transcends a silence that can be positively indicated. More than 
anything it is a myth that enables us to accept the insufficiencies of language.  
 
Thus silence is also attractive because it provides an alternative to our current reality. It 
posits the existence of a “beyond” in which our experiences make sense and gain 
purpose.
20
 Any experience that challenges our linguistic ability to describe it—those 
                                                 
19
 Loevlie writes, “As the other of language, silence can represent all our dreams and yearnings for a 
beyond not ruled by language” (14). 
20
 Because of its ability to give meaning to reality, Loevlie draws attention to two sources of the “Dream of 
Silence” in the Western tradition which continue to augment its seductive appeal: Christianity and 
psychoanalysis. Regarding Christianity and its story of Creation and the Fall, Loevlie writes, “The Fall into 
sin was also the fall into language. In other words, man is forever doomed to speak in fallen language, a 
language that can never grasp God or the Absolute and that constantly distorts any immediate reality. This 
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moments that simply “can’t be put it into words”—are pushed into the beyond of 
language, into an almost mystical realm in which silence reigns. That would explain the 
fact that Guatemalans resorted to silence as a means of coping with the horrors of the 
war. As numerous firsthand accounts suggest, many Guatemalans found their experiences 
to be “unspeakable.” Victor Perera, in his study Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan 
Tragedy (1995), recalls hearing a woman named Marina speak of the violence. After her 
talk, Perera approached her and told her of his own experiences, to which she responded: 
As a Guatemalan, you know that I could not tell them the full truth of what is 
being done to our people, for fear no one would believe me. How could I tell them 
of watching a soldier bayonet my aunt in the stomach, rip out her four-month-old 
fetus, and smash it against the house post? How could I speak to them of our 
children waking up screaming in the middle of the night, beyond comforting, and 
of our nightly prayers to God for justice in our land?’” (qtd in Perera)  
 
Marina’s experience had been so horrific that she considered it “unspeakable.” And thus 
she altered her story to make it “sayable” and acceptable to international ears. Marina, of 
course, refused to remain silent. She spoke the violence, even though she felt the need to 
alter the “truth” of her account in order to do so. Others, however, refused to speak, 
lamenting the failure of language to communicate the “truth” of such inexhaustible 
horror.  
Yet there is a danger in rendering the violence of the war “unspeakable.” By 
pushing the non-symbolic into a realm that is beyond language, such notions of an 
                                                                                                                                                 
story consequently defines silence as congruent with the sense of plenitude, peace, and a continuous 
relationship with God that existed before the Fall” (13). The seductive appeal of silence in psychoanalysis’ 
emphasis on the pre-linguistic stage of the infant has a similar effect. Loevlie writes,  
In the Imaginary the infant experiences a continuous relationship with the surroundings. Its reality 
is immediate, not organized, fragmented, or separated by means of symbols. The entry into 
language is experienced as a major loss and rupture […] in that it fragments and discontinues the 
continuous sense of being. Silence is identified with the pleasure of immediacy, of wholeness that 
precedes reflexivity and language.  (14) 
Therefore, in addition to the continued disappointment with the proliferation of words and language, the 
association of silence with the pre-Fall or pre-Symbolic gives the Dream of Silence a powerful seductive 
appeal that is almost impossible to ignore. 
14 
 
unspeakable violence inevitably make all attempts to discuss the violence impossible. 
Though it is certainly true that silence provided citizens a sense of security and safety 
during the war, to suggest that violence was “unspeakable” had several major 
consequences. First, it granted violence a mythic quality that was beyond citizens’ 
capacities for comprehension. Violence as absolute other, incapable of being narrated, 
attained an almost sacred status. Idolizing the violence in such a way renders resistance 
ineffective and forecloses the possibility of seeking alternative forms of narration. 
Dualistic conceptions of silence and language are insufficient for many reasons, but 
primarily because they perpetuate the “Dream of Silence” and thus discount alternative 
forms of silence, namely “literary silence” (Loevlie 14). More specifically, Loevlie’s 
project—an attempt “to think an alternative silence that is not reducible to the other of 
discourse or text” (25)—has profound implications for how we conceive of the 
relationship between language and the non-symbolic. In my current project, of course, 
this opens up new ways of talking about the “non-symbolic” of torture and massacre in 
Guatemala. More broadly considered, however, Loevlie’s exploration of “literary 
silence” opens up countless possibilities for narrating those experience that initially 
appear to be “unspeakable,” whether they are religious, psychological, or otherwise.  
Though I will explore her concept of “literary silence” in greater detail throughout 
my analysis in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, we should note briefly for now the 
conceptual difficulties in approaching a paradoxical notion such as “literary silence.” 
Following Maurice Blanchot and his suggestion that a world without literature would be 
recognized “not by its silence, but by the absence of silence” (Loevlie 26), Loevlie 
questions precisely how it is that literature produces silence. As Loevlie writes, “literature 
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somehow maintains silence; it is the paradoxical dwelling place of silence, the producer 
of silence, or the guardian of silence” (26). The idea that literature creates silence is 
baffling, but at the same time it opens up the possibility for a non-dualistic conception of 
the relation between silence and language. As Loevlie writes, “Silence is not the other of 
language, not in the gaps, not at the end of the text; it is the result of the text itself” (28). 
This non-dualistic concept of silence and language also implies a new relationship 
between the text and the non-symbolic. If “literary silence” does indeed arise as a 
dynamic within the text and is thus conceived “as inside language, rather than outside it; 
as coming through literary language, rather than existing beside it” (Loevlie 25, italics in 
original), then the primary result, for my purposes here, is that it opens up the possibility 
to conceive of a language that can speak the unspeakable. According to Loevlie, “literary 
silence is a concept that explores the literary text’s paradoxical, almost uncanny, ability 
to give voices to silence, to say the unsayable” (30). This concern with “saying the 
unsayable” will occupy the remainder of my project.  
As I have already noted, the “Dream of Silence” was widely accepted during the 
Internal Armed Conflict. Nevertheless, though it was certainly true that many 
Guatemalans remained “united in silence,” others soon realized that not speaking about 
the violence was not an option. The horrors of torture and massacre had to be spoken, but 
as noted above, many continued to doubt their ability to narrate such atrocities. Thus 
within their narrations, the question of language and “unspeakability” took center stage. 
If torture was an “unsayable” or “unspeakable” horror, how should it be depicted in 
literature? How best to narrate the “silent non-symbolic” of torture?  
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The Silent Non-Symbolic of Torture: Plan and Chapter Distribution 
This project will examine three distinct literary modes employed by Guatemalan 
authors in order to narrate the atrocities of the war. I have selected texts published 
between 1975 and 1985—“the most violent years of the war” (Doyle 59).
21
 The authors 
whose works I intend to analyze include Rigoberta Menchú’s Me llamo Rigoberta 
Menchú, y así me nació la conciencia (1983), Marco Antonio Flores’ Los compañeros 
(1976), Arturo Arias’ Después de las bombas (1979), and Rodrigo Rey Rosa’s El 
cuchillo del mendigo (1985
22
). Each of the literary texts that I examine in this study 
includes scenes that either depict an act of torture or narrate a story or event from the 
perspective of someone who is confronting the legacy of torture. In addition to being four 
of the most celebrated and widely read authors since the beginning of the 36-year civil 
war, these writers also distinguish themselves by presenting three very distinct modes of 
narrating torture and the non-symbolic, which I will treat in Chapters Two through Four. 
I suggest that these authors all engage in projects that explore not only the rhetorical 
potential of torture, but also the importance of bearing witness to it. 
 Chapter One lays the foundational and historical framework for the dissertation. 
In that chapter, I examine how acts of violence, specifically torture and massacre, were 
employed by the state in order to create a society of fear. By manipulating the visibility 
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translation (by Paul Bowles) had already been published by City Lights Books in 1985.  
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and invisibility of violence, torture and disappearance, the regime sought to establish 
itself as a sovereign power and silence all those who opposed it. In order to contextualize 
the question of violence and the role of the military in the country, the chapter begins 
with an in-depth treatment of the violence itself, focusing on the years of La violencia, 
but also including a discussion of the historical events leading up to and including the 
Intervention of 1954. From there, I turn to a more theoretical examination of torture, 
drawing heavily on the work of Elaine Scarry, John T. Parry, Jennifer Ballengee, and 
Paul Kahn. In that section, I discuss the relationship between torture and “escalation,” 
focusing specifically on the ways in which the imagining of pain can be manipulated by 
the state as a strategy for the production of power. Regarding the connection between 
violence and state power, I will also—both in the Introduction and throughout the 
dissertation as a whole—draw on other theorists where useful. I engage closely with the 
theoretical work of Michel Foucault on power, particularly his conceptions of discipline 
(Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison) and governmentality (Security, 
Territory, Population). In addition, the writings of Giorgio Agamben (The Remnants of 
Auschwitz, Homo Sacer, and The State of Exception) have been helpful in framing 
questions of power and sovereignty, the relationship between the citizen and the state, 
and the role of shame in the formation of the subject. I also draw heavily on Judith 
Butler’s use of Foucault and psychoanalysis (The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in 
Subjection and Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence) to explore the 
question of subject formation. My use of these theorists focuses not on their work as a 
whole, but rather on the ways in which they help to think through the relationship 
18 
 
between violence and state power, particularly the notion of torture as public spectacle 
and its role in the contemporary nation-state. 
Though torture is typically conceived as a practice that occurs hidden from public 
view in the shadowy cells of detention centers, torture in Guatemala was often carried out 
in the town square. I denote the importance of these massacres in Guatemala, arguing that 
they constitute a form of public, collective torture designed to put the tortured body on 
display. As a result of these public massacres, the Guatemalan army’s use of torture in its 
counterinsurgency campaign became common knowledge. The proliferation of rumors, 
coupled with the absence of official knowledge from the state, actually produced more 
uncertainty than certainty regarding the nature of the violence, spreading fear more than 
anything else. As the fear spread, people lost the ability to discern the difference between 
fact and fiction. In such an environment, everything—no matter how unbelievable—
became a possibility. The boundaries between the real and the unreal faded and blurred. 
Torture—and the terror it produced—corrupted and infected society to such a degree that 
it became “normal,” penetrating the recesses of the Guatemalan psyche. Masked behind 
the normalcy of everyday life, torture crept below the surface, “just beyond view.” 
Torture’s shadowy presence haunted the very fabric of Guatemalan society and soon 
became an “unspeakable” aspect of society itself. Silence became one of the best 
defenses against the state’s strategies of social control. 
But not all chose the path of “silence.” Many people began to speak out against 
the atrocities of the state, attempting to counter the state’s rhetoric of torture by re-
narrating the acts of terror in literature. In doing so, however, the question of the 
“unspeakability” of the violence remained a continual theme in their narratives. The 
19 
 
critical question for these authors was often the same question posed by Mazariegos: how 
do we name the “unnameable”? How do we speak a violence that so often escapes 
representation in language? In answering these question and in speaking out against the 
violence, various authors sought to play with the relationship between visibility and 
invisibility, presence and absence, in order not only to re-present the violence, but also to 
explore the possibility of bearing witness to that violence.  
Chapters Two through Four represent the main content chapters of the 
dissertation. In each of these chapters I discuss a different literary mode with respect to 
narrating torture. In the selected texts, I attend to the narrations of torture by focusing 
specifically on the relationship between language and the non-symbolic. Following 
Loevlie’s understanding of the “silent non-symbolic,” I analyze the literary texts 
themselves and the various modes employed to narrate torture in literature. Two main 
forms of narrative developed in the 1970s and 1980s as a literary response to the violence 
in Guatemala: testimonio and the “new novel.” Chapter Two begins the exploration of 
these literary responses to the state’s rhetoric of fear by treating the narrations of torture 
in testimonio. In Novels of Testimony and Resistance from Central America (1997), Linda 
Craft notes that much of Guatemalan fiction during the war was quite expectedly 
characterized by testimonial techniques which sought to denounce the violence 
committed by the government. These testimonial techniques typically draw on very 
detailed representations and recollections of the atrocities committed, and their 
production increased dramatically during in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In this 
chapter, I will focus my analysis on one of the most celebrated and also most polemical 
texts published during the war: Rigoberta Menchú’s Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú, y así 
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me nació la conciencia (1983). My primary goal is to analyze the strategies employed by 
Menchú to narrate the torture and death of her family members, arguing that the primary 
motivation informing her narrative of torture is political responsibility. That is, in order to 
move readers to denounce the injustices of the war and rebuild society, Menchú’s 
narrative seeks above all else to make the violence perpetrated by the state visible to the 
world and thereby achieve a level of “denuncia política” (Lienhard 312). Instead of 
noting the difficulties and uncertainties of narrating torture in literature, Menchú assumes 
that language can narrate it. Her rhetoric of certainty, therefore, attempts to persuade 
international audiences of the state’s abuses by focusing on and emphasizing the fullness 
of torture’s meaning in the text.  
Chapter Three then turns to the “new novel,” specifically Marco Antonio Flores’ 
Los compañeros (1976) and Arturo Arias’ Después de las bombas (1979). Not only are 
these two works representative of larger trends in Guatemala, but also they are two of the 
most well known Guatemalan novelists, both nationally and internationally. According to 
Arturo Arias, the “new novel” rejects the collapsing of distance between signifier and 
signified, between text and historical reality, and instead takes language as its primary 
focus, questioning the extent to which language can describe reality and thus privileging 
signifiers that “float” relatively autonomously from historical reality (“Literary 
Production” 20). Employing diverse narrative techniques and incorporating the interplay 
of divergent narrative discourses, both Flores and Arias play with the relationship 
between language and referent so as to question our capacity for bearing witness to the 
horrors of the war. In the words of Arias, because language fails to communicate the 
“unspeakable” nature of the atrocities, “the novel’s real protagonist” is language itself 
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(“Literary Production” 25). Therefore, unlike Menchú who focused upon details and 
certainty in her narration, the new novelists elevated doubt and ambiguity. Through a 
rhetoric of uncertainty, these authors undermine historical representation. The goal, 
according to Arias, is to push readers to seek truth and certainty beyond the text. Arias 
asserts that not only should readers question the state’s narrative, but they should also 
question the literary text itself. The rupture between text and reality ultimately seeks to 
produce a desire for justice and political responsibility. That desire cannot be met in the 
literary text, and when the desire for justice proves impossible, the object of desire must 
be continually replaced. This is why its characters often end up disillusioned. They give 
up on political responsibility, replacing revolution and resistance with sex and drugs. The 
distance formed between the literary text and the historical “truth”—in this case, the acts 
of torture and violence committed during the armed conflict—is established precisely so 
that it can be overcome. The reader can thereby make the absent meaning present. The 
reader, therefore, takes a much more active role than in testimonio, for it is the reader—
and not the text—who must ultimately find the “meaning” of the war. In that sense, Arias 
claims that one of the primary goals of the Guatemalan new novel is to produce desire. 
Rather than producing a desire for justice or political responsibility, however, it produces 
endless desire: a desire for desire that culminates in ambivalence. As I will argue, this 
attempt to produce desire in the reader ends up eroticizing torture and violence.  
 Chapter Four then turns to Rodrigo Rey Rosa’s El cuchillo del mendigo (1985
23
). 
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Over and against testimonio and the new novel, Rey Rosa strives to hold on to both 
certainty and uncertainty in narrating torture. Whereas Menchú emphasized only those 
elements that were certain and verifiable, Rey Rosa draws on dreams and nightmares in 
order to challenge the readers’ conceptions of the real and the unreal. And unlike the new 
novelists who—despite their attempts to elevate uncertainty by ripping apart signifier and 
signified, thereby emphasizing language’s inability to narrate the truth of the war— end 
up celebrating ambivalence and thus creating the possibility for torture’s eroticization, 
Rey Rosa refuses to draw upon symbolic language or push the non-symbolic of torture 
beyond language. Rather, Rey Rosa preserves the uncertainty within the text. More 
specifically, I will argue that Rey Rosa, over and against previous attempts to narrate the 
violence of the war, seeks to mask the silent non-symbolic within language itself. In El 
cuchillo del mendigo, torture no longer has an immediate presence within the text as we 
saw with testimonio, where narrating torture became a means of presenting documented 
evidence for international audiences. Nor is torture a mediated absence, pushed beyond 
the text and language into a realm that cannot be reached by signifiers. Rather, Rey Rosa 
structures his descriptions of torture around a gap that cannot be named, but that 
nonetheless must be narrated. Rey Rosa does not seek to overwrite the uncertainty and 
irrationality of torture with documentary evidence; nor does he symbolize torture to the 
degree that we witnessed in the new novel. Rather, by destabilizing the boundaries 
between the real and the unreal, the certain and the uncertain, Rey Rosa is able to 
repeat—to recreate—the spectral fear of torture. Rey Rosa writes with a language that 
can speak the unspeakable, thereby proffering a new conception of the relationship 
between the text and the non-symbolic. As noted above, “Silence is not the other of 
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language, not in the gaps, not at the end of the text; it is the result of the text itself” 
(Loevlie 28). We see this non-dualistic concept of silence and language in Rey Rosa. 
Following Loevlie’s discussion of “literary silence” as a dynamic within the text—“as 
inside language, rather than outside it; as coming through literary language, rather than 
existing beside it” (Loevlie 25, italics in original)—I argue that Rey Rosa’s stories 
explore the ways in which a text might “give voices to silence, to say the unsayable” 
(Loevlie 30). 
Bearing witness to torture and the violence of the Internal Armed Conflict 
remains a central concern in contemporary Guatemala. Those attempting to work through 
the legacy of torture and massacre continue to struggle with naming a violence that often 
seems indecipherable or unnamable. As the authors analyzed in this project grope for an 
adequate means of narrating, and thus confronting, what happened, they provide valuable 
insight into the difficulties involved in facing the specters of the unspeakable.  
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Chapter Two: A Rhetoric of Fear: The Shadowy Nature of Torture as Spectacle 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us 
that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we 
live is not the exception but the rule.
24
  
 
And in the state of emergency which is not 
the exception but the rule, every possibility 
is a fact.
25
  
 
Over the course of Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, it is estimated that over 
100,000 people were abducted and tortured.
26
 In many instances, their bodies were 
marked and mutilated, presumably in order to extract information, but ultimately to serve 
as a reminder of what the government would do to those who opposed them. Often the 
victim’s body was later found by the side of the road, in a plaza or another public space—
displayed publicly as a warning sign to the general population. Eduardo Galeano refers to 
the years following the intervention in 1954 as an “orgy of violence” (Open Veins 114). 
Regarding the very public nature of the violence, Galeano writes in graphic language: 
All the men of the village of Cajón del Río were exterminated; those of Tituque 
had their intestines gouged out with knives; in Piedra Parada they were flayed 
alive; in Agua Blanca de Ipala they were burned alive after being shot in the legs. 
A rebellious peasant’s head was stuck on a pole in the center of San Jorge’s plaza. 
In Cerro Gordo the eyes of Jaime Velázquez were filled with pins. The body of 
Ricardo Miranda, thirty-eight holes in his head, and the head of Haroldo Silva 
were found beside the San Salvador highway. In Los Mixcos, Ernesto 
Chinchilla’s tongue was cut out. In Ojo de Agua, the Oliva Aldana brothers, 
blindfolded and with hands tied behind backs, were pumped full of bullets. The 
head of José Guzmán was chopped into a mass of tiny pieces and scattered along 
the road. In San Lucas Sacatepéquez, the wells yielded corpses instead of water. 
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On the Miraflores plantation, the men greeted the dawn without hands or feet. 
(Open Veins 114-15) 
 
The effects of torture on the victims’ bodies had numerous and varied consequences, but 
above all else torture functioned as a reminder and a witness to the regime’s power. The 
public nature of the violence indicates the state’s intention to create a spectacle that could 
be witnessed by large audiences. The bodies of citizens became a visible and public text 
upon which the state could inscribe its own message of fear. 
 In this chapter, I will explore the role that torture played during the Internal 
Armed Conflict in Guatemala. I will first outline the historical context, beginning with 
the events surrounding the Intervention in 1954 and then continuing with the period 
known simply as La Violencia. Crucial to this contextualization will be to show how 
pervasive the violence was in the country and the extent to which it was characterized by 
an ethos of terror. In the second section, I turn to a largely theoretical assessment of 
torture, drawing heavily from texts by John Parry, Jennifer Ballengee, Elaine Scarry, and 
Paul Kahn. In that section, I discuss the relationship between torture and “escalation,” 
focusing specifically on the ways in which this relationship and the imagining of pain can 
be manipulated by the state as a strategy for the production of power. Though torture is 
typically conceived as a practice that occurs hidden from public view in the shadowy 
cells of detention centers, in Guatemala, torture was often carried out in the town square. 
The state’s use of these public massacres distinguishes Guatemala from many other 
countries that suffered violent wars in the 1970s and 1980s. In the third section, I analyze 
the importance of these massacres in Guatemala, arguing that they constitute a form of 
public, collective torture that put the tortured body on display. As a result of these public 
massacres, the Guatemalan army’s use of torture in its counterinsurgency campaign 
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became common knowledge. Yet despite the seemingly public nature of the massacres, 
the state denied all knowledge of the events. Out of fear, it became increasingly unlikely 
that anyone—in person or through the media—would speak out publicly against the 
violence. And thus, knowledge about the massacres spread only by rumor. The 
proliferation of rumors, when coupled with the absence of official knowledge from the 
state, actually produced more uncertainty than certainty regarding the nature of the 
violence, spreading fear more than anything else. In the fourth section, I thus provide an 
in-depth analysis of the concept of rumor and its role in spreading the state’s message of 
fear. As the fear spread, people lost the ability to discern the difference between what was 
fact and what was fiction. In such an environment, everything—no matter how 
unbelievable—became a possibility. The boundaries between the real and the unreal 
faded and blurred. The effect of this blurring on the citizens’ ability to witness to torture 
and other atrocities of the war cannot be underestimated. Torture—and the terror it 
produced—corrupted and infected society to such a degree that it became “normal.” As 
torture became a normal, everyday occurrence, a practice that was “tolerated” and 
accepted by society, it penetrated the recesses of the Guatemalan psyche and fragmented 
it. Even those citizens who had not experienced torture directly felt its oblique presence. 
Masked behind the normalcy of everyday life, torture crept below the surface, just 
beyond view. Torture’s shadowy presence haunted the very fabric of Guatemalan society.  
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In the Land of ‘Even’  
In the murk, an eye watching, an eye 
knowing. Here you can’t trust anyone. 
(Taussig, Nervous System 21) 
 
The year 1954 proved to be one of the most decisive in the vast history of 
Guatemala.
27
 This year not only marked the beginning of a period of extreme repression 
and state violence that would continue to haunt the memories of its citizens more than 
five decades later, but it also came to symbolize the loss of hope. The October Revolution 
of 1944, which began with demonstrations by university students and culminated in 
country-wide revolt, forced the resignation of General Jorge Ubico (1931-1944) and 
ushered in an era of great optimism. Mythologized as the Ten Years of Spring, the period 
1944-1954 witnessed the democratic election of two presidents—Juan José Arévalo 
(1945-1951) and Col. Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954)—and sweeping economic and political 
reforms. A new constitution was drafted in 1945, establishing more open and democratic 
institutions and resulting in the legalization of unions, the implementation of a social 
security system, as well as decisive programs in education and literacy.
28
  
Arbenz, who often described himself as a “spiritual socialist,” was not a 
communist but was certainly sympathetic to the Communist party and its goals, 
particularly concerning agrarian reform. In 1952 Arbenz enacted Decree 900, “an 
agrarian reform law that expropriated all idle lands larger than 223 acres—reimbursing 
their owners with government bonds” (Volpendesta 19). This redistribution of unused 
lands to large numbers of indigenous families had an enormous impact on the United 
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Fruit Company (UFC), which at the time was Guatemala’s largest landowner. Though the 
UFC was paid for the appropriated lands, unfortunately for the UFC, the compensation 
was calculated at “the recorded assessed value” of the expropriated lands (Foster 211). 
This backfired on the UFC, because for years they had “undervalued their land in order to 
keep tax payments down” (Foster 212). When Decree 900 was announced, the UFC 
immediately responded, indicating that their lands were worth much more than tax 
records showed. The enactment of Decree 900 meant that “the Arbenz government 
offered to pay United Fruit less than $1 million for land they then claimed was worth 
almost $16 million” (Foster 212). Frequently referred to as “El Pulpo” [the Octopus], the 
UFC had friends in numerous U.S. offices (e.g., U.S. Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles) and requested that the U.S. State Department 
intervene, alleging the agrarian reform was unconstitutional.
29
 Cold War political 
pressures, coupled with numerous United States business interests, ultimately led to 
military action. In October 1953, the CIA launched Operation PBSUCCESS, a covert 
military operation with the express aim of overthrowing the Arbenz government. As 
REMHI notes, “In May 1954, with the conspiracy already in its advanced stages, the 
United States signed military aid pacts with Honduras and Nicaragua, whence it was 
already preparing to launch a military invasion of Guatemala” (Never Again 187). A 
CIA-backed invasion overthrew Arbenz in June 1954, triggering decades of repression 
and violence.  
For more than five decades now, Guatemala has been characterized by an ethos of 
violence. It is the land of “even”: “Chopping up a little girl is repugnant behavior even in 
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Guatemala. … It was a fraudulent election even for Guatemala. Basest corruption even 
for Guatemala” (Goldman 165). Such an ethos has left a seemingly indelible mark on 
society, uniting its citizens not in resistance, but in an apparent silent complicity. In a 
country where the targets of state violence were often random, where citizens were 
abducted and disappeared apparently without cause, to speak out against the government 
would have been certain death. Not speaking out became one of the best defenses against 
future violence. People spoke of the violence only in hushed whispers, not knowing 
whom to trust and fearing that everyone was una oreja [an informant] working with the 
state.   
 Following the “definitive end of hostilities” (REMHI xvi) in 1994, the Comisión 
para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) was created under UN sponsorship to 
investigate what had “really” occurred during the war.
30
 The CEH report found that the 
vast majority of the violence was perpetrated by the Guatemalan army; it “assigns blame 
for fully 93 percent of the atrocities to the government forces and their allied paramilitary 
bands” (Never Again xvi). The army was an instrument whose “spectacles of terror” had 
one ultimate goal: social control. The Recovery of Historical Memory project
31
 notes that 
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 Of course, to suggest that 1994 marked the end of the violence is decidedly shortsighted and ignores the 
continuing violence in the country. In fact, after the signing of the peace accords, there arose a “parallel 
state” in Guatemala to continue the violence:  
After the peace accord, the state’s security apparatus—death squads, intelligence units, police 
officers, military counter-insurgency forces—did not disappear but, rather, mutated into criminal 
organizations. Amounting to a parallel state, these illicit networks engage in arms trafficking, 
money laundering, extortion, human smuggling, black-market adoptions, and kidnapping for 
ransom. The networks also control an exploding drug trade. (Grann, “A Murder Foretold” 44) 
The violence became so pervasive, in fact, that in 2012, the newly elected president of Guatemala proposed 
to legalize the drug trade with the hope of stemming the violence. Of course, to suggest that 1994 marked 
the “definitive end of the hostilities” also ignores the deep-felt psychological violence that continued long 
after the act itself. These psychological effects will be explored at length in the present chapter.  
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of Historical Memory], or REMHI for short. The four-volume publication was later translated into English 
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the methods employed by the military in order to establish control actually underwent a 
series of strategic stages:  
During the sixties, in addition to combat between the guerrillas and the army, 
government violence targeted peasants in the eastern part of the country. In the 
seventies, state violence was particularly virulent in the cities. It was trained on 
leaders of social movements and sectors opposing the successive military 
regimes, in addition to the guerrilla infrastructure. In the early eighties, 
counterinsurgency polity took the form of state-sponsored terrorism featuring 
systematic, mass destruction, particularly of indigenous communities and 
organized peasant groups. (Never Again xxxii)  
 
Violence as “selective repression” was systematically performed against very specific 
sectors of the population (Never Again xxxii). In this way, the regime sought to 
intimidate and silence those members of society who represented a threat to its 
sovereignty.   
In Guatemala, this visible terror was typically paired with a type of violence 
considered by many to be much more devastating and insidious: disappearance.
32
 
Alongside torture’s marking of individual bodies, disappearance offered a more 
“invisible” threat by which the regime could hide its role in the violence. The apex of 
power, as Michel Foucault suggests, is its invisibility. Foucault writes, “the external 
power may throw off its physical weight; it tends to the non-corporal; and, the more it 
approaches this limit, the more constant, profound and permanent are its effects” 
(Discipline and Punish 203). It is estimated that over 40,000 people were disappeared 
                                                                                                                                                 
and published as an annotated, one-volume report. Throughout most of the current project, I will draw from 
the Spanish version, in which case I will refer to it in the citation as “REMHI.” In a few instances, 
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during the 36-year civil conflict.
33
 Victor Perera, a Guatemalan journalist and novelist 
who has written extensively about the war in Guatemala, pointedly remarks on the 
impossibility of comparing the number of disappeared in Guatemala to that of any other 
dictatorial regime:  
In trying to gain perspective on Guatemala’s violencia, I groped for historical 
parallels: Mexico in the twenties, Algeria prior to independence, Peru and its 
Maoist Shining Path guerrillas. None of them measure up. Even the 15,000 who 
disappeared during Argentina’s seven-year “dirty war” are only a fraction of 
Guatemala’s 40,000, which in 1989 made up—according to Americas Watch—45 
percent of Latin America’s total of disappeared and unaccounted for. (48-49)  
 
In fact, the use of “desaparecer” as a transitive verb—to disappear someone—originated 
in Guatemala (Perera 9). Fear of being abducted and disappeared was omnipresent 
throughout the civil conflict. Yet it was not the disappearing that frightened so many; it 
was knowing what would happen once they had been disappeared. Disappearance and 
torture went hand in hand. The fear of being tortured pervaded Guatemalan society 
during the war.   
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The Rhetoric of Torture: Pain, Escalation, and the “Logic of Choice” 
Whether in the form of mass killings or the 
appearance of corpses bearings signs of 
torture, the horror was so massive and so 
flagrant that it defied the imagination. 
(Never Again 9) 
 
In most cases, the fear of torture was a fear of pain. Indeed, according to the 
Convention against Torture, torture is defined primarily as the application of “severe pain 
or suffering” (Article 1).
34
 The relation between torture and pain is explored by many 
critics, but the most-cited study continues to be Elain Scarry’s The Body in Pain (1985). 
In this now classic text, Scarry examines in great detail the relationship between pain and 
torture, noting specifically the ways in which torture allows pain to be converted into 
power. Torture is a production, she argues, an imaginative process carried out for the 
unique purpose of creating “a fantastic illusion of power” (28). According to Scarry, the 
general structure of this creative process is threefold:  
First, pain is inflicted on a person in ever-intensifying ways. Second, the pain, 
continually amplified within the person’s body, is also amplified in the sense that 
it is objectified, made visible to those outside the person’s body. Third, the 
objectified pain is denied as pain and read as power, a translation made possible 
by the obsessive mediation of agency. (27) 
 
These three steps are not always sequential, of course, and to understand how they create 
“a fantastic illusion of power” (28), we must explore Scarry’s argument in greater depth.  
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 According to the Convention Against Torture, the complete definition of torture is as follows: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
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In torture, Scarry argues, intense pain is always accompanied by interrogation in 
the form of the “question.” Torture therefore consists of the simultaneous pairing of 
physical and verbal acts, and the questions themselves are framed and presented as 
though they are the reason for the pain. There is a deep sense of urgency with which this 
drama unfolds, and thus it is often assumed that the purpose of torture is to extract 
information from the victim. Indeed, many films and novels present torture as if it were 
just that: a method for obtaining information. Yet such representations of torture are 
misleading, a point that Aristotle recognized more than 2000 years ago. He writes that 
torture as a means for obtaining information is profoundly unreliable, observing that 
“those under compulsion [of  torture] are as likely to give false evidence as true, some 
being ready to endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready 
to make false charges against the others” (Art of Rhetoric Lxv. 26, qtd in Ballengee 8). 
Indeed, numerous writers today bemoan the oft-repeated claim that torture remains a 
reliable method for extracting information from a prisoner. In his study of the relationship 
between torture and terror, for example, Paul Kahn, Professor of Law and the Humanities 
at Yale Law School, refuses to accept the notion that torture can be employed as a 
reliable means for finding the truth, instead expressing skepticism regarding what he calls 
“the epistemic value of torture” (Kahn 2).
35
 In fact, according to Kahn, torture continues 
to be practiced not because of any trust in its ability to discover the truth, but rather 
because of the ways in which the state could continue to employ it in order to create truth 
(Kahn 26). Its fundamental purpose in contemporary use remains largely the same: 
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Torture was used as a test of faith. Its product was understanding for both the 
victim and the torturer. The outcome of this performance was a truth established 
in the act itself. The victim would know whether for the sake of his beliefs he 
would suffer self-sacrifice, that is, martyrdom. The torturer, as well as the 
audience, would know whether sovereign power was real. In a world in which life 
offers a continual test of faith, torture is a form of inquiry designed to reach truth. 
(Kahn 26)  
 
This ability to create truth signals a vital connection between torture and the imagining of 
political power. For that reason, we must approach torture not merely as a violation of the 
law, but rather as a practice that demonstrates a more profound political phenomenon, in 
which the relationship between individual citizens and sovereign power is imagined and 
revealed (Kahn 4). Though many recent publications on torture continue to employ the 
“ticking bomb” hypothesis, assuming that coercive measures will force the victim to 
reveal tactical information, such arguments fail to address the basic relationship between 
terror and torture.
36
 In many cases torture continues to be practiced not for the purposes 
of interrogation, even though the “question” remains a central component of the act, but 
rather as a contest between the state and the victim:  
Torture was deployed in a contest over the character of the sacred. That contest 
leads to the confession because we cannot know the meaning of the body as 
signifier until that final act of speech in which the victim names his god. Every act 
of torture is a competition between the power of the torturer to demand confession 
and the power of the victim to refuse and die as a martyr to his own sovereign. 
(Kahn 30)  
 
This “confession” no longer serves to establish guilt, but it does continue to elicit the 
fundamental connection between torture, terror and sovereignty. Scarry concurs, 
suggesting that the pain of torture is so intense that the victim will say anything to make 
it stop. Because the specific information provided by the victim when put to “the 
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question” remains unreliable, it would be a mistake to assume that the only purpose of the 
interrogation is to discover the truth or extract information.  
According to Scarry, however, what is important is the fact that the victim 
answers. Any confession the prisoners make has little reference to the “real world” 
outside the pain.
37
 The content of the answer is in most cases irrelevant. That they 
answer, however, shows the extent to which their reality has been reduced to the 
immediate now: pain. Everything beyond the pain of the body loses meaning, and the 
“disintegrating perception” of the prisoner causes the rest of the world to fade away 
(Scarry 30).
 
The restriction and enclosure of the victim’s world thus creates an “invisible 
distance” between the torturer and the prisoner whereby each is placed at oppositional 
extremes of the pain/interrogation binary (Scarry 36). Whereas the prisoner experiences 
an “annihilating negation” in which his or her connections to the world are destroyed, the 
torturer and any other who witnesses the act experience “the absence of this annihilating 
negation” (Scarry 36).  
Here we begin to see how pain becomes power. In the pairing of physical and 
linguistic acts, the centrality of the “question” allows the spatial play of negation and 
absence of negation to transform itself linguistically into a play between absence and 
presence of power: 
These physical realities, an annihilating negation and an absence of negation, are 
therefore translated into verbal realities in order to make the invisible distance 
visible, in order to make what is taking place in terms of pain take place in terms 
of power, in order to shift what is occurring exclusively in the mode of sentience 
into the mode of self-extension and world. (36)  
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One of the effects of torture is the imagining of a space in which the prisoner ceases to 
exist relationally.
38
 Or rather, there is an attempt to re-school the prisoner by rendering all 
relationality unthinkable. As Scarry suggests, “Even the physical objects in his prison 
cell, the most immediate and concrete objects of consciousness, have been emptied of 
their content, have each become a mere sketch” (32). This occurs through a process that 
Scarry calls the “objectification of the prisoner’s world dissolution” (38). In this process, 
both the objects in the room—bathtubs, refrigerators, tables, etc.—and the room itself are 
converted into objects of pain.
39
 According to Scarry, however, the crucial step in this 
process is not the conversion of these objects into weapons, but rather the moment in 
which the room and objects are then de-objectified through a process of unmaking. In 
other words, in becoming what they are not, i.e. weapons, these objects are unmade and 
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Scarry’s tripartite treatment of torture and Henri Lefebvre’s theory of space. In his seminal The Production 
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makes Lefebvre’s treatment so valuable in analyzing the purposes of torture. If torture seeks as its goal the 
transformation of pain into power, as Scarry claims, then that transformation must continue to be produced 
and reproduced long after the prisoner leaves the cell. That is, the space of torture must be maintained after 
the pain of the event has ceased. This process, I would suggest, is carried out by the witnessing audience. 
As the Guatemalan people witness the display of bodies in public, the occasions for further transformations 
of pain into power multiply exponentially. Torture then becomes a rhetorical practice whose effects extend 
well beyond the confines of the detention center. 
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thus cease to exist as objects of everyday relationality for the victim. Scarry writes, 
“Made to participate in the annihilation of the prisoners, made to demonstrate that 
everything is a weapon, the objects themselves [as non-weapons], and with them the fact 
of civilization, are annihilated: there is no wall, no window, no door, no bathtub, no 
refrigerator, no chair, no bed” (41). As the object is converted into what it is not, the 
object itself ceases to exist; it is “unmade.” The continued unmaking results in the 
shrinking of the prisoner’s world. Her world becomes “a mere sketch” (Scarry 38), and 
she loses the imaginative capacity to form a positive, constructive relationship with her 
surroundings. For this reason, Ariel Dorfman suggests that torture is most fundamentally 
“a crime committed against the imagination” (8). Torture not only deprives the victim of 
her imaginative vision and thus her ability to interact with her surroundings, but it also 
deprives her of her ability to distinguish between what is real and what is not. Therefore, 
the unmaking of her world and her language has a drastic impact on her ability to 
comprehend what has happened, and thus robs her of her ability to give meaning to the 
event. No longer able to give meaning to her own torture, the victim becomes a body 
upon which the state can then write its own message.  
The capacity of vision lost by the victim is thereby transferred to the torturer. 
Michel de Certeau confirms the epistemological and imaginative effects of the 
transformation of pain into power. He writes, “Torture is the technical procedure by 
which the tyrannical power acquires for itself this impalpable primary matter which it 
itself destroyed and which it lacks: authority, or, if one prefers, a capacity to make 
believe” (de Certeau, “Corps tortures, paroles capturées,” qtd in Cavanaugh 56). This 
capacity to “make believe” is one of the most lasting and insidious effects of torture. Pain 
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acquires not only spatial, but also epistemological significance. Thus the final step of the 
transformation has been achieved. Once the prisoner’s immediate physical setting has 
been destroyed and ceases to exist as a possibility for social relationships, the torturer is 
able to “reach out, body forth, and destroy more distant and more numerous 
manifestations of civilization” (42). The loss of imaginative vision accompanies the 
victim even after he or she leaves the detention center, thereby infecting other members 
of society.  
John Parry, in his study Understanding Torture: Law, Violence, and Political 
Identity (2010) describes the ways in which torture infects society itself. Torture, he 
suggests, exists on an ever-escalating continuum of pain. Even those who have not been 
tortured understand this continuum, and thus he notes the ways in which torture comes to 
incorporate a “logic of choice”:  
Once torture begins, the result is always the product of the victim’s ‘choice.’ 
Victims who provide information have ‘chosen’ to talk. Yet these words ascribe 
agency and responsibility to a victim whose ordinary subjectivity is compromised 
or broken. If a victim resists, he or she will be tortured again—but again, the 
victim is responsible. According to the logic of torture, if the victim would only 
surrender to the torturer’s domination, the pain would be over. By refusing to talk, 
the victim ‘consents’ to more torture. (205) 
 
The most obvious conclusion regarding such a conception of torture concerns the ways in 
which intense pain can shape the victim’s perception of responsibility and choice. Indeed, 
this is the focus of Scarry’s study. The victim’s refusal to cooperate can lead to greater 
pain, and thus many studies emphasize the relationship between pain and torture. Yet 
such a conception of the relationship between choice, consent, and responsibility in 
torture also reveals the ways in which pain itself might come to be irrelevant. Clearly, the 
victim’s resistance can lead to greater pain. But this “escalation” is not only about 
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inflicting greater pain, but also “about beginning with a relatively milder amount of pain 
or coercion and with the possibility, even the expectation, of more” (Parry 205). Thus 
torture must be considered not only the application of “severe pain” but also as a practice 
that exists upon a continuum of pain: “it can include not just the most intensely painful 
practices but also all the practices that use pain to punish or gather information, damage 
the victim’s identity or worldview, or express the domination of the state and the 
torturer” (Parry 205). In other words, it is not only the pain itself that must be considered 
when discussing torture, but also the knowledge that the state is capable of inflicting that 
pain. Therefore, victims who “break” or confess at the beginning of inhumane treatment 
have been tortured “if they reasonably believe that progressively more painful treatment 
will follow” (Parry 205). It does not matter whether that treatment is only mildly coercive 
and does not involve the application of “severe pain.” Here we see one of the problems 
involved when torture is defined by international law as the implementation of “severe 
pain.” As Parry writes, 
International law tries to establish that the purposeful infliction of severe pain, 
whether or not accompanied by the threat of escalation, is torture. But a practice 
that lasts only briefly and causes less than severe pain is also torture if it operates 
against a background (or threatened background) of total control and potential 
escalation, which, in turn, asserts the torturer’s (and state’s) dominance and 
unsettles or destroys the victim’s normative world. (Parry 205) 
 
Following this conception of escalation, therefore, even the explanation of torture can be 
considered as torture if the person has reason to believe that such an explanation might 
become reality (Parry). Here we see the difficulties involved in “defining” torture 
according to international law. If “threats of coercion can be as effective as the real thing” 
(Parry 206), then attempts to categorize torture according to the degree of pain involved 
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become nonsensical, as do attempts to distinguish between pervasive and aberrational 
practices.  
 Because of its possibility of escalation, torture and its effects extend well beyond 
the tortured and the torturer. In situations of extreme crisis, when the state resorts to 
violence in order to enact social control, the act of policing pervades the fabric of society. 
As Parry writes, “The emergency means that anyone, whether or not defined in advance 
as an enemy or a friend, is always at risk, always subject, among other things, to being 
tortured or to being forced to torture. This ongoing political trauma forces new 
identities—or perhaps reinforces existing identities—on a much broader group than those 
already involved in torture” (215). Anyone can be abducted and questioned at any time. 
This means that in states of emergency, every citizen “is simultaneously defined as 
capable of torturing or being tortured” (212). Standard patterns of identity become so 
disrupted that political subjectivity is defined in a constant relationship to violence and 
torture. His treatment merits an extended quote:  
If the state is always engaged in the process of shaping political identity and does 
so more violently in times of emergency—including by making its population 
potentially subject to being tortured or being forced to torture—then to the extent 
that the emergency becomes the norm, the use of violence (including torture) to 
shape identity will also become the norm or, at least, will emerge as a perpetual 
potential. This logic also means that when torture takes place, the new identities 
must include not just the fact of membership in a community that tortures but also 
recognition that one’s rights, freedoms, or material well-being rest partly on those 
acts of torture. (213) 
 
In other words, in situations of extreme emergency, when the state employs violence and 
torture as a means of insuring order, the political identity of all citizens is constituted in a 
constant relationship with the escalating continuum of torture. Policing is inescapable, 
and thus everyday spaces—restaurants, public squares, and even people’s homes—
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become potential sites of violence and abduction. As Anna Secor writes concerning 
policing and violence in Turkey, “the very ordinariness of these spaces is shot through 
with the possibility of a ‘check point,’ which may take the form of a request for papers, 
an interrogation, perhaps detention, maybe worse” (47). As society becomes saturated 
with the normality of torture—as the exception becomes the norm—all citizens become 
witnesses to the state’s use of torture and violence.
40
  
 Parry’s treatment of the population as potential victim bears a striking relationship 
with Jennifer Ballengee’s conception of the “rhetoric of torture.” In her book The Wound 
and the Witness (2009), Ballengee examines literary depictions of torture in ancient 
Greek texts in order to understand the “persuasive potential” of torture and its continued 
use today, especially given the role the media plays in swaying public opinion (Ballengee 
129).
41
 By focusing on torture’s representations in literature, she seeks to demonstrate 
that “the representation of torture functions as a rhetorical tool by combining bodily 
empathy with ethical and aesthetic judgment in order to persuade its audience” (1). As 
she argues, torture—including its representations in the media and in literature—not only 
has a profound and traumatic impact on the witness, but perhaps more importantly, 
torture only gains meaning in being witnessed. Torture, according to Ballengee, is 
polysemic. Torture has no definable or determinate meaning in itself and thus will always 
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fail to send a particular or defined message.
42
 Ballengee’s discussion of this point 
warrants an extended quote:  
In sum, the sense of certainty conveyed by torture and its representation covers 
over the slipperiness of its message—the fact that it communicates either too little 
(since communication breaks down at the level of the materiality of the body) or 
too much (since the destructive quality of pain and the polysemy of the image 
may produce a range of possible meanings). This polysemy gives torture its 
unique rhetorical potential: the audience’s response—illogical, empathetic, 
immediate—feels certain, yet that certainty or authority can be guided in a 
number of directions by the rhetorician, since the various elements involved in the 
representation of torture actually resist determinable meaning. (9) 
 
The polysemy of torture reveals the importance of the witnessing audience since it is the 
witness herself, not the victim, who plays the final role in giving meaning to torture. In 
order to produce a determinate meaning, torture, and the scars it leaves, must become a 
public spectacle performed before a witnessing audience. To create the desired effect, 
“the mutilated body must be presented before an other or others; the ‘effectiveness’ of the 
torture depends, in part, upon the one who sees the inscription of pain upon the body and 
responds to it” (Ballengee 6-7). The witness then becomes “the key element in the 
‘successful’ practice of torture in its political province” and remains fundamentally 
“complicit in the production of meaning that torture communicates” (Ballengee 1). Her 
conclusion bears remarkable similarity to Parry’s suggestion that torture extends beyond 
the tortured/torturer binary to include the entire country. If it is true that torture relies 
more on “escalation” and the threat of pain than on pain itself—especially when “it 
operates against a background (or threatened background) of total control and potential 
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 Regarding the polysemy of torture, Ballengee argues that torture and its representations “create uniquely 
fertile rhetorical situations because they combine three factors—the body, pain, and the image—that all 
resist linguistic signification” (7). We should note, however, that such a way of describing this difficulty, 
however, falls prey to the same dualistic conceptions of language which I presented in the Introduction. In 
other words, to suggest that these experiences “resist linguistic signification” forces them into a realm 
outside of language and renders them “unspeakable.” For an in-depth analysis of precisely how Ballengee 
understands their resistance to linguistic representation, see Ballengee 7-9.  
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escalation” (Parry 205)—then it is possible to see how the witnessing audience becomes 
the ultimate target of torture. As witnesses to torture, citizens learn “that progressively 
more painful treatment” is indeed possible (Parry 205), they become aware of the state’s 
ability to implement pain, and thus the state can insure the continued functioning of 
escalation and the “logic of consent” (Parry 205). The witnessing audience becomes 
complicit in torture precisely to the extent that they learn what will happen if they 
“choose” not to confess.
43
 This was certainly the case in Guatemala, where torture and 
violence had become so commonplace that any violence on the part of the state seemed 
possible. 
But who are the witnesses to torture? How does the perceived possibility of 
torture reach public, everyday spaces? After all, contemporary practices of torture are 
usually performed in secret, away from the prying eyes of citizens and the media. Kahn 
addresses the presumed “secrecy” of torture in his study on torture and terror.  He agrees 
that several aspects of torture—including its visibility—have shifted over the past few 
centuries, and he outlines these changes in his study. Several centuries ago, he argues, 
torture was a public spectacle carried out for the goals of not only religious and political 
confession, but also terror.
44
 As Kahn writes, “the sovereign deployed torture to instill a 
kind of terror. Statecraft rested on the production of terror, not consent. This was the age 
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 Because of the role of the witness in the production of meaning, torture and its representations offer 
insights into the workings of state power. Drawing on Foucault, Ballengee argues:  
[T]he power of the state may be ‘written’ without words on the bodies of soldiers, prisoners, or 
civilians in the display of strategically placed bruises, wounds, and mutilations. In a manner 
similar to the public execution, torture—or the results of torture—presented to the public can 
convey an unspoken message for the regime that inflicts it. (Ballengee 5-6)  
Later in this chapter, I will explore the particular nature of this “unspoken message” in Guatemala and the 
strategies employed by the Guatemalan state for spreading its message throughout society 
44
 According to Kahn, it undoubtedly true that “the scaffold was the site of a kind of passion play whose 
end was the confession of faith” (25). But the prisoner’s confession, he suggests, not only established guilt, 
but also recognized and reinforced the power of the sovereign (23). 
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of the spectacle of the scaffold” (23). Eventually, as argued most famously by Michel 
Foucault, the scaffold was replaced with the modern penitentiary, with a corresponding 
substitution of pain with reform.
45
  
Since contemporary criminal justice systems no longer relied on the need for 
confession or the legitimation of violence as power, one might assume that there was no 
longer a need for torture. On the contrary, as Kahn asserts, the place of torture shifted. 
Even though criminal procedure had begun to doubt “the epistemic value of torture” 
(Kahn 2) and its relationship to public admissions of guilt, torture did not disappear 
entirely. Rather, contemporary practices of torture became more secretive. Kahn 
acknowledges this, noting that contemporary practices of torture occur “in places closed 
to public regard, under conditions of deniability, and by agents whose relationship to the 
state is likely to be ‘shadowy.’ The modern phenomenon of torture has the opaque 
presence of the ‘deniable’” (3). According to Kahn, however, though it is true that torture 
became “more secretive and hidden” (3), its use still had to become “known” in public. 
Narratives of torture must eventually reach the public in order to produce the terror 
necessary to strengthen the state’s hold on the population. Witnesses are fundamentally 
necessary to the workings of escalation and consent (Parry). And thus according to Kahn, 
there will always be some method by which the public can gain knowledge of the 
“deniable” acts of torture. As Kahn writes, torture “must be known but not seen; it must 
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 Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish remains one of the most cited books in discussing the 
relationship between power and the public display of torture. He writes, “The scaffold where the body of 
the tortured criminal had been exposed to the ritually manifested force of the sovereign, the punitive theatre 
in which the representation of punishment was permanently available to the social body, was replaced by a 
great enclosed, complex and hierarchized structure that was integrated into the very body of the state 
apparatus” (116-17). Foucault asserts that the spectacle of torture soon disappeared from public space. 
Power instead began to be concentrated in the hands of an administrative apparatus whose principles—the 
distribution of individuals in space and the absolute control of their activities—literally produced “docile 
bodies” that could be reintroduced into society (Discipline and Punish 130-131). 
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be spoken of but never speak itself. It is a political practice that cannot exist in public 
space. Nevertheless, to be effective the threat of torture must taint the public space. It is 
always just beyond view” (Kahn 3). In other words, there will always be a means of 
determining the extent to which countries still employ torture, even if those countries 
later deny those practices as aberrations.  
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Massacres: The Public Spectacle of Torture in Guatemala 
The enemy is not destroyed in battle. You win over 
him by destroying his mind, his intelligence, and his 
will. (Military poster, Petén
46
) 
 
In a reality that has turned threatening, the 
boundaries between the real and the imagined are 
grossly distorted. (Never Again 11) 
 
In Guatemala, this “tainting” of public space occurred in many different forms. It 
is certainly true, as noted above, that contemporary practices of torture have become 
more secretive and hidden, occurring “in places closed to public regard, under conditions 
of deniability, and by agents whose relationship to the state is likely to be ‘shadowy’” 
(Kahn 3). And though in other countries it might be difficult to analyze the precise means 
by which these “deniable” acts became public knowledge, this is not the case in 
Guatemala. Indeed, there is one key factor that comes to bear on our discussion of torture 
and that distinguishes the Guatemalan situation from what occurred in many other 
countries: the massacres.
47
 An analysis of the numerous massacres in Guatemala will 
reveal not only that they served as a form of public, collective torture, but also how this 
public spectacle succeeded in disseminating the state’s message of fear. 
The Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) indicates that 
there is evidence of 626 massacres in Guatemala that can be attributed to the Guatemalan 
military and security forces (CEH 3064).
48
 The CEH defines a massacre as follows: “la 
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 Qtd. in Perera 52. Perera does not provide a date for the poster.  
47
 I do not mean to suggest that state use of massacres was limited to Guatemala. The history of Latin 
America is replete with examples of violence on a massive scale. Consider, for example, the massacres in 
Tlatelolco (Mexico) and El Mozote (El Salvador). However, during the 1970s and 1980s – the period in 
which many other countries (such as Argentina and Chile) suffered similar wars – no other country 
experienced massacres on comparable scale.   
48
 REMHI describes the general characteristics of the massacres as follows:  
Las características generales de esas masacres fueron: 1) se desarrollaron en las zonas ‘rojas’ en 
las que el Ejército consideraba que la población estaba con la guerrilla; 2) en lugares donde no 
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ejecución arbitraria de más de cinco personas, realizada en un mismo lugar y como parte 
de un mismo operativo, cuando las víctimas se encontraban en un estado de indefensión 
absoluta o relativa” (“the arbitrary execution of more than five people, carried out in a 
single place and as part of a single operation, when the victims found themselves in a 
state of absolute or relative defenselessness” [CEH 3058]).
49
 Though more than more 
than 95% of those 626 massacres occurred between 1978 and 1984 (CEH 3080), they 
occurred throughout the entire armed conflict and represented “la expresión más 
concentrada de la fuerza represiva del Estado” (“the most concentrated expression of the 
repressive force of the State” [CEH 3077]).  
For our purposes here, we must note that these massacres, in addition to mass 
destruction and the elimination of witnesses, also represent 45% of the cases of torture 
during the war (CEH 3077). REMHI, noting the frequency and cruelty of the massacres, 
also refers to them as “collective torture”; the massacres served as “un mecanismo de 
tortura colectiva para buscar delaciones e información sobre los movimientos de la 
guerrilla y destruir la integridad de las comunidades” (“a mechanism of collective torture 
for seeking denunciations and information about guerrilla movements and for destroying 
                                                                                                                                                 
había infraestructuras importantes o intereses económicos de los grupos dominantes que pudieran 
ser dañadas por acciones de destrucción masiva; 3) después de sucesivos intentos de controlar 
luchas campesinas o cambiar la actitud de la población; 4) conllevaban la decisión de destruir 
hasta las últimas posibilidades de rearticulación comunitaria para evitar el ‘rebrote’; 5) producían 
una enorme cantidad de muertos de todos los grupos de población, destrucción de aldeas enteras y 
desplazamientos masivos; 6) no siguieron un modelo fijo en las estrategias de destrucción masiva, 
sino que fueron cambiando en función de los objetivos prioritarios de control del territorio y de la 
población. (REMHI II 2)  
In addition to these general characteristics, REMHI denotes a typology of massacres, dividing them into 4 
categories: “Ataque masivo indiscriminado” (50.5%), “Castigo y terror” (23%), “Planificación de las 
atrocidades” (6%), and “Terror selectivo” (20%). For a more detailed description of these types, see 
REMHI II 23-26. 
49
 For a treatment of REMHI’s definition of massacre and the criteria used in its analysis of the massacres, 
see REMHI II 3. 
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the integrity of the communities” [REMHI II 16]).
50
 Thus here we see the immense 
importance of the massacres for understanding the rhetoric of torture in Guatemala. Not 
simply limited to the detention centers and other “places closed to public regard” (Kahn 
3), torture in Guatemala also occurred in the plaza and in places open to public view 
where it could be performed before a witnessing audience.  
In the majority of the cases, according to REMHI, the public acts of torture were 
brutal. They were mass killings “sin ninguna relación con obtención de información” 
(“without any relation to obtaining information” [REMHI II 56]). As already noted, 
torture is not a reliable form of obtaining information, and following the manuals 
distributed by the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, the State clearly used torture for 
purposes other than interrogation. As public spectacles, the massacres and acts of torture 
served the primary goal of being a “terror ejemplificante” (REMHI II 9). This terror 
“tuvo un efecto paralizante en los sobrevivientes” (“had a paralyzing effect on the 
survivors” [REMHI 56]). By paralyzing them—both the tortured and the witnesses to 
torture—these acts served to “violentar la conciencia de sus familias y comunidades” 
(“violentar the conscience of their families and communities” [REMHI II 57]).
51
 This 
notion of “violentar” can have numerous meanings, including “to embarrass,” “to 
distort,” and “to rape.” Thus we should draw attention to the fact that torture is not simply 
a physical violence, but that it leaves a lasting impact on the individual and collective 
psyche by distorting the consciences of citizens. Described by REMHI as “asesinatos 
colectivos asociados a destruccción comunitaria” (“collective murders associated with 
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 “Junto con la quema y destrucción de las casas, las torturas y atrocidades masivas cometidas (56%) y las 
capturas de la población (52%) fueron los elementos más frecuentes que aparecieron en más de la mitad de 
las masacres analizadas” (REMHI II 15). 
51
 For more details on the relation between torture and “terror ejemplificante,” see REMHI II 49-64. 
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communal destruction” [II 3]), the massacres served as psychic distortion for the purpose 
of breaking down the consciences of survivors. As noted above, understanding torture on 
the continuum of state violence means we must consider not only the implementation of 
severe pain, but also the means by which the state made its ability to inflict such pain 
known to the public (Parry). Hence Parry’s suggestion that torture extends beyond the 
tortured/torturer binary to include the entire country. If it is true that torture relies more 
on “escalation” and the threat of pain than on pain itself—especially when “it operates 
against a background (or threatened background) of total control and potential escalation” 
(Parry 205)—then it is possible to see how the massacres targeted not only the victims 
themselves, but also the wider public. As witnesses to torture, citizens learn “that 
progressively more painful treatment” is indeed possible (Parry 205). Massacre as 
collective torture thus serves as a visible spectacle for fracturing society and spreading 
terror throughout the country.  
Moreover, these were not random killings, but rather a systematic attempt to 
“terminar totalmente con determinadas comunidades” (“completely eliminate specific 
communities” [REMHI II 6]). According to REMHI, they obeyed a logic developed by 
the state to target certain sectors of the population (REMHI II 5). Yet even though the 
massacres were not random, there was no way of knowing which communities had been 
selected for extermination or which one would be next. The element of surprise was a 
critical factor in the majority of the massacres (REMHI II 8). The impossibility of 
knowing if an attack would come contributed significantly to the military’s attempt to 
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spread fear. Increased uncertainty regarding the cause and reasons for the massacres 
exacerbated the terror and infected the entire social fabric.
52
  
The importance of this uncertainty is critical, for it bears directly on my 
examination of the ways in which the Guatemalan state employed torture as a means of 
blurring the boundaries between what was known and what was unknown. In fact, there 
is evidence to suggest that many people remained unaware of the exact nature of the 
massacres and the potential danger. Despite the very public nature of the massacres, in 
many cases the massacres often retained “the opaque presence of the ‘deniable’” (Kahn 
3). Even though torture had become a public spectacle, the details of the many massacres 
were not disseminated in a reliable manner to many sectors of Guatemalan society. And 
thus the massacres maintained a “shadowy” aspect similar to more secretive practices of 
torture. REMHI, for example, notes that despite the imminence of danger, many people 
remained where they were and took no action to avoid the military. Various factors 
influenced this lack of response: “la dificultad de creer en lo que está sucediendo (eso no 
puede pasar aquí),” “la falta de información clara y concreta,” “la credibilidad de la 
fuente que transmite la amenaza,” and “la difusión de rumores contradictorios que quitan 
fuerza a la indicación de salir huyendo” (“the difficulty in believing what was happening 
(that cannot happen here),” “the lack of clear and concrete information,” “the credibility 
of the source who transmits the threat,” and “the diffusion of contradictory rumors that 
weakens any indication to run away fleeing”[REMHI II 8, n. 10). Though carried out in 
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 One particularly disastrous effect was the relocation of survivors. In some cases, survivors fled the site of 
the massacre out of fear: “Después de la masacre lo más frecuente fue que la gente huyera (40%) como 
forma de defender su vida, ya fuera a la montaña, al exilio o a otra comunidad” (REMHI II 20). In other 
cases, the Guatemalan military relocated survivors by force into camps that were called “model villages.” 
As a part of the army’s “Poles of Development Plan,” these villages were established by the army and 
rigorously controlled. For more on the model villages and poles of development, see Cultural Survival 
(1988) and AVANSCO (1992). 
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public, the massacres continued to function as a practice that was only partially known 
and partially seen. We can now suggest two conclusions concerning torture’s visibility 
during the armed conflict. First, we can acknowledge that in many areas of Guatemala, 
torture did exist in public space. The massacres demonstrate this clearly. Yet we can also 
propose, and this is the most disconcerting point, that despite its existence in public 
space, something prevented it from doing more than “tainting” the public space. That is, 
despite the seemingly public nature of torture, its existence in public remained somehow 
ephemeral and “always just beyond view” (Kahn 3). Diana Taylor refers to this blurring 
of the visible and the invisible as “percepticide” (123). Though Taylor’s project examines 
torture and disappearance in Argentina, her analysis helps to shed light on the 
repercussions of the atrocities committed in Guatemala. Taylor argues that the result of 
spectacles of terror is often “percepticide,” which she defines as the population’s act of 
self-blinding. As people were abducted in broad daylight, many citizens covered their 
eyes and refused to see. The visible aspects of state violence were thereby rendered 
invisible. Perhaps even more so than in Argentina, particularly given the large number of 
public massacres, the displays of tortured bodies were unavoidably visible throughout 
Guatemala. However, because of the factors noted above, the people had been trained to 
look away and to ignore the spectacle. Thus their response to the torture was feigned 
blindness. In a sense, the spectacle of torture disappeared. This play between visibility 
and invisibility will be critical for exploring the problematic and seemingly impossible 
nature of witnessing to torture.  
As already noted, the Guatemalan military carried out massacres as public acts of 
torture designed to exercise power through the perception of terror (REMHI) and 
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escalation (Parry). The impact of this terror fundamentally altered the social imaginary 
and “llegó a reestructurar el tejido social, incluso familiar, en base a los objetivos 
militares, para eliminar cualquier tipo de oposición” (“succeeded in restructuring the 
social fabric, including the family, based on the military’s objectives to eliminate any 
type of opposition” [REMHI II viii]). But more than simply scaring and silencing the 
Guatemalan people into submission, this cultural production of terror succeeding in 
enabling the military to dictate the real. Massacre as public torture was “a crime 
committed against the imagination” (Dorfman 8). The very public display of the 
massacres, when coupled with the uncertainty regarding the reasons for their occurrence, 
led to a breakdown of the boundaries between reality and unreality. In order to 
understand how this occurred, we must examine in greater detail the effects of the 
massacres on the vision of Guatemalan citizens. More specifically, we must note the 
ways in which the state was able to control who and what could appear in the public 
sphere. According to Judith Butler,  
One way a hegemonic understanding of politics is achieved is through 
circumscribing what will and will not be admissible as part of the public sphere 
itself. […] To produce what will constitute the public sphere, however, it is 
necessary to control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. 
The constraints are not only on content […] but on what ‘can’ be heard, read, 
seen, felt, and known. The public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear, 
and the regulation of the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will 
count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose lives can 
be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths. Our capacity to feel 
and to apprehend hangs in the balance. (Precarious xx-xxi) 
 
By limiting what can appear in public, the state trains its citizens to see only that which is 
“given to be visible” (Taylor). Therefore, in addition to affecting its citizens’ sense 
perceptions, we begin to see how, in countries ruled by violence and fear, “the state 
becomes the arbiter of what is real and what is not” (Cavanaugh 55). Rather than set firm 
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boundaries between the two, “it is more profitable for the state to leave those boundaries 
confused and ambiguous. Ambiguity and unknowing create anxiety, which in turn creates 
the demand for order which the state provides” (Cavanaugh 55). In Guatemala, the real 
and unreal—as well as the citizen’s ability to discern and narrate them—remained 
purposefully unfixed, ultimately allowing the state to justify its own existence. But this 
was only possible through the manipulation of the visible and invisible aspects of the 
massacres. The state’s fragmentation of reality affected the ways in which citizens could 
describe and makes sense of the acts of violence. By altering the citizens’ perceptions of 
the “real,” the state’s discursive power developed a contrived rhetoric that became part of 
the identity of the individual citizen. Regarding this ability to manipulate “reality,” Judith 
Butler writes, “The public sphere is constituted in part by what cannot be said and what 
cannot be shown. The limits of the sayable, the limits of what can appear, circumscribe 
the domain in which political speech operates and certain kinds of subjects appear as 
visible actors” (xvii). In the state’s production of violence, it is precisely this dimension 
of the “sayable” that is in question. Indeed, the state’s control of the media and access to 
“official” and reliable information during the war only heightened feelings of uncertainty. 
The state’s goal was to confuse citizens—to blur the lines between the known and the 
unknown, the certain and the uncertain—in order to undermine their ability to talk about 
the violence of the war. Therefore, in addition to destroying the imaginative and 
epistemological capacities of the victim, massacre as collective torture ultimately 
succeeds in problematizing the witnessing audience. 
To see more precisely how this happens, we must return to Scarry’s description of 
torture, specifically regarding what is lost during the torture session. According to Scarry, 
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the most lasting effect of torture is the conversion of the prisoner’s own body into an 
agent of pain. Each experience of the tortured and every object encountered become a 
means of turning the prisoner’s body against itself, “forcing the body to feed on the 
body” (48).
53
 This feeding on the body forces a divide between “self” and “body” (Scarry 
49). As already noted, this breakdown results in social rejection and the inability to 
participate in the life of the community.
54
 Yet I would suggest that the most insidious 
effect of this process is not merely the dismantling of social bodies, but rather the 
conversion of the tortured into other. The fragmentation of the tortured is explored in 
depth by Cavanaugh. He writes, “The feeling and reality of powerlessness in torture is so 
extreme that the subject is no longer subject but mere object. The ego is dissolved 
because it cannot sustain the processes necessary for self-preservation. In fact, death, the 
very negation of ego, becomes desirable” (40). This desire for death reveals the 
profundity of the fragmentation.
55
 The ontological split into self and body often forces the 
prisoner to “renounce her psychological integrity as a coping mechanism, such that her 
words become those of another, dissociated from her self” (Cavanaugh 40). Indeed, 
torture victims become so fragmented that they are often incapable of narrating their 
experience afterwards (Lira). There is evidence to suggest, then, that one of the goals of 
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 Scarry explains, “the eyes are only access points for scorching light, the ears for brutal noises; eating, the 
act at once so incredible and so simple in which the world is literally taken into the body, is replaced by 
rituals of starvation involving either no food or food that nauseates; taste and smell, two whole sensory 
modes that have emerged to watch over the entry of the world into the body, are systematically abused with 
burns and cuts to the inside of nose and mouth, and with bug-infested or putrefying substances; normal 
needs like excretion and special wants like sexuality are made ongoing sources of outrage and repulsion” 
(48). This “turning” of the body back onto the body is also explored by Butler throughout her Psychic Life 
of Power (see especially her discussions of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Althusser).  
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 As I argue above, the society imagined by the torturer and the state – in which the prisoner is isolated and 
fragmented as a monad – is then reproduced once the prisoner is freed, resulting in the destruction of 
interpersonal relationships and the dismantling of social bodies. According to Elizabeth Lira and Eugenia 
Weinstein, psychologists who work with victims of torture in Chile, “The most important psychosocial 
damage that torture generates consists in the destruction or deterioration of collective links” (qtd in 
Cavanaugh 44-45). 
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 For more on the process of disintegration of the prisoner, see Lira and Weinstein “La tortura.”  
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torture is to render it “unspeakable” (Cavanaugh 40). Cavanaugh comments on this fact, 
noting how “[t]he experiences are remembered vaguely, as those of another, repressed 
into a hidden corner of the fragmented self” (Cavanaugh 40). Because the experiences are 
repressed and rendered unspeakable, witnessing to those experiences becomes highly 
problematized. How does one bear witness to experiences of massacre or torture if these 
events occur at the “limits of the sayable” (Butler xvii)? How does one bear witness to 
what really happened during the armed conflict if the state has become the arbiter of what 
can be said and what can be shown (Butler xvii)?  
The rendering of torture as “unspeakable” and the fragmentation of the tortured 
reveal not only the loss of the ability to narrate the act of torture, but also the inability to 
counter-imagine the state’s project. This inability to produce imaginatively an alternative 
to the state’s “rhetoric of torture” (Ballengee) brings about a corresponding ambivalence 
regarding the future of the self and society. This ambivalent relationship between citizens 
and the state is treated at length by Judith Butler in her book The Psychic Life of Power 
(1997). In that work, Butler seeks to give “insight into how the boundaries of the social 
are instituted and maintained, not only at the expense of psychic life, but through binding 
psychic life into forms of melancholic ambivalence” (167-68). Butler’s argument draws 
heavily on Freud’s theories regarding melancholy:  
Melancholia describes a process by which an originally external object is lost, or 
an ideal is lost, and the refusal to break the attachment to such an object or ideal 
leads to the withdrawal of the object into the ego, the replacement of the object by 
the ego, and the setting up of an inner world in which a critical agency is split off 
from the ego and proceeds to take the ego as its object. (Psychic Life 179) 
 
Unlike mourning, in which the object can be declared lost, melancholia is the result of the 
loss of a loss: “the object is not only lost, but that loss itself is lost” (Psychic Life 183). 
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Because the loss cannot be recognized, the melancholic person will declare, “I have lost 
nothing” (Psychic Life 183). Such “unavowable loss” (Psychic Life 170) limits the 
melancholic’s ability to speak, producing an “unspeakability and unrepresentability” that 
hinders the process of grieving (Psychic Life 183).  
The crux of Butler’s argument, for our purposes here, is her assertion that within a 
given society, “forms of social power emerge that regulate what losses will and will not 
be grieved” (Psychic Life 183). Its manipulation of the real and the unreal allows the state 
to control what can be perceived as a loss. Thus in regulating, and often impeding, the 
processes of mourning, the Guatemalan state plays a fundamental role in the formation of 
the subject. Its active participation in the formation of the super-ego—the “critical 
agency” of the individual—reveals a breakdown in what we typically consider to be a 
separation between the public and the private. Butler writes,  
The ‘critical agency’ of the melancholic is at once a social and psychic 
instrument. This super-egoic conscience is not simply analogous to the state’s 
military power over its citizenry; the state cultivates melancholia among its 
citizenry precisely as a way of dissimulating and displacing its own ideal 
authority. This is not to suggest that conscience is a simple instantiation of the 
state; on the contrary, it is the vanishing point of the state’s authority, its psychic 
idealization, and, in that sense, its disappearance as an external object. The 
process of forming the subject is a process of rendering the terrorizing power of 
the state invisible—and effective—as the ideality of conscience. (Psychic Life 
190-91) 
 
The resulting confusion regarding whom to trust and what to believe produces a strong 
ambivalence with respect not only to the state, but to life itself. Perera suggests that in 
Guatemala this ambivalence is termed popularly as “mala saña,” which includes the 
“acceptance of the blackest proclivities in human nature […] coupled with a brand of 
machismo that consists in going about your daily business unflinching and unmoved as 
the bullets fly about you and the country’s elite annihilate one another” (44). Butler 
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describes this same basic state as the “struggle that loss occasions between the desire to 
live and the desire to die” (Psychic Life 193). This confusion, she argues, may very well 
culminate in the desire for subjection at the hands of the state (Psychic Life 79), thereby 
rendering denunciation and counter-memory impossible.  
The massacres carried out by the military produced a very particular meaning for 
the tortured body in Guatemala. Even though torture is by nature polysemic, we can now 
see the ways in which the state employed collective torture as a means of subduing 
possible witnesses and dismantling social bodies. Within the state’s strategic production 
of terror, these “docile bodies” (Foucault, Ballengee) aided in the production of fear and 
ambivalence. The critical question then becomes precisely how the regime’s message was 
disseminated throughout society. If it is true that the massacres obeyed a logic developed 
by the state to create “una forma de no dejar testigos de los hechos” (“a means of not 
leaving any witnesses to the events” [REMHI II 5]), how did the terror spread? If the goal 
was to leave no witnesses, how do we account for the rampant terror? In order to answer 
these questions, we must now turn to an examination of the phenomenon of rumor.  
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Rumors and the Specter of Torture 
The army wants the people to give them 
information that is untrue. The only thing 
that matters is that the people will say 
whatever the army wants them to say.
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Victor Perera offers the following analogy for Guatemalan state violence: you 
cannot kill a hundred birds with one stone, but you can easily kill one and scare the others 
away (47). In the words of Perera, you can “frighten them into silence” (47). Even when 
there were survivors of the massacres, the idea of denouncing the violence was 
unthinkable. As Perera observes, “Too many Guatemalans have become silent 
accomplices to terror. The difference between them and the ‘good Germans’ of World 
War II is that a Guatemalan knows the mere act of witnessing can cost you your life” 
(44). Though that is certainly true, we must acknowledge the fact that people did talk 
about the violence. Hence it is clear that the Guatemalan response was not total silence, 
but rather apparent silence. Though many people were unwilling to denounce the military 
publicly out of fear of retaliation, this did not preclude them from spreading rumors about 
what they seemingly “knew” and what they had heard. After all, the massacres were 
carried out in public. In some cases, there were survivors who were able to speak of what 
they had seen (REMHI; CEH). In other cases, village inhabitants were away when the 
massacres occurred and, upon returning to the village, they discovered the bodies of those 
who had been killed (REMHI).
57
 Therefore, though REMHI suggests that one of the 
goals of the massacres was to leave no witnesses (REMHI II 5), it would be more 
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 Quoted in Sanford 180.  
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 Indeed, the public display of tortured bodies was a common sight during the war. Yet even when the 
bodies of loved ones were found, it was not always possible to mourn them according to custom. In some 
cases, “los cuerpos de las víctimas quedaron calcinados en las casas o fueron comidos por los animales. 
Sólo en contadas ocasiones pudieron ser enterrados por los sobrevivientes” (REMHI II 18). This 
impossibility of mourning will be an important theme throughout the present study. 
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appropriate to say that the goal was to problematize the notion of witness. By carrying 
out the massacres in public, the state created numerous opportunities for citizens to see 
the tortured body. By bringing the tortured bodies out of their shadowy confines of the 
detention centers and displaying them openly in the town plaza, the state managed to 
increase the production of rumors. As noted above, in order for escalation and the “logic 
of consent” to function, it was necessary to establish that “more and greater pain” was 
possible (Parry 205). If it is only “by means of the response of the witness to torture that 
torture conveys its message” (Ballengee 10), then we must concede the possibility that 
massacres create opportunities for witnessing and speaking about torture. The massacres, 
precisely because of their confusion of the boundaries between public and private, 
allowed torture to become a practice that haunted the social sphere.  
In this section I will examine the notion of rumor and explore its implications for 
the diffusion of terror. More specifically, I will argue that the spreading of rumors, rather 
than allowing citizens an opportunity to work through their trauma and make sense of the 
violence, instead succeeds in furthering the state’s “terror ejemplificante” (REMHI II 9). 
The diffusion of rumors actually participates in the narrative of the state in several ways. 
Not only does it “establish a background (or threatened background) of total control and 
potential escalation” (Parry 205), it also perpetuates the blurring of the real and the 
unreal. As I will suggest, through rumor, massacre as collective torture becomes ghostly, 
haunting the psyches of Guatemalan citizens who never knew exactly what was 
happening. In order to see how this happened, we must draw attention to two important 
aspects of rumor in Guatemala. First, we must note the nature of rumor in general and 
discern how rumors would have been transmitted during a situation of such extreme 
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violence. And second, we must note more specifically the relationship between rumor 
and torture in Guatemala, highlighting especially what I will describe as the state’s 
“rhetoric of fear.”   
Regarding the first aspect of rumor, we must stress that the very nature of rumor 
itself raises doubt concerning its reliability. In their study Rumor Psychology: Social and 
Organizational Approaches (2007), DiFonzo and Bordia define rumors as “unverified 
and instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation that arise in contexts of 
ambiguity, danger, or potential threat and that function to help people make sense and 
manage risk” (13). More than anything else, rumor concerns information that is not only 
“unverified,” but also extremely important or “relevant.” When official or formal 
information is unavailable, no matter the reasons for its absence, people compensate for 
such a lack through unofficial means. Rumor is therefore a process that is social and 
communal in nature (DiFonzo and Bordia 13).
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 It is a means for society to attempt to 
make sense of what is generally unknown.  
During the Internal Armed Conflict, stories of violence paralyzed people through 
the resulting fear and confusion that the stories themselves created. Lack of access to 
verifiable information about what was really occurring in the country raised major 
uncertainties regarding the precise details and scope of the violence, including doubt 
concerning the perpetrators or agents of the violence. Many “knew” of the general acts of 
violence: “We all knew that civilians who went in there never left, or if they did, they 
were dead” (qtd in Sanford 124). In fact, numerous statements made by witnesses 
concerning the atrocities include similar statements: “We all knew…” Though many 
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 DiFonzo and Bordia are not alone in proposing a conception of rumor as compensation for lack of 
official discourse. See also Shibutani (1966) and Bauer and Gleicher (1953). 
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remained uncertain as to the details of the violence or the reasons behind it, the diffusion 
of rumors provided a means for people to gather glimpses of what was going on. But they 
were only glimpses, partial views of the real nature of the massacres. Hence we must 
draw attention to the uncertainty that is characteristic of rumor. Though it is true that 
rumors, regardless of their content, “allow human beings to cope with the uncertainties of 
life” (Rosnow and Fine 12), that does not mean that such coping erases uncertainty. 
Rumor does not produce certainty. Indeed, there are many situations in which rumors will 
become not only unreliable and unverifiable, but purposefully and necessarily untrue. 
H. Taylor Buckner, in his “Theory of Rumor Transmission” (1965), attempts to 
answer the question of whether rumors become more or less accurate as they are passed 
on. In that essay, he notes that even those who are “careful and assiduous” in their 
readings of major studies of rumor transmission will “finish knowing neither whether 
rumors expand or contract, nor whether they become more or less accurate” (54). Indeed, 
he argues that the most important studies come to apparently “contradictory conclusions” 
(54). This leads him to propose that the truthfulness of a rumor remains unimportant in 
studying its transmission (55). Much more important in assessing the phenomenon of 
rumor is the fact that it is unconfirmed and nevertheless transmitted. What he seeks to 
explain more specifically is the factors that govern transmission, not only whether the 
rumor is passed on, but also how and to what extent it may be modified. This bears 
greatly on our discussion of rumor in Guatemala, and grants us insight into the possible 
mechanisms of rumor transmission during the war.   
In order to determine a theory of rumor transmission, Buckner focuses his 
analysis on the orientation or situation of the individual who transmits the rumor, 
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examining specifically whether the individual is able to respond critically or uncritically 
to the rumor in question.
59
 A “critical” response generally implies a previous knowledge 
regarding the rumor, either because the individual has experience with the subject matter 
or situation, or because the source of the rumor can be determined to be reliable based on 
past experience (Buckner 55-56). Given the above discussion of what was going on in 
Guatemala, very few people would have been able to exercise a critical ability regarding 
the rumors about the massacres. Indeed, it seems unlikely that citizens would have been 
able to discern the relevant from the irrelevant or “detect misinformation in the rumor and 
eliminate it” (Buckner 56). For our purposes here, this means that as the rumors spread, it 
is highly doubtful that they would have become more accurate. On the contrary, it seems 
more likely that citizens would have responded uncritically to the rumors about torture 
and massacre. Regarding the “uncritical set,” Buckner notes that “[c]ertain circumstances 
and emotions hamper or eliminate the possibility of exercising critical ability” (57). Fear, 
for example, especially a fear for one’s life, hampers this ability. Moreover, in situations 
in which the individual has no “advance knowledge” of the rumor, the surprise or 
unexpected nature of the rumor can also render the critical ability impotent, especially if 
the rumor concerns urgent action (Buckner 57). As indicated above, surprise was one of 
the key factors when the Guatemalan military carried out a massacre. The urgent action 
in such situations would have been to flee. But as REMHI discovered in its 
investigations, many people refused to flee (II 8). Buckner suggests that in these types of 
crisis situations where all are “interested and involved in the situation and seeking 
information,” it is possible for the “stable rumor channels” to be disrupted, which in turn 
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on Buckner’s treatment of the first two orientations: “critical set” and “uncritical set” (Buckner 55-57). 
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creates further confusion and makes it more difficult to determine the reliability of the 
rumor transmitter (57). Furthermore, in situations that are both uncertain and urgent, 
there often arises a “temporary lowering of critical standards until reliable information 
becomes available”, thereby increasing the likelihood of transmitting unverifiable 
information (Buckner 57). In such cases in which a critical ability cannot be exercised, 
the individual will either “speculate on the meaning of the rumor to fit it into his 
framework of ideas, prejudices, and attitudes,” “modify the rumor to give it a better 
Gestalt, to achieve a sense of closure,” “come up with an idiosyncratic version of the 
meaning of the rumor, which he then passes on,” “distort the rumor in a rational or non-
rational direction, depending at least in part on his own psychic needs,” or “come up with 
an original message that seems to describe the situation” (Buckner 58). When considering 
the uncritical set, we see not only how the question of veracity or truthfulness has become 
irrelevant; we also see that despite the lack of verifiability, there is little doubt that the 
rumor will be transmitted.  
Having assessed the general nature of rumor transmission in Guatemala, two 
hypotheses emerge. First, the sheer urgency and lack of knowledge regarding the 
violence in Guatemala would have rendered all responses to be “uncritical,” to use the 
terminology of Buckner. In other words, setting aside for a moment our specific 
examination of torture, we can assert that in Guatemala rumor would have been 
transmitted uncritically and without regard to its veracity. Generally speaking, we can 
now see that “stable rumor channels” would have been disrupted, thereby creating further 
confusion and lowering the community’s critical standards. Second, we can also 
understand how rumor would not have been a reliable means of “making sense” of the 
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violence. On the contrary, it seems much more likely that the spreading of rumors would 
have rendered any “working through” impotent. It was not always the case that the 
people lacked information regarding the massacres. Rather, in many instances the rumors 
provided too much information by producing numerous and alternative versions of 
events. Perera confirms this, writing that “in the absence of a reliable press, every 
kidnapping and assassination acquires four or five interpretations: the official government 
version, the left-wing and right-wing versions, and the versions convenient to the various 
private sectors” (46). Because of the lack of reliable information, different versions of 
events created conflicting discourses that precluded the people from gaining perspective 
regarding the violence. It is certainly true that at times the rumors reaffirmed one another, 
gathering legitimization in their commonalities. However, as suggested by Perera, it was 
more often the case that the rumors clashed completely, foreclosing the possibility of 
arriving at a common ground. For example, according to REMHI, there were multiple 
cases where communities received “rumores contradictorios” regarding the massacres, 
resulting in an impaired ability to “salir huyendo” (“run away fleeing” [REMHI II 8]).  
More often than not, the increased rumors actually contributed to and increased 
the citizens’ uncertainty regarding the violence. The proliferation of divergent stories 
challenged the possibility of arriving at a reliable version of events and succeeded only in 
further perturbing the recipient, who was laden with the task of deciphering some hidden 
truth. This anxiety of the unknown became one of the state’s most potent weapons during 
the conflict. In addition to further intensifying the state’s fragmentation of reality, it also 
encouraged the public proclamation of clichés and stereotypes cultivated in the social 
imagination. If, as Foucault suggests, power cannot be understood as the forces of the 
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state, but rather the multiplicity of discourses, then we must acknowledge the intimate 
relationship between rumors and the construction of those discourses. Power is not only 
an institution or structure, but rather a complex and strategic discursive force, 
omnipresent within society. The implication, of course, is that the people who 
participated in the rumor mill eventually became complicit in their own subjectivity. 
Through incessant repetition the voices of rumor were eventually transformed into a 
masked acceptance of the violence as characteristic of daily social life. The terror not 
only paralyzed and perturbed; it also became a part of the psyche of individual citizens.  
This relationship to the formation of the psyche brings us to the second aspect of 
rumor: its specific relation to torture. As I have noted above, torture created a rupture 
within the psyche not only of those being tortured, but also of those witnessing the 
torture. Massacre as collective torture functioned in a similar fashion. As rumors about 
the massacres spread, so did the rupture. Following Kahn and his assessment of the 
relation between torture and sovereignty, narratives of torture must eventually reach the 
public in order to produce the terror necessary to strengthen the state’s hold on the 
population. There will always be some means by which the public can still gain 
knowledge of the “deniable” acts of torture. Torture must be “known but not seen; it must 
be spoken of but never speak itself. It is a political practice that cannot exist in public 
space. Nevertheless, to be effective the threat of torture must taint the public space. It is 
always just beyond view” (Kahn 3). The same can be said of the massacres, as collective 
torture. Despite the fact that the massacres were ostensibly public, the uncertainty created 
by the proliferation of rumors meant that they remained “always just beyond view” 
(Kahn). In Guatemala, torture was no longer a private phenomenon, but neither was it a 
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public practice. Rather torture existed in a space that defied both; it “tainted” the public 
space. Torture thus came to exist in that blurred space that was both public and private, 
real and unreal, present and absent. It existed only in the “in-between.”  
Employing Avery Gordon’s terminology, we can see how torture had become a 
“seething presence” (17) in Guatemalan society; torture was a ghost. Torture haunted 
society by challenging “the distinctions between the fictive and the factual, and between 
the imaginary and the real” (Gordon 14). Moreover, the proliferation of rumor allowed 
torture to blur received social, political, and epistemological boundaries. It existed only in 
that in-between space that defied standard dualistic conceptions of the social and the 
individual, the public and the private. Defying such categorizations, torture became one 
of those processes by which the “organized forces and systemic structures that appear 
removed from us make their impact felt in everyday life in a way that confounds our 
analytic separations and confounds the social separations themselves” (Gordon 19). 
Through the proliferation of rumor and the constant disruption of the boundaries between 
the known and the unknown—between torture as public and torture as private, and 
between torture as presence and torture as absence—torture became a spectral presence 
that haunted the social sphere. Borrowing Gordon’s terminology, we can assert that the 
specter of torture was one of “those singular yet repetitive instances when home becomes 
unfamiliar, when your bearings on the world lose direction, when the over-and-done-with 
comes alive, when what’s been in your blind spot comes into view” (Gordon xvi). 
Through rumor, the uncertainty of the spectacle of torture continued to be reenacted and 
re-performed even after the massacre had been carried out or the prisoner had been freed. 
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The proliferation of rumors thus allowed the destructive effects of torture to extend and 
infect the very fabric of society.  
One result of the spectrality of Guatemalan torture was that the state further 
solidified its role as “the arbiter of what [was] real and what [was] not” (Cavanaugh 55). 
The real and unreal—as well as the citizen’s ability to discern and narrate them—
remained purposefully unfixed. The resultant confusion and ambiguity allowed the state 
to justify its continued intervention. As I have suggested, the anxiety of the unknown 
created a psychological need to make sense of what cannot be officially “known.” But 
how does one “make sense” of torture? Torture—as a practice that blurs not only the 
boundaries of the private and the public, but also the very boundaries between the real 
and the unreal—corrupted the citizens’ ability to distinguish between the certain and the 
uncertain. As Weschler writes,  
All torn and twisted and broken, with so much of the brokenness concentrated 
around this notion of knowledge, of knowing: ‘You can’t possibly know what it 
was like.’ ‘We didn’t know, we didn’t realize.’ The torturer’s ‘I know everything 
about you.’ The victim’s ‘I don’t even know what I said, what I did.’ (171)  
 
This distortion of knowledge actually precludes any effort to make sense of torture. 
Indeed, not only does it not make sense, torture—and the terror it produces—“makes a 
mockery of sense-making” (Gordon 80). But it does so “not because terror is senseless 
but, on the contrary, because it is itself so involved with knowledge-making” (Gordon 
80). The confusion between fact and fiction wreaked havoc on the social imaginations of 
citizens. Shifting continually between “unbelievable facts and potent fictions” (Gordon 
80), the terror of torture “makes epistemological doubt itself a form of domination” 
(Gordon 80). Here we see the connection to my previous argument that torture actually 
creates truth (Kahn). Torture, as a very specific form of knowledge-making, produces a 
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form of understanding directly related to the ways in which we imagine political power. 
Torture is not merely a violation of the law, but rather a practice that reveals a more 
profound political phenomenon, in which the relationship between individual citizens and 
sovereign power is both imagined and revealed (Kahn 4). 
Thus we can now see how the proliferation of rumors about torture helped render 
citizens complicit in what I call the state’s “rhetoric of fear.” By fragmenting the tortured 
and forcing her to become other, torture became a practice of individualization that had 
“the effect of disciplining the society into isolated monads easily made to serve the 
regime’s purposes” (Cavanaugh 45). Both the tortured and those who spread rumors 
about the torture became “walking signifiers of the regime’s power, spreading fear 
among others who might be tempted to defy the state” (Cavanaugh 45). As one witness to 
the massacres states, “Mataron a varios – mujeres embarazadas, ancianos, ancianas –, 
nadie vio exactamente cuántos eran, nadie contó por el miedo” (“They killed many – 
pregnant women, elderly men, elderly women –, nobody saw exactly how many there 
were, nobody counted out of fear” [REMHI II 4]). As the “haunting quality” of torture 
spread throughout society, fear impeded witness. Therefore, though I thoroughly agree 
with Dorman’s assessment that torture not only corrupts “those directly involved in the 
terrible contact between two bodies,” but also “corrupts the whole social fabric” (9), we 
must qualify his assertion that it does so by prescribing “a silencing of what has been 
happening between those two bodies” (9). After all, the proliferation of rumors was far 
from “silent,” if by silence we mean the absence of speech. Rumors do not spread to the 
extent they did during the war without speech. And yet Dorfman is not the only critic to 
suggest the term “silent.” As noted above, numerous other critics and authors in 
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Guatemala employed the adjective in their assessment of the violence.
60
 Why is it that 
critics continue to employ the term “silent” to describe Guatemalans during the Armed 
Conflict? To answer this question, we must re-examine the relationship between the 
concepts of witness and silence.  
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 Others who employ the term “silence” are Victor Perera, Arturo Arias, Victor Montejo, Ricardo Falla, 
Victoria Sanford, and David Volpendesta, among others. In her examination of the exhumations of mass 
graves in Guatemala, Sanford acknowledges that these “silences” are not very silent:  
The process of the exhumations also begs the question ‘how silent are silences?’ Mass graves of 
massacre victims are referred to as clandestine cemeteries.  […] These clandestine cemeteries 
were hidden in that they were silenced, but survivors, witnesses, and most community members 
know the locations of these graves. Thus, they are truly clandestine only in the official negation of 
their existence and the silence imposed on communities. (17) 
Though Sanford poses the question about silence, she does not answer it, nor does she investigate the term 
itself in any depth. 
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Speaking “Silence”: Bearing Witness to the Impossibility of Bearing Witness 
[I]t is not that mourning is the goal of 
politics, but that without the capacity to 
mourn, we lose that keener sense of life we 
need in order to oppose violence. (Butler 
xvii-xix) 
 
A tree, for example, is not just a tree. 
(Sanford 143) 
 
To be sure, rumor about torture took many forms during the war; but none of 
them was “silence,” if by silence we mean the absence of speech. Nonetheless, there is 
something very attractive about the term that has continually warranted its use in various 
circles.
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 Dorfman writes that torture “obliges us to be deaf and blind and mute. Or we 
could not go on living. With that incessant awareness of the incessant horror, we could 
not go on living” (Dorfman 9). However, it is contradictory to pair terms such as “deaf 
and blind and mute” with “incessant awareness” (Dorfman 9). If one is deaf, blind, and 
mute, how does he or she become incessantly aware? It is true that torture forces people 
“to make believe that nothing, in fact, has been happening, it necessitates that we lie to 
ourselves about what is being done not far from where we talk, while we munch a 
chocolate bar, smile at a lover, read a book, listen to a concerto, exercise in the morning” 
(Dorfman 9). But that is far different from suggesting it renders us “deaf and blind and 
mute.” Rather than speaking about torture in such terms, I suggest that it is much more 
theoretically fruitful to re-examine what we mean by “speech” or “vision.” Torture, by 
inhibiting and re-shaping the ability of both victim and witness to see, became “a crime 
against the imagination” (Dorfman 8). But it did so not by rendering the witness silent, 
but rather by normalizing torture and proliferating speech about it to the point that words 
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the “Dream of Silence.”  
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no longer signified. As rumors of torture and massacre become part of everyday life, 
torture became the norm. It became accepted as a normal part of everyday life. Imre 
Kertész, a Hungarian concentration camp survivor who won the Nobel Prize in Literature 
in 2002, writes about this notion of accepting violence, stating that what is new about 
Auschwitz is not mass murder,  
sino la eliminación continua de seres humanos, practicada durante años y décadas 
de forma metódica, y convertida así en sistema mientras transcurren a su lado la 
vida normal y cotidiana, la educación de los hijos, los paseos amorosos, la hora 
con el médico, las ambiciones profesionales y otros deseos, los anhelos civiles, las 
melancolías crepusculares, el crecimiento, los éxitos o los fracasos, etcétera. Esto, 
sumado al hecho de habituarse a la situación, de acostumbrarse al miedo, junto 
con la resignación, la indiferencia y hasta el aburrimiento, es un invento nuevo e 
incluso muy reciente. Lo nuevo en él, para ser concreto, es lo siguiente: está 
aceptado. (Kertész)
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As I have argued throughout this chapter, this “acceptance” of the violence—and of 
torture more specifically—is one of the defining qualities of the war in Guatemala. More 
than that, I would argue, the production of this “acceptance” can actually be seen as one 
of the state’s goals. The ways in which the massacres were carried out, the blurring of the 
boundaries between the real and the unreal and between the known and the unknown, the 
lack of official knowledge, and the state’s encouragement of rumors—especially if the 
information spread is “untrue” (Sanford 180)—all these factors indicate a strategy on the 
part of the state to defeat its enemy by “destroying his mind, his intelligence, and his 
will” (Military poster, Petén
63
). This strategy trained the Guatemalan people to see torture 
as normal. Concerning the normalization of torture, the CEH concludes:  
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 “but the continuous elimination of human beings carried out methodically for years and decades, and 
thus converted into a system in which, in the meantime, daily and quotidian life unfolds normally: children 
are educated, amorous walks taken, an hour with the doctor, professional ambitions and other desires, civil 
aspirations, crepuscular melancholy, success, failure, etc. This, in addition to the fact of getting used to the 
situation, accustomed to fear and resignation, indifference and even boredom, is a new and even very recent 
invention. What is new in it, to be precise, is the following: it is accepted.” 
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[E]l uso sistemático de la tortura implicó dos consecuencias colectivas 
fundamentales. En primer lugar, se formó y entrenó a expertos en las formas más 
eficientes y aberrantes de aplicar dolor sobre un ser humano para quebrarlo física 
y espiritualmente. En segundo lugar, la tortura se convirtió en algo ‘normal’ 
dentro del trabajo rutinario de las estructuras militares y policiales del Estado, 
sobre todo entre los integrantes de Inteligencia, tolerado por la sociedad y los 
funcionarios judiciales. (CEH 55)
64
  
 
As torture became a normal, everyday occurrence, a practice that was “tolerated” and 
accepted by society, it penetrated the recesses of the Guatemalan psyche and fragmented 
it.
65
 Even those citizens who had not experienced torture directly felt its oblique presence. 
Masked behind the normalcy of everyday life, torture trafficked below the surface, “just 
beyond view.”  
The uncertainties propagated by rumor not only blurred the boundaries between 
the real and the unreal, abrogating “our capacity to imagine” (Dorfman 8); they also 
blurred the boundaries between what we consider “speech” and what we consider 
“silence.” Indeed, throughout this study I will be investigating whether and to what extent 
speech and writing about torture can produce a form of silence. Is there such a thing as 
“literary silence” when speaking about torture? That is, despite the proliferation of 
narratives detailing the practices of torture, torture had become a phenomenon that in 
many ways defied language. If torture is polysemic and fails to send a particular or 
determinable meaning (Ballengee 9), then rumors of torture merely exacerbate that 
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 “The systematic use of torture implied two fundamental collective consequences. In the first place, it 
formed and trained experts in the most efficient and aberrant forms of applying pain to a human being in 
order to break him physically and spiritually. In the second place, torture became something “normal” 
within the routine work of the military and police structures of the State, above all among the members of 
the Intelligence, tolerated by society and the judicial employees.” 
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 Taussig discusses this same notion, referring to it as “the normality of the abnormal” (Nervous System 
17).He describes the effect upon the psyche as a doubling “in which one moves in bursts between somehow 
accepting the situation as normal, only to be thrown into panic or shocked into disorientation by an event, a 
rumor, a sight, something said, or not said—something that even while it requires the normal in order to 
make its impact, destroys it” (Nervous System 18). The confusion between the normal and the abnormal 
parallels and supports my above discussion of the distortion between the certain and the uncertain, the 
known and the unknown.  
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failure, multiplying the possibilities of its message ad infinitum. Not only did practices 
like torture cease to signify; other everyday objects took on new and terrifying meanings. 
Torture—and the terror it produced—crept into the chains of signification of everyday 
life, converting everyday objects into objects of terror and violence. Everything became a 
potential weapon. Sanford writes,  
This living memory of terror can reinvoke the physical and psychological pain of 
past acts of violence in unexpected moments. A tree, for example, is not just a 
tree. A river, not just a river. At a given moment, a tree is a reminder of the baby 
whose head was smashed against a tree by a soldier. The tree, and the memory of 
the baby it invokes, in turn reinvoke a chain of memories of terror, including 
witnessing the murder of a husband or brother who was tied to another tree and 
beaten to death—perhaps on the same day or perhaps years later. (143)  
 
The fact that such incidences were common occurrences forced citizens to internalize this 
“living memory of terror” (143). Terror soon became “a part of the psyche and identity of 
the individual, the community, and the nation” (Sanford 146). In numerous cases, local 
citizens were forced to participate themselves in the murders and massacres of other 
community members (CEH 50, 3068). According to the REMHI report, “Forced 
participation in atrocities meant that violence became the norm and its source was 
internalized; this redefined social values and the very meaning of community” (Never 
Again 23). Citizens could look at their own hands and know that they had been 
instruments of torture. The CEH suggests that this was one of “los daños más drásticos 
del enfrentamiento” (50). When not only trees but you yourself can invoke the memory 
of torture, then the state’s “rhetoric of fear” has succeeded. Normalized and omnipresent 
in the psyches of Guatemalan citizens, torture contaminated everything, not only 
language but life itself. To borrow Gordon’s terminology, everything “conjured” the 
ghosts of torture (22). Its spectral presence haunted the entire social sphere. 
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As I have argued, any examination of torture must acknowledge its rhetorical 
nature and the importance of the witnessing audience. Yet precisely because of the 
distortions and blurrings examined above, the narratives that people told—not only about 
the violence and torture, but also about themselves—were rendered problematic. To 
explore torture as a “ghostly haunt” (Gordon) necessarily involves a mediation between 
standard conceptions of fact and fiction.
66
 As Gordon writes about sociology, its 
“dominant disciplinary methods and theoretical assumptions constantly struggle against 
the fictive” (25). By “fictive,” she means not only literature, but the complications bound 
up with social life: “the ensemble of cultural imaginings, affective experiences, animated 
objects, marginal voices, narrative densities, and eccentric traces of power’s presence” 
(25). Such is the case in Guatemala. The narratives that Guatemalan citizens told (and 
continue to tell) about themselves and their suffering necessarily occupy an in-between 
space, a gap that defies and blurs the boundaries between the real and the unreal. The 
“seething presence” of torture in language renders all speech problematic. If a “tree” is no 
longer a “tree,” but rather the “tree where a loved one was tortured and killed” then, 
linguistically speaking, torture infected not only everyday life, but also the chain of 
signifiers that governed the production of meaning. When torture corrupts and infects 
language itself, we begin to see the complications inherent in “witnessing” to torture.  
Giorgio Agamben explores the paradoxical nature of bearing witness in his book 
The Remnants of Auschwitz (2002), noting the problematic nature of the term “witness.”
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 For a more sustained treatment of haunting as mediation, see my discussion of Gordon in the 
Introduction to the present study.  
67
 Though being a witness can signify a third party who testifies at a trial (testis), in situations such as that 
of Guatemala, in which one acts as a witness to scenes of violence or torture, more often than not, that 
witness is a survivor (superstes) who “has lived something, who has experienced an event from beginning 
to end and can therefore bear witness to it” (Agamben 17).  For more on the nature of the term witness, see 
Agamben, The Remnants of Auschwitz. 
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In Agamben’s analysis, there is an aporia present in all cases of bearing witness, which 
reveals the general senselessness of bearing witness: “Those who have not lived through 
the experience will never know; those who have will never tell; not really, not 
completely…. The past belongs to the dead” (Elie Wiesel, qtd. in Remnants 33). In other 
words, in all cases of witnessing—not just bearing witness to torture—there will 
inevitably be gaps and aporias that cannot be “witnessed.” In his analysis of Auschwitz, 
Agamben asserts that bearing witness remains an “ontological paradox” (Remnants 131). 
In order to acknowledge this paradox, we must understand that to bear witness faithfully 
means that language “must give way to a non-language in order to show the impossibility 
of bearing witness” (Remnants 39). Any testimony that seeks to explore the gaps and 
disjunctures of society must acknowledge the gaps. Faithful testimony, he concludes, 
must occur at “the disjunction between two impossibilities of bearing witness” (39). 
Agamben calls this the “non-place of articulation” (Remnants 130). Borrowing from 
Agamben, we can see that in order to reflect the “ghostly haunts” of Guatemalan society, 
witnesses must learn to bear witness to their incapacity to speak. In order to bear witness 
to the “impossibility of bearing witness,” their language must become a “non-language” 
(Agamben Remnants 39).  
Writing “non-language,” I would argue, is akin to writing silence. On the one 
hand, silence can be written as a semantic void, representing resistance through sheer 
survival. The mere existence of a non-speaking character in a text can be interpreted as 
evidence of the state’s inability to disappear that person completely. Her bodily presence 
might therefore be understood to represent a haunting reminder of the limit of the state’s 
power and, therefore, a potential form of resistance. On the other hand, it can be argued 
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that the idea of sheer survival—and the resultant conception of silence as semantic 
void—presents a problematic conception of the relationship between violence and 
language. Agamben explores this problematic, noting that over and against conceptions 
of sovereign power as “to make die” and biopower as “to make live,” the “most specific 
trait of twentieth-century biopolitics” is “to make survive” (155). In this sense, survival, 
even the survival of a victim or witness, can only partially be considered resistance, since 
sheer survival remains one of the ultimate goals of the state’s production of power. Just 
as subjects are constituted and produced through various structures of society, to survive 
is to be produced by the structures of power as a survivor. According to Agamben, 
“[b]iopower’s supreme ambition is to produce, in a human body, the absolute separation 
of the living being and the speaking being, zoē and bios, the inhuman and the human—
survival” (156). This separation corresponds to the ontological split described by Scarry. 
A person who merely survives—and who does not speak in the face of the atrocities—has 
become inhuman, thereby confirming the efficacy of the state’s program of 
desubjectification. This form of silence, more akin to a “semantic void,” can resist the 
structures of power only in an evidentiary function which participates in, and therefore 
threatens to repeat, the state’s project of silencing. I would assert that the situation in 
Guatemala reveals these strategies and that one of the key activities of the numerous 
military regimes is not the production of life or death, but rather “a mutable and virtually 
infinite survival” (Agamben 155) that remains ambivalent in its desire for subjection. By 
training the people to accept torture as normal, by confusing what was real with what was 
not, the state’s rhetoric of fear exercised a strict control over the citizens’ ability to mourn 
for those who had died. The acceptance of torture and death as normal, coupled with the 
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impossibility of witness, corrupted citizens’ capacity to mourn for those who had been 
lost. Indeed, it affected their ability to recognize the loss itself. As Judith Butler suggests, 
the impossibility to mourn greatly affects one’s ability to resist state violence. She writes, 
“it is not that mourning is the goal of politics, but that without the capacity to mourn, we 
lose that keener sense of life we need in order to oppose violence” (Butler xvii-xix). It is 
this tangled relationship between torture, witness, language, mourning, and power which 
I seek to explore in the present study.  
In what follows, I will examine the degrees to which Guatemalan authors explore 
the “unarchivability” of testimony and the role of the witness (Agamben 158).
68
 To bear 
witness to torture, I suggest, is to attempt to speak a lacuna, to speak of those boundaries 
between the real and the unreal. Fiction allows us to explore this “unreality principle” 
(Gordon 81) in very fruitful ways. As Taussig confirms:  
All societies live by fictions taken as real. What distinguishes cultures of terror is 
that the epistemological, ontological, and otherwise philosophical problem of 
representation—reality and illusion, certainty and doubt—becomes infinitely 
more than a ‘merely’ philosophical problem of epistemology, hermeneutics, and 
deconstruction. It becomes a high-powered medium of domination. (Shamanism 
121).  
 
As rumors proliferated and questions of representation ceased to be “a ‘merely’ 
philosophical problem” (Taussig, Shamanism 121), Guatemalan authors began to explore 
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 As Agamben writes, the true authority of witness  
depends not on a factual truth, a conformity between something said and a fact or between 
memory and what happened, but rather on the immemorial relation between the unsayable and the 
sayable, between the outside and the inside of language. The authority of the witness consists in 
his capacity to speak solely in the name of an incapacity to speak—that is, in his or her being a 
subject. Testimony thus guarantees not the factual truth of the statement safeguarded in the 
archive, but rather its unarchivability, its exteriority with respect to the archive. (158, italics in 
original)  
The distinction between the living being and the speaking being (and Agamben’s use of testimony as a 
means of refusing to separate the two) presents a unique opportunity for examining the violence and 
repression in Guatemala. 
78 
 
these issues in literature. In order to explore this “impossibility of witness,” I will be 
examining literature produced during the war. 
As the war progressed in Guatemala, authors sought in various ways to narrate 
torture inarticulately, to frustrate and distance the reader in such a way that they might 
bear witness to the “impossibility of bearing witness” (Agamben Remnants 39). Some 
authors, such as Rigoberta Menchú, denounce the violence of the war by narrating the 
violence almost mimetically, yet they allude to cultural secrets to which the reader does 
not have access.
69
 Others, such as Arturo Arias and Marco Antonio Flores, play with 
language and the complexity of the text (e.g. multiple viewpoints, structural 
fragmentation, interior monologue, inverted chronologies) in order to involve the reader 
more actively in constructing the meaning of the text and challenge representation.
70
 Still 
others, such as Rodrigo Rey Rosa, fragment their texts in such a way that the violence is 
not re-presented so much as it is re-staged and repeated within language itself. In each 
chapter of the present study, I will analyze the scenes of torture in the novel in question, 
examining its techniques for re-narrating the state’s practices during the war. Focusing 
specifically on the text’s rhetoric of torture and locating that rhetoric within the text as a 
whole, I will highlight two key factors: the relationship between the physical and 
linguistic components of torture and the certainty or doubt elicited by that relationship.  
In the end, I will argue that any discourse that attempts to reveal and resist the 
atrocities carried out by the military regimes must not only be aware of the military’s 
rhetoric of fear—of the play between visibility and invisibility, reality and unreality; it 
must also employ the same tactics of play in its own narrative. In the same way that the 
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 I will discuss Rigoberta Menchú and the significance of testimonio in chapter two of the present study.  
70
 In chapter three, I will analyze the Guatemalan new novel, focusing specifically on Arias’ Después de las 
bombas (1979) and Flores’ Los compañeros (1976).  
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regime’s spectacles of violence were “given-to-be-invisible”, only those authors who 
seek to bear witness to the “impossibility of bearing witness” (Agamben Remnants 39) 
can succeed in challenging the state’s narrative and resisting its control of the socio-
political imaginary.   
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Chapter Three: A Rhetoric of Certainty: Re-Presentations of Torture in I, Rigoberta 
Menchú 
[T]he uncertainty of the testimony produced 
by torture robes itself in the certainty of the 
experience of the physical body.
71
 
 
When Rigoberta Menchú won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992, the world turned its 
attention to questions of torture, violence, and human rights abuses in Guatemala. Her 
story quickly became known worldwide, captivating audiences with her denunciations of 
the atrocities of the war. By that time, however, her testimony Me llamo Rigoberta 
Menchú y así me nació la conciencia (1983) had already received ample attention in 
various circles and had alerted both scholars and activists to the plight of the indigenous 
peoples of Guatemala during the years of the Internal Armed Conflict.
72
 Menchú first 
started gaining international attention near the end of 1981. Having fled Guatemala the 
previous year in order to seek safety in Mexico, she was known then only as the daughter 
of Vicente Menchú, a Maya activist who had been killed on January 31, 1980 when the 
Guatemalan military destroyed the Spanish embassy during protests of human rights 
violations in the country (Arias, “Rigoberta” 5). In response to the escalation of the 
military’s counterinsurgency campaigns in 1980, many Guatemalans, including Menchú, 
fled to Mexico. Some of these refugees formed Guatemalan opposition groups that 
sought international recognition by launching a media campaign in which representatives 
“toured the United States and Europe in order to alert the world to the ruthlessness and 
viciousness of the Guatemalan regime” (Arias, “Rigoberta” 6).  
                                                 
71
 Ballengee 8. 
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 This text was originally published in Barcelona in 1983. Unless otherwise noted, throughout this chapter 
I will be citing from the English translation I, Rigoberta Menchú (1984). 
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Menchú quickly attracted the attention of numerous international audiences. 
Cécile Rousseau, a French-Canadian who was working with the Revolutionary 
Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), “first noticed her innate ability to tell a 
good story and seduce her audience” orally (Arias, “Rigoberta” 6). Given Menchú’s 
talent for narrating the events of her life, Rousseau then contacted Arturo Taracena, the 
representative for the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (Guerrilla Army of the Poor—
EGP) in France, to inform him that Elisabeth Burgos-Debray “was looking for someone 
with her characteristics to do an interview” for a project she was researching (Arias, 
“Rigoberta” 6). Though she was at first reluctant to interview Menchú, realizing that 
“such projects depend to a large extent on the quality of the relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee” (xiv) and recognizing that she had “never studied Maya-
Quiché culture” and had never worked in Guatemala (xix), Burgos-Debray ultimately 
agreed to do so.  
Menchú, it would seem, was also reluctant to speak to Burgos (Brittin 103), but 
Taracena and the Comité de Unidad Campesina (Committee for Campesino Unity—
CUC) persuaded her to collaborate (Brittin 103). In January of 1982, Menchú was finally 
introduced to Burgos-Debray at her home in Paris (Burgos 54). Her presence there, 
according to Burgos, “had to do not with an anthropological project but with a political 
one” (54). The intention had been to produce and publish an interview with Menchú in 
order to inform public opinion regarding the abuses committed during the war, 
particularly those related to Guatemala’s indigenous communities. Nevertheless, Burgos-
Debray soon realized that the project had developed into much more than that, and the 
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final text also included passages on “her customs, her vision of the world …, and, above 
all, her identity” (Burgos 56).
73
  
Since its publication in 1983, Menchú’s testimonio has sparked numerous debates 
worldwide. It continues to elicit dialogue and controversy today, not only on the general 
issues regarding the philosophical nature of representation, but also on the controversy 
surrounding Menchú’s narration of the specific acts of violence of the war (Stoll). Yet 
despite the thousands of pages published on Menchú’s testimonio over the last few 
decades, no study has drawn attention to the scenes of torture in the work and their 
significance in Menchú’s role as a witness to the atrocities of the war. In what follows, I 
argue that Menchú’s rhetoric of torture seeks to create an empathetic certainty in readers 
that will invoke a reaction against the violence of the state. Her descriptions are not a 
“horror story” (Craft); much less are they “hallucinatory” or “symbolic” (Beverley). 
Rather, I argue that Menchú’s rhetoric of torture relies heavily on the re-presentation of 
detail in order to convey a sense of certainty regarding the torture and death of her 
family. Emphasizing what was known and certain about torture, Menchú is able to cover 
over the “slipperiness” of torture’s meaning (Ballengee) and assign it a determinable 
signification. As I noted in the previous chapter, the polysemy of torture gives it a 
“unique rhetorical potential: the audience’s response—illogical, empathetic, immediate—
feels certain, yet that certainty or authority can be guided in a number of directions by the 
rhetorician, since the various elements involved in the representation of torture actually 
resist determinable meaning” (Ballengee 9). The certainty created by Menchú is guided 
in one primary direction: to move international readers to action. But, as I will argue, she 
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 For a more detailed account of the process of developing the book, as well as the problems concerning 
representation, authorship, and royalties which arose after its publication, see Burgos 54-62. See also Arias, 
“Rigoberta” 5-7.  
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is only able to do this by focusing on the visible and verifiable aspects of torture, thereby 
producing a documentary-like assessment of the torture and death of her brother and 
mother. However, in order to address the specific details of Menchú’s narration and their 
bearing on her rhetoric of torture, it is first necessary to address the numerous 
controversies surrounding the publication of I, Rigoberta Menchú, specifically the issues 
of representation and referentiality.  
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The Controversies Surrounding I, Rigoberta Menchú  
Maybe the truth is unknowable, because the 
milieu is too ambiguous and fraught with 
repression to have confidence in any 
particular version.
74
 
 
The major controversies surrounding I, Rigoberta Menchú emerged following the 
publication of David Stoll’s Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans 
(1999), more than 15 years after the initial publication of Menchú’s text.
75
 Stoll’s book is 
massive, treating not only the historical material covered in I, Rigoberta Menchú, but also 
the events surrounding the book’s “construction,” her winning of the Nobel Prize, and the 
situation in the region of Chimel in the 1990s. But it was not the publication of the book 
that ignited what is now referred to simply as “The Controversy,” but rather an article 
published by Larry Rohter on the front page of the New York Times on December 15, 
1998.
76
 In that article, Rohter’s characterization of Stoll’s findings made it seem as 
though Menchú was a liar (Rohter), something which Stoll never really charged, but 
which quickly became the international perception of Stoll’s argument. Indeed, as Pratt 
affirms, “Many journalistic commentaries appear to be based not on a reading of the book 
at all but on media reports, or a look at the early chapters” (Pratt 38). Sklodowska 
confirms this, noting that the controversy was “impelled by ad hominem attacks and 
fraught with sensationalism” (“Poetics of Remembering” 251). Even before it was 
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 Stoll, Rigoberta Menchú 63. 
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 Stoll’s book presents the findings of his investigations for his doctoral dissertation in anthropology at 
Stanford University. The impact of Stoll’s book has varied from discipline to discipline, depending on the 
focus of the investigation (i.e., studies of gender, investigations into subaltern studies, etc.). Because of the 
immensity of the text, I will be limiting myself to the controversies that bear directly on the question of 
torture and its representation.  
76
 For an excellent and reasonably comprehensive treatment of the controversy, see The Rigoberta Menchú 
Controversy (2001), edited by Arturo Arias. The edited volume contains over 30 essays and articles by 
prominent journalists, critics and scholars, including a previously unpublished article by Stoll.   
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officially released, Stoll’s work became the focus of attention for a large international 
audience. The reactions among critics and journalists varied, and the ensuing “media 
barrage” (Pratt 29) spread rampantly as numerous periodicals covered the story on the 
front page of their publications.
77
 Menchú’s popularity—having won the Nobel Peace 
Prize less than seven years previously—demanded such a reaction, and the entire world 
read with rapt attention as the controversy unfolded. For Stoll’s book was much more 
than simply an attack on Menchú’s character; the political ramifications of Stoll’s 
findings were also considerable. As Arias notes, because she was frequently the guest of 
numerous presidents and prime ministers, the controversy was “a source of concern not 
only to obscure academics, but also to heads of state themselves” (The Rigoberta Menchú 
Controversy 52).
78
 To understand the import of Stoll’s text and its implication for reading 
the torture scenes in Menchú’s testimonio, we must look more closely at “The 
Controversy,” specifically the questions that arise concerning the historical accuracies of 
her testimony and the rhetorical strategies she employs to narrate the violence of the war.  
The primary issue in the controversy concerns the historical accuracy of 
Menchú’s narration. Stoll’s investigation began “when a routine atrocity check … failed 
to corroborate the immolation of her brother and other captives in the Chajul plaza” (Stoll 
8). According to Menchú, her brother and numerous other captives had been burned alive 
in the Chajul plaza in September 1979. Stoll’s investigations, however, soon revealed 
significant contradictions between Menchú’s version of the violence in Chimel and that 
of her neighbors. Drawing on documentary evidence and human rights reports in order to 
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 For a summary of the reactions to Stoll’s findings, see Arias, The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy 51-57.  
78
 Menchú was “on friendly terms with the president of France, who has given her the highest medal in his 
country, the king of Spain, the prime minister of Sweden, and the secretary-general of the United Nations” 
(Arias, The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy 52). Hence the controversy was of great import politically as 
well. 
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demonstrate the extent to which Menchú falsified, or at the very least exaggerated, the 
torture and death of her brother Petrocinio, Stoll soon started to ask himself the question: 
“What if much of Rigoberta’s story is not true?” (viii). His Rigoberta Menchú and the 
Story of All Poor Guatemalans describes in great depth the contradictions he discovered 
and his attempt to wrestle with the implications of Menchú’s claims.   
Yet even before the publication of David Stoll’s book in 1999, Menchú’s text had 
received critical attention from various sectors regarding the issue of representation.
79
 
Because of the highly controversial events surrounding its compilation, editing, and 
publication, it immediately drew fire, leading numerous critics to ask whether they were 
reading the words of Burgos-Debray or Menchú.
80
 Burgos-Debray has been candid in 
acknowledging her role in the editing and compilation, the process of which she has had 
to defend repeatedly over the last few decades.
81
 Despite her assertions that she tried to 
remove herself from the text and allow it to stay in “the form of a monologue” (xx), she 
has been honest in describing her attempts to fix grammatical errors and to maintain the 
chronology of the narrative.
82
 Nevertheless, her frankness did not diminish the number of 
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 The secondary sources are vast and at times overwhelming, and I cannot hope to include an exhaustive 
discussion of those texts here. What follows is a summary of some of the most popular and most cited texts 
on Menchú as they pertain to my current project.  
80
 Regarding the doubts over whether we are reading the words of Menchú or Burgos-Debray, Stoll writes, 
“As soon as the book appeared, skeptics wondered how an unschooled peasant, illiterate and monolingual 
until a few years before, could be so fluent with concepts like class, ethnicity, culture, identity, and 
revolution” (Rigoberta Menchú xiii). As I note below, Stoll later withdrew his critique after gaining access 
to the taped interviews.  
81
 For a discussion of Burgos-Debray’s role in preparing the text for publication, see her “Introduction” to 
the text. For a more extensive defense of her involvement in the production of the work and the 
controversies after its publication, see her “The Story of a Testimonio” (1999). 
82
 According to Menchú, she had only been speaking Spanish for three years when she first met with 
Burgos in 1982 and still committed numerous grammatical errors. Burgos-Debray corrected these mistakes, 
specifically “the gender mistakes which inevitably occur when someone had just learned to speak a foreign 
language. It would have been artificial to leave them uncorrected and it would have made Menchú look 
‘picturesque’” (xx-xxi).  
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attacks, and until the publication of Stoll’s book in 1999, the majority of the discussion 
surrounding Menchú’s text concerned the questions of representation and mediation.  
Such issues are not unique to this particular text. Indeed, the emergence of 
testimonio in Guatemala
83
 reflected a wider trend across Latin America in the 1970s and 
80s.
84
 The widespread violence in Latin America during that time gave rise to the need to 
bear witness to the atrocities and make them known to international audiences. Hence the 
importance of the extraliterary elements involved in the construction of the text, and their 
relationship to debates concerning memory and social justice.
85
 Indeed, it is clear that the 
testimonios that emerged in the 80s in Guatemala constitute responses to an extremely 
aggressive repression. The primary reason for their appearance during the war, of course, 
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 For a more complete list of the development of the testimonial tradition in Guatemala, see Zimmerman, 
“Testimonio in Guatemala.” In that essay, he mentions two texts that emerged well before the 1980s: 
Manuel Galich’s Del pánico al ataque (1949) and Rubén Barreda Avila’s Guaridas infernales (1960), but 
the focus is upon those texts that emerged in the 1980s. in addition to Menchú’s work, he also discusses 
several testimonios that emerged shortly before or just after the publication of Menchú’s text, including 
Ignacio Bizarro Ujpán’s Son of Tecún Umán (1981) and Campesino (1985), Miguel Ángel Albizures’ 
Tiempo de sudor y lucha (1987), and Victor Monetjo’s Testimony (1987). One of the most discussed 
testimonios from Guatemala, besides that of Menchú, is Mario Payeras’ Días de la selva (1980).  
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 Despite the enormous popularity of testimonio and its general acceptance into the academic canon, this 
genre continues to escape easy definition or categorization (Pratt). The canonization of the genre became 
more clearly defined in 1970 when Casa de las Américas in Cuba first incorporated testimonio as one of 
the categories for their annual literary contest (Sklodowska, Testimonio hispanoamericano 55-68). Since 
then, however, there has been no lack of debate regarding the precise definitions and conceptions of this 
category of writing. The most widely cited definition of the genre comes from John Beverley and Marc 
Zimmerman. In their Literature and Politics in the Central American Revolutions (1990), a text that more 
than twenty years after its publication continues to be one of the most popular studies on testimonio, the 
genre they define as follows:  
The general form of the testimonio is a novel or novella-length narrative, told in the first-person 
by a narrator who is also the actual protagonist or witness of the events she or he recounts. The 
unit of narration is usually a life or a significant life episode (e.g., the experience of being 
prisoner). Since in many cases the narrator is someone who is either functionally illiterate or, if 
literate, not a professional writer or intellectual, the production of a testimonio generally involves 
the recording and/or transcription and editing of an oral account by an interlocutor who is a 
journalist, writer, or social activist. (173)  
Despite the widespread acceptance of their definition, however, numerous critics continue to disagree, and 
some even question whether testimonio should be defined as a separate genre at all. As Pratt affirms, “we 
still lack well-developed theoretical frameworks for specifying what testimonio is, how it should be read, 
produced, taught” (42). The debates are thought-provoking and challenging, yet any attempt to proffer a 
“well-developed theoretical framework” would take me beyond the scope of the present study. Hence my 
analysis will focus less on the critical process and more on the textual product. 
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 Indeed, Nance suggests that testimonio “is not only a text. It is a project of social justice in which text is 
an instrument” (Nance 19). 
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was to make the violence perpetrated by the state visible to the world and thereby achieve 
a level of “denuncia política” (Lienhard 312). The linguistic roots of the term testimonio 
clearly indicate its relationship with testifying to, or being a witness to, the violence, and 
thereby to making it visible to the world outside Guatemala. According to Victor Perera, 
Guatemala’s civil war remains one of the most underreported conflicts of the 20th 
century. He suggests that after the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, “a curtain of 
silence descended over Guatemala. The country and its war … have remained largely 
invisible, even to North Americans who defy the State Department’s negative travel 
advisories and fly to the Mayan ruins of Tikal or visit the artisans’ markets of Atitlán and 
Chichicastenango” (11). The idea of “making visible” designates a political message and 
is clearly dependent upon a certain conception of the relationship between presence and 
absence. Regarding the issue of presence and absence in testimonio, Norma Klahn 
discusses the relationship between a novel’s anthropological and fictional elements in 
what she terms the “ficción de lo verificable” (“fiction of the verifiable” [241]). This type 
of fiction, of course, includes above all testimonio, the “novela testimonio” (to borrow the 
term employed by Miguel Barnet) and popular autobiographies. Klahn suggests that we 
must judge these works “no por su referencia sino por su presencia” (“not by their 
reference but rather by their presence” [241]). By this “presence,” she means the ways in 
which the literary freedoms of testimony can be employed to make the truth known to the 
reader. Her commentary merits attention when discussing the place and reputation of 
testimonio and truth in Guatemalan literature. The relation between reference and 
representation entails, more than anything, an investigation of presence, particularly a 
questioning of the presence of specific details and knowledge in the text.  
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This presence has great import in discussing the extraliterary dimensions of 
Menchú’s text, for it can lead us to doubt the voice of the narrator. That is, who is 
narrating the events in question: Menchú or Burgos-Debray? Following Gayatri Spivak’s 
now famous assertion that First World intellectuals often construct representations of the 
Other that continue the project of colonialism, many critics derided Burgos-Debray for 
her role in the compilation of I, Rigoberta Menchú. Advocates of the authenticity model 
of testimonio—which rejects “excessive editorial work as a subversion of the genre: it 
sullies the witness’s ‘presence;’ it distorts testimonio’s ‘claim to the real’” (Brooks 
182)—have repeatedly criticized Burgos-Debray with charges of ethnographic 
interference. Others, however, have defended Burgos-Debray, noting that she provided a 
means by which Menchú could speak out, “without at all undermining the ultimate 
authority of Menchú herself as a specially privileged subaltern who can indeed speak” 
(Zimmerman 55). Alice Brittin, one of the most ardent defenders of Burgos-Debray, 
argues that Menchú ultimately succeeds in speaking for herself. In her article “Close 
Encounters of the Third World Kind: Rigoberta Menchú and Elisabeth Burgos’s Me 
llamo Rigoberta Menchú” (1995), Brittin concludes that “though Menchú’s discourse 
was definitely mediated by Elisabeth Burgos, it would be misleading to say that it was 
either manipulated, exploited, or controlled by her” (104).
86
 Citing an interview with 
Menchú that she and Kenya Dworkin published in 1993, Brittin reveals that Menchú and 
the CUC actually participated in editing the final transcription of the interviews and had 
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 To suggest that Menchú was manipulated by Burgos-Debray ignores the performative aspects of 
testimonio and the interview process in general. As Beverly and Zimmerman affirm, “In the creation of the 
testimonial text, control of representation does not flow one way: someone like Rigoberta Menchú is also in 
a sense manipulating and exploiting her interlocutor in order to have her story reach an international 
audience, something which, as a political activist, she sees in quite utilitarian terms” (Beverly and 
Zimmerman 177). For more on the performative aspects of testimonio, see my treatment of Brooks below.  
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the final say in what was published in the “finished product,” altering several passages 
and removing other ones entirely (Brittin 104).
87
 Beverly remarks that, despite the role 
that Burgos-Debray played in editing and sometimes rearranging the chapters, there 
remains little doubt that “the individual diegetic units are wholly composed by Menchú, 
and depend on her narrative skills” (Beverly, 165-66, qtd in Zimmerman 57). Though 
Burgos-Debray has yet to publish the tapes of her interviews with Menchú, she has 
granted access to some critics, including Stoll. Notwithstanding minor corrections and 
organizational decisions, Stoll confirms that the published text was not altered 
significantly by Burgos-Debray. He writes:   
Now that I have been able to listen to the eighteen hours, I am pleased to report 
that they bear out my earlier conclusion, as well as the most recent of Menchú’s 
own statements, that this is indeed her story. In view of Burgos’s explanation that 
she shifted Menchú’s episodes to maintain chronology, what most surprised me 
about the tapes is how closely Burgos ended up following them in the book. 
(“Interview” n. pag.)  
 
Thus we can see that, even though the question of representation must be addressed, 
several scholars—including Stoll, who has been one of the most vocal critics—argue 
quite forcefully that what we have in I, Rigoberta Menchú is indeed Menchú’s story. If 
                                                 
87
Even though an analysis of the role of the CUC in the process of compiling I, Rigoberta Menchú would 
lead us away from the focus of this chapter, it is, nonetheless, an interesting point of contention for some 
critics. The CUC emerged between 1976 and 1978 in response to the escalating violence against the 
indigenous populations of Guatemala. Jonas describes the CUC as “a national peasant organization, 
including both peasants and agricultural workers, both Indians and poor ladinos, but led primarily by 
Indians—almost by definition a ‘subversive’ organization, from the viewpoint of the ruling coalition” 
(127). Hence there is reason to suspect, as critics such as Dinesh D’Souza have, whether Menchú is merely 
“a mouthpiece for a sophisticated left-wing critique of Western society, all the more devastating because it 
issues not from a French scholar-activist but from a seemingly authentic Third World source” (D’Souza 
72). Yet we must remember that Menchú was politically active long before her interview with Burgos-
Debray, and while she may have been persuaded to carry out the interview, at no time has she given the 
impression that she was forced to do so. Menchú continually stresses her interest in producing the 
testimonio, stating that “it was very important to give this as a memory, and this idea was what most 
compelled me to do it, and I threw myself into the project with a lot of strong emotion” (Brittin and 
Dworkin, qtd in Brittin 105). In that same interview Menchú states that this desire to share her memory 
actually “determined the way in which the book was done” (Brittin and Dworkin, qtd in Brittin 105), thus 
reaffirming her own role in the editing and compilation of the text. For more details, see Brittin.  
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the notion of representation ceases to be a major issue, then we must return to the notion 
of referentiality, specifically the question posed earlier: are the specifics of Menchú’s 
story as important as its foundations? What, if any, is the significance of Stoll’s exposure 
of the contradictions in Menchú’s narrative?
88
  
 In order to explore the question of referentiality and historical inaccuracies, we 
must first briefly note the intended readership of I, Rigoberta Menchú. After all, the 
questions of readership and audience directly relate to the composition of a text and the 
rhetorical devices employed. Zimmerman notes that the underlying purpose of the entire 
process of producing I, Rigoberta Menchú was influenced by “the clear political intent 
that her story reach millions who would otherwise not know of, or not experience through 
empathy, the moving events that emerge in the resulting text” (Zimmerman 56). Indeed, 
the fact that the text was first published in Barcelona (1983) and then translated into 
English the following year in New York and London indicates that the intended 
readership was the world beyond Guatemala’s borders. Furthermore, because of 
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 Stoll is quick to point out that his argument is not limited to revealing historical inaccuracies about how 
Menchú’s brother died, and that the contradictions of her narrative have more profound political 
consequences. More broadly conceived, his work had several goals: 
to analyze how political violence reached Uspantán; to defy romantic prejudices about indigenous 
communities and guerrilla warfare; to prove that rebel movements originated in the urban middle 
class; to explain why they did not develop roots among indigenous peoples; and to analyze how 
the academic world constructs the sacred, to the detriment of the scientific spirit. (Fernández 
García 69).    
Despite the fact that Stoll’s book has received far more attention for pointing out historical inaccuracies 
than it has for anything else, Stoll suggested in the book itself that it would be a mistake to focus solely on 
what did or did not happen in Chimel. And he admits that “[t]here is no doubt about the most important 
points: that a dictatorship massacred thousands of indigenous peasants, that the victims included half of 
Rigoberta’s immediate family, that she fled to Mexico to save her life, and that she joined a revolutionary 
movement to liberate her country” (viii). For Stoll, the central question is not so much the narrative 
truthfulness of her account, but her rationale concerning why the violence began in Chimel in the first 
place. At stake is less the historical accuracy than a more profound understanding of the nature of the 
violence. For Stoll, therefore, the most important point is to recognize why the violence was carried out in 
Chimel in order to see what is gained by Menchú’s descriptions of the violence. My purposes here have a 
similar goal. My question is not about the historical inaccuracies themselves, but why Menchú felt the need 
to exaggerate in her account. That is, my focus is more on the rhetorical effect of those exaggerations than 
it is on the exaggerations themselves.  
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repression and censorship, the book was virtually impossible to find in Guatemala for 
nearly ten years after its publication. Thus there were multiple reasons that the initial 
readership was primarily foreign. The text did not reach a Latin American publisher until 
1985 (Siglo XXI). Unlike the texts of major boom novelists whose translation into other 
languages, notably English, signaled their popularity and international acclaim as best-
sellers, the early translation of Menchú’s work into English reveals instead the “strategy 
to reach an international reading public with political clout who might express outrage 
when confronted with eyewitness accounts and with information regarding its own 
government’s complicity in perpetuating the injustices” (Craft 46). Menchú was aware of 
the intended readership from the beginning, and this greatly affected her narration during 
the interviews. She had seen pamphlets about the lives and suffering of indigenous 
peoples in Latin America, and she did not want her story to be ignored. Regarding her 
experiences and the life of her community, Menchú asserts, 
It’s that it was going to make me enormously sad if that life ended up like any 
other pamphlet from Latin America, the way the lives of children, mothers, and 
old folks in Latin America have ended up. No one paid any attention to them. For 
me, it was very important to give this as a memory, and this idea was what most 
compelled me to do it, and I threw myself into the project with a lot of strong 
emotion. (Brittin and Dworkin, qtd in Brittin 105) 
 
Her numerous dealings with international audiences had provided her with the experience 
necessary to craft her narrative in such a way that it would be rhetorically effective. Her 
goal was to make people pay attention.  
Of course, the goal of reaching an international audience is not without 
complication. As Zimmerman notes, in the process of appealing to a primarily First 
World audience, Menchú “must choose which aspects of her culture she seeks to 
preserve, which to modify, transform, reject, which to stress at one moment, which to 
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stress at the next. By her life and narrative choices, she and her text come to embody this 
process” (69). In other words, she must determine what to disclose and what to keep 
secret. When considering the question of “secrets” within Menchú’s text, Doris 
Sommer’s article “Rigoberta’s Secrets” (1991) remains one of the most influential and 
most cited secondary texts on Menchú’s work.
89
 In that article, Sommer marvels at the 
withholding of information in Menchú’s text and observes that her “refusal to tell secrets 
remains on the page after the editing is done” (32). For example, Menchú explains in her 
account, “I’m still keeping secret what I think no-one should know. Not even 
anthropologists or intellectuals, no matter how many books they have, can find out all our 
secrets” (247). Not only does there exist a “silence” in the text regarding certain aspects 
of her culture, but also that silence is spoken in order to maintain a distance between 
reader and writer.  
Sommer examines these “secrets” in great detail. Drawing on Nietzsche’s 
treatment of the truth value of language and the rhetorical strategy of “troping” (36), 
Sommer notes that language “cannot absolutely affirm anything without acknowledging 
that any affirmation is based on a collective lie” (34). Because it remains impossible to 
determine any “categorical difference between one kind of writing and another” (33), 
readers must be aware that “the difference between truth and fiction, philosophy and 
literature, constatives and performatives, philosophical persuasion and literary troping is 
finally undecidable” (34). Hence Sommer concludes that Menchú’s strategy within the 
text must be more literary and rhetorical than it is “real” (36), suggesting that her refusal 
to divulge all of her secrets remains primarily “performative; it constructs metaleptically 
the apparent cause of the refusal: our craving to know. Before she denies us the 
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 For a contrasting interpretation of the secret in Menchú’s text, see Williams 95-97. 
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satisfaction of learning her secrets, we may not be aware of any desire to grasp them” 
(34). Furthermore, despite the aforementioned desire to cater to an international audience, 
“[t]he calculated result of Rigoberta’s gesture for sympathetic readers is, paradoxically, 
to exclude us from her circle of intimates” (36). According to Sommer, the goal of her 
“rather flamboyant refusal of information” (36) is to produce “a particular kind of 
distance akin to respect” in which readers are forced to acknowledge simply that 
“difference exists” and deter any “illusion of complete or stable knowledge” (36). In 
many cases, these secrets concern practices known only to the Quichés, such as 
ceremonies of birth, sowing, marriage, and death. In Menchú’s words, they are secrets 
that “no-one except we Indians must know” (13). Santiago Colás also notes this rhetorical 
use of distancing in the text, suggesting that Menchú employs a form of representation 
that purposefully dislocates and disjoins the “representative” and the “represented.”
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Thus despite the convincing nature of Menchú’s voice and language, there is no desire to 
create an easy identification between reader and writer. According to Sommer, the “I” in 
Menchú’s text “neither presumes nor even invites us to identify with it. We are too 
foreign, and there is no pretense here of universal or essential human experience. That is 
why, at the end of a long narrative in which Rigoberta has told us so much, she reminds 
us that she has set limits which we must respect” (Sommer 39). Such a strategy frustrates 
the desires of readers who expect to come away from the text with a truth. As 
Zimmerman remarks, “our whole sense of truth becomes undermined and problematized, 
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 The relationship between distancing and representation is important. According to Colás, representation 
in Menchú’s text is an impossibility, a fiction that can only exist “to the extent that the transparency 
entailed by the concept is never achieved; and that a permanent dislocation exists between the 
representative and the represented” (Ernesto Lacau, qtd. in Colás 169). The dislocation is irreparable and 
prohibits “representative” access to Menchú’s history. This dislocation is what Doris Sommer refers to as 
Menchú’s “secrets.” 
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and there is nothing we can know with certainty” (Zimmerman 60). According to 
Zimmerman, the goal of this distancing is not, however, some “festishized privileging of 
ambiguity” (60), that is, a celebration of ambiguity and unknowing for the sake of 
philosophical abstraction. Rather, Menchú employs the rhetorical strategies of distancing 
and uncertainty in order to “protect the truth from distortion and manipulation” 
(Zimmerman 60). Having seen the ways in which international audiences manipulate and 
exploit the indigenous peoples of Latin America, Menchú chooses to keep her distance. 
We must ask ourselves, however, how Menchú hopes to reach an international audience 
and share her memory with readers (Brittin 105) if she continually distances them with 
her secrets. Are there other rhetorical strategies employed by Menchú that offset the 
secrets and their destabilization of the relationship between text and reader?
91
 Are there 
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 Other critics have explored the destabilization between reader and writer. In addition to Sommer and 
Colás, Brooks argues that Burgos-Debray actually plays a strong role in fomenting that relationship, and 
points to the rhetorical strategies employed by Burgos-Debray in the introduction to I, Rigoberta Menchú. 
Brooks proceeds to document those strategies, the goal of which was to stage that “trace of the real” and to 
produce “the sense (aesthetic and ideological) of the witness’s physical presence” (Brooks 187). Her 
interest is less in Rigoberta’s presence than in the strategies by which that presence was staged or 
performed. For example, in the introduction to I, Rigoberta Menchú, Burgos-Debray describes in great 
detail the first time she met Menchú. Yet according to Brooks, this description is more “melodramatic 
scenario” than truth, and actually “has nothing to do with reality” (Brooks 188). Burgos-Debray’s first 
meeting with Menchú was actually very different from the scene described in the introduction (Brooks). 
Brooks argues that Burgos-Debray sought to portray the encounter with Menchú more literarily, as “the 
editor’s-first-encounter-with-the-Other,” a scenario that is found in numerous testimonios, not just I, 
Rigoberta Menchú. According to Brooks, in order to create the appropriate effect for the reader, this staged 
encounter is, and must always be, “calculatedly, and successfully, unheimlich” (Brooks 189). As Brooks 
remarks, “Menchú is certainly physically there. But her thereness, her ‘presence’ or ‘trace’ is generated not 
by mimesis—the journalistic imitation of ‘authentic reality—but by poesis, by the mounting of a new, 
theatrical reality” (189). According to Brooks, this unheimlich presence becomes necessary when there is a 
presumed distance, particularly a sociocultural distance, between author and reader. According to Brooks, 
testimonio “is a performance-based, collaborative form of writing, grounded not in journalism or legal 
testimony but in anthropology—itself a collaborative, performance-based discipline” (182). Because of the 
performative nature of the genre, Brooks calls it “anthropological theatrics”: 
The witness and the editor speak in words hidden from the reader/audience by a theatrical scrim or 
literary staging. As such, they cannot be taken at face value nor can the speaker be held 
responsible for them as fact-based or ‘serious’ statements. Rather than verifiable truth claims, the 
witness’s and editor’s words are enactments of broader truths—performances of the dialogical 
process by which truths originate. (Brooks 183) 
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other aspects of her text that make an identification between reader and writer more 
feasible?  
I suggest that the answers to these questions can be found in Menchú’s 
descriptions of her brother’s and her mother’s torture. At first sight, it would seem that 
Menchú’s secretive privileging of the unknown and the uncertain reflects a general 
strategy in the text to distance readers and frustrate their access to the “truth.” Not only 
would such a strategy avoid cultural and political exploitation, it would also in many 
ways recreate that feeling of uncertainty and unknowing produced by the state’s rhetoric 
of fear and the lack of access to official information.
92
 But that is not the case. Menchú 
does not seek to recreate that feeling, but rather to counter it and thereby resist it. As 
noted in the first chapter, the state had successfully enacted a strategy that limited what 
could be seen or heard in public. This rhetoric of fear trained its citizens to see only that 
which is “given to be visible” (Taylor). Therefore, in addition to affecting its citizens’ 
sense perceptions, the state had set itself up as “the arbiter of what [was] real and what 
[was] not” (Cavanaugh 55). Rather than set firm boundaries between the two, it was more 
profitable for the Guatemalan state “to leave those boundaries confused and ambiguous. 
Ambiguity and unknowing create anxiety, which in turn creates the demand for order 
which the state provides” (Cavanaugh 55). In Guatemala, the real and unreal—as well as 
the citizen’s ability to discern and narrate them—remained purposefully unfixed, 
ultimately allowing the state to justify its own existence. In order for Menchú to resist the 
state’s rhetoric of fear, she could not leave the boundaries unfixed. Thus any privileging 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brooks then proceeds to criticize critics like Berverley who, despite being aware of the performative nature 
of testimonio (see note above), are nonetheless “[s]educed by the notion of Menchú’s ephemeral ‘trace’ on 
the testimonio page” (Brooks 188).  
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 For my discussion of the state’s rhetoric of fear as a strategy for social control, see Chapter One of the 
present study.  
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of the uncertain and unknowable was limited exclusively to those passages dealing with 
the cultural practices of her community, and does not apply to her narrations of torture. In 
fact, I argue that in order to offset the uncertainty produced by her secrets, Menchú 
employs a rhetoric of certainty in her narrations of torture that seeks to create an 
empathetic bond with readers and thus invoke a reaction against the violence of the state.  
I demonstrate that Menchú’s rhetoric of torture relies heavily not only on the re-
presentation of detail, but in some cases on the personalized and individualized 
exaggeration of it, in order to give a documentary-like assessment of the torture and death 
of her brother and mother. The use of sharp and vivid details, even when those details 
might contradict what really happened, aims to repair and offset any distancing created 
by her secrets. In those passages, the goal is exactly the opposite of her secrets: to over-
write doubt and unknowing and privilege her access to the “truth” about the torture. 
Those passages provide sufficient detail so that the reader attains a “complete” and 
“stable” knowledge, a truth that appears to be unmarred and undistorted.
93
 This emphasis 
on detail highlights the importance of the historical veracity of her claims about the 
violence more generally, and the torture of her brother more specifically. All 
representations of violence and torture have a rhetorical purpose, and, therefore, are 
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 Here we can see a connection between Menchú’s position and what Avery Gordon calls hypervisibility:   
Hypervisibility is a kind of obscenity of accuracy that abolishes the distinctions between 
‘permission and prohibition, presence and absence.’ No shadows, no ghosts. In a culture 
seemingly ruled by technologies of hypervisibility, everything is available and accessible for our 
consumption. In a culture seemingly ruled by technologies of hypervisibility, we are led to believe 
that neither repression nor the return of the repressed, in the form of either improperly buried 
bodies or countervailing systems of value or difference, occurs with any meaningful result. (16) 
The failure of hypervisibility is to assume that nothing lies outside our gaze, that there are no gaps or 
fissures in the way we see the world: “no shadows, no ghosts.” Everything can be seen, described, and put 
on view for the consumer , or in our situation, the reader. According to Gordon, many disciplines (her focus 
in this passage is on sociology) presume that “everything is on view” and “everything can be described” 
(13). Such a vision fails to move previous preoccupations with positivistic epistemologies and ontologies of 
the visible. As I will argue in this chapter, Menchú seems to subscribe to such a conception of the visible in 
her treatment of torture. 
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intended to invoke a particular response in the witnessing audience. In order to 
understand that persuasive function, we must now turn to the torture scenes in I, 
Rigoberta Menchú.  
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Recollecting Torture  
What haunts are not the dead, but the gaps 
left within us by the secrets of others.
94
 
 
Despite the lack of critical attention to the torture scenes in I, Rigoberta Menchú, 
critics have nevertheless noticed the moral and legal imperatives that emanate from the 
text, drawing attention to the authority with which Menchú speaks about the violence in 
Guatemala and the need for something to be done. Linda Craft, for example, in her study 
of testimony and resistance literature in Central America, mentions the authority of 
Menchú’s voice, and though she does not elaborate in detail, she appears to attribute that 
authority to Menchú’s status as a firsthand witness to the torture and death of her family: 
“one by one, she witnessed the torture, rape, and murder of various members of her 
family” (1). Craft asserts that precisely because of that witness, her account grabs the 
attention of readers and renders them “morally obliged to pay attention” (Craft 12). But 
what happens if Menchú was not actually there, as Stoll has confirmed? Does that 
undermine Menchú’s authority? After all, Stoll has shown in numerous points in the 
narrative, her story “is not the eyewitness account that it purports to be” (70). Even 
though she claims that she and the rest of her family were there to witness the death of 
her brother, her father “was professing ignorance about the fate of his son shortly before 
his own death” and Menchú could not have been there either (Stoll 70). So if she did not 
witness the events in Chajul, is the authority of her text undermined? Does the authority 
of her text reside in her status as “firsthand” witness?  
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 Abraham and Torok, Shell and the Kernel.  
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Many critics have chosen to dismiss Stoll’s findings as essentially irrelevant, 
asserting that Menchú’s representation remains much more important than the actual 
referentiality, the “literal truth” of her claims. According to Zimmerman, for example, the  
questions of Rigoberta’s protective games, her possibly traumatized memory, her 
use of literary tropes, her fix on collective identity, and so forth—even her 
representativity of some or all of Guatemala’s Indian groups—all help to explain 
possible deviations from ‘what really happened.’ (Zimmerman 68) 
In other words, there are reasons to explain why Menchú told her story the way she did, 
and thus critics like Zimmerman are willing to forgive historical inaccuracies in 
Menchú’s testimonio. Focusing more on the broad truth regarding what happened during 
the war, Zimmerman asserts that whatever doubts or suspicions have emerged about the 
specifics of Menchú’s story, Stoll and those who defend him “have failed to shake its 
foundations: the atrocities, the murders, the losses, in the context of events about which 
many people know from a wide variety of printed and taped narratives” (Zimmerman 68). 
I cannot underestimate the importance of Zimmerman’s position and its bearing on my 
purposes in this project, for it raises critical questions concerning how many Guatemalans 
chose to narrate the violence of the Armed Conflict. As I suggested in the Introduction 
and in Chapter One, any discourse that attempts to reveal and resist the atrocities carried 
out by the military regimes must not only be aware of the military’s rhetoric of fear—of 
the play between visibility and invisibility, reality and unreality—it must also employ the 
same tactics of play in its own narration of that violence. That is, these narratives must 
also “play” with the facts and manipulate language in order to bear witness to events that 
for many were unspeakable. Following this line of thought, is it not possible to defend 
Zimmerman and defend his claim that the specifics of Menchú’s story are not as 
important as the fact that it is convincing, and that it succeeded in garnering international 
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attention and support for the victims of the violence? Indeed, given the prevalence of 
postmodern literary approaches as well as the current popularity of the “constructed” or 
“imagined” nature of concepts such as nation, community, gender, and sexuality, the 
factual veracity of Menchú’s narration might seem insignificant.  
Even Stoll, despite his reputation for calling Menchú a “liar” and for directing the 
world’s attention to the historical inaccuracies of Menchú’s account, actually admits in 
his study that the contradictions are of little consequence. The fact that Petrocinio was 
probably not burned to death in the town plaza does not mean that others did not die in a 
similar fashion. Menchú’s story, “[e]xcept for the sensational details,” remains mostly 
true (Stoll 70). As Stoll affirms, “She is correct that the army brought prisoners to Chajul, 
claimed that they were guerrillas, and murdered them to intimidate the population. As 
best anyone can determine, they included her younger brother” (Stoll 70). Neither 
Menchú’s physical absence during her brother’s death nor the “sensational details” (Stoll 
70) damage the moving nature of Menchú’s story. The question remains: why is 
Menchú’s narrative so forceful? I argue that we should not focus on the question of 
Menchú’s authority, nor on the correspondence between her descriptions and what really 
happened. Rather a key element in the authority of Menchú’s account lies in her 
presentation of torture and its meaning, specifically its evidentiary and rhetorical 
function. Menchú’s descriptions of the torture of her brother and mother provide textual 
evidence of the military’s actions, and represents her attempt to bear witness to the 
horrors of the war by seeking to re-present and “recollect” his torture and death for the 
reader. 
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Viewed by many as the climactic moment of the book, the chapter dealing with 
the death of Menchú’s brother Petrocinio was “reprinted in magazines and read aloud at 
conferences, with the hall darkened except for a spotlight on the narrator” (Stoll 2).
95
 
Menchú opens her description of the death of her brother by highlighting his involvement 
in organizing the people against the military presence in the region.
96
 Unlike the rest of 
her brothers who had fled to other parts of the country in order not “to expose the 
community to danger” and to protect their family from what the government considered 
to be a “bad influence,” Petrocinio had elected to stay in the community (172). Menchú’s 
father had gone into hiding because of his involvement with the CUC, and Menchú 
herself was working in the Department of Huehuetenango (173). According to Menchú, it 
was precisely because Petrocinio was the “secretary of the community” (172), however, 
that he remained behind.  
According to Menchú’s account, Petrocinio was kidnapped on September 9, 1979. 
From the very beginning of her description, Menchú notes the shocking nature of his 
abduction, torture, and death. For those who have not witnessed the atrocities of the war 
and the brutality of the Guatemalan military, Menchú warns that her narration may even 
appear to be “an unbelievable story” (173). As I have suggested, however, Menchú’s goal 
in narrating these events was to convince international readers of the events described, 
not merely to suggest the possibility that they could have happened, but to prove that they 
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 The chapter “The Torture and Death of Her Little Brother, Burnt Alive in Front of Members of Their 
Families and the Community” is chapter XXIII in the Spanish version but chapter 24 in the English 
translation.  
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 In the Spanish edition, she says that he was kidnapped on September 9 but that his disappearance was not 
noted until November 9 (199). Clearly this is an error and has been corrected in the English translations. A 
few sentences later, Menchú notes that her mother contacted her as soon as she learned he was missing, 
after which she went home to be with her mother. Petrocinio had only been missing three days when 
Menchú arrived in September, clearly well before the erroneous November 9 date (174). It is odd that 
Vicente Menchú would make the same mistake in an interview with David Stoll (Stoll 66).     
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occurred precisely as she describes them. Menchú maintains that she and her family not 
only learned the exact details of his capture and torture, but that they were also witnesses 
to his brutal death. Her family, she states, “managed to find out how he died, what 
tortures they inflicted on him from start to finish” (173). Given my treatment in Chapter 
One of the prevalence of rumors, however, we must take caution and note the 
problematic nature of any type of “knowing” about the violence perpetrated by the 
military, especially concerning the massacres or torture. Menchú emphasis on the 
certainty of this “knowing”—that despite the seemingly unbelievable nature of the 
events, her account is historically accurate and verifiable—runs contrary to what we 
know about the nature of the rumors during the war and the impossibility of witnessing to 
the massacres.
97
 We must bear this problematic in mind as we read her narration of the 
events surrounding her brother’s kidnapping, torture, and death. For example, Menchú 
states that after he was kidnapped, the girl and her mother who had been with Petrocinio 
at the time followed him and his abductors for two kilometers, to the army’s camp. 
Petrocinio was tied up and beaten as he walked. When he fell, they dragged him over 
rocks and fallen limbs, disfiguring his face (173). Menchú learned of these details 
secondhand, presumably from the women who had followed him during his abduction. 
Once Petrocinio arrived at the camp, his captors questioned him and tortured him to make 
him reveal the whereabouts of his family members (174). Menchú states that because of 
his unwillingness to reveal that information, he was “subjected to terrible, terrible pain” 
(174).  
According to Menchú, the precise details of that torture were proclaimed publicly. 
Two weeks after his capture, the army announced that it would be carrying out a public 
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 For my treatment of the impossibility of witness, see Chapter One of the present study. 
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punishment of all the guerrillas imprisoned in their camp, including Petrocinio. The 
spectacle would be carried out on September 24 in Chajul, a town twenty-five kilometers 
from her home in Chimel. Rigoberta and her family only heard about the punishment the 
day before and travelled overnight to arrive in Chajul the following morning, just in time 
to see the prisoners being unloaded from an army truck. According to Menchú, her 
mother recognized Petrocinio at once. His head had been shaved and cut. His fingernails 
had been removed and his wounds were swollen from infection. But according to 
Menchú, she and her parents knew without a doubt that it was Petrocinio. After an officer 
admonished the crowd, warning them of the evils of communism, the prisoners’ clothes 
were removed, and an officer proceeded to describe in detail each prisoner’s wounds and 
how they had been inflicted. In Menchú’s account, the officer explained all this so that 
the crowd could see what awaited anyone who associated with the communists. Menchú 
notes that the officer made continual reference to the issue of communism: “he must have 
repeated the word ‘communist’ a hundred times” (177). The insistence upon this point 
occurs multiple times in Menchú’s narration. As readers, we can draw two conclusions. 
First, Menchú narrates the scene as if the military had an ostensible reason for abducting 
and torturing Petrocinio. Second, the military sought to use the public massacre as a 
means to frighten the masses. For the military, it would seem, Petrocinio’s death was 
justified as a means of obtaining information about other communists and as a 
mechanism for preventing others from joining the communists’ cause. In other words, 
Menchú states that the military understood its actions to be justified. Once this message 
had been announced to the public, the prisoners were then soaked in gasoline and set on 
fire, thus searing the message into the public memory.   
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The precision of Menchú’s description of the events in the plaza was one of the 
details that initially raised suspicions during Stoll’s investigations. As Stoll was 
questioning Domingo, an elder in the town of Chajul, he realized that one of his questions 
had caught the man off guard: “The army burned prisoners alive in the town plaza? Not 
here, he said” (Stoll 1). Domingo was the first of seven people in Chajul who told Stoll 
that no one had been burned publicly (Stoll 2). Stoll was initially unconcerned with such 
discrepancies; after all, he was “able to corroborate that the brother had died at Chajul, if 
not in the precise manner described” (8) by Menchú in her testimonio. He admits that 
“[g]iven the vagaries of memory and the translation of eyewitness accounts into 
secondhand ones, it is hardly surprising that there are conflicting versions” (69). Indeed, 
given the proliferation of rumors during the war and the evidence of multiple, 
contradictory narrations of the massacres, not only is it not surprising, it is expected. Stoll 
even acknowledges that his sources may have still been too frightened of the army to give 
a truthful account of what they had witnessed (69). Given these variables, Stoll initially 
accepted the possibility that Menchú’s version was factual.  
What he could not dismiss, however, was the fact that Petrocinio’s father, during 
an interview in January 1980, only four months after the death of Petrocinio, “had yet to 
accept that his son was really dead” (Stoll 70). In that interview, Petrocinio’s father and 
his delegation stated that they did not know with certainty if Petrocinio was alive or 
whether he had been among those killed in Chajul, and they could only confirm with any 
confidence that seven prisoners had died. Their identities remained unknown. Some 
maintained that they had been executed in front of the church; others “insisted that the 
seven were killed on the road into town … then dumped in the plaza to dramatize one of 
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the army’s antiguerrilla harangues” (Stoll 70). But the precise details were uncertain. 
Many attacked Stoll after the publication of his book, suggesting that the “inaccuracies” 
he discovered were due to the “vagaries of memory” or fear of discussing the military’s 
violence with an American anthropologist. After all, even though he was conducting his 
research nearly ten years after the massacre in Chajul, the fear of the military remained 
quite strong. Yet the “vagaries of memory” and the fear of retaliation do not explain why 
Petrocinio’s father could not confirm his son’s death only four months after the massacre. 
Nor do they explain the fact that the accounts gathered by Stoll in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s—affirming that the seven were killed by the road and then carried to the 
plaza—were subsequently corroborated by human rights reports and by Mario Payeras of 
the EGP (Stoll 70). My goal is not to defend Stoll or his investigation into the violence.
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Rather, my goal is to point out the numerous uncertainties involved. This confusion 
between the certainty and the uncertainty of what had actually happened in Chajul 
coincides with the army’s practices of spreading confusion and fear, which I noted in 
Chapter One. Therefore, though I agree with Stoll that it is important to consider the 
possibility that Menchú was not “really” there and did not witness her brother’s death 
“firsthand,” what we must look at more closely is why she felt compelled to narrate the 
event as if she had been and what effect her account has on the reader. Though they may 
be “inaccurate,” the details are important. The critical question is not only why she 
narrated her brother’s torture and death as if she had been present, but also, why she did 
so in such a detailed manner. How do these historical inaccuracies affect our 
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 Nevertheless, I do agree with Stoll that it is unlikely Menchú’s version is “historically accurate” given 
the numerous reports of uncertainty and the fact that only 4 months after the massacre in Chajul, 
Petrocinio’s father denied knowledge of his son’s death. 
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understanding of Menchú’s rhetoric of torture? What purpose does the preponderance of 
details serve?   
Most importantly, the details do not serve to present Menchú’s narrative as “a 
horror story,” as claimed by Craft (1). Nor are her descriptions “hallucinatory” or 
“symbolic” as stated by Beverley, according to whom the descriptions are so graphic as 
to appear unreal (“Margin” 33).
99
 Horror stories—particularly those that employ 
“hallucinatory” or “symbolic” descriptions of violence that cannot be verified or affirmed 
with any conviction—generally aim to instill fear and uncertainty in the reader. Such 
strategies would not be able to offset the distancing produced by Menchú’s secrets. On 
the contrary, such fear would further distance readers, an effect that, as noted above, 
Menchú hoped to avoid. It is certainly true that Menchú includes startlingly descriptive 
details in her account. In Menchú’s own graphic language, she notes that her brother was 
“cut in various places. His head was shaved and slashed. He had no nails. He had no soles 
to his feet. The earlier wounds were suppurating from infection” (178). As readers, we 
can see the appalling nature of her brother’s torture. The woman prisoner, who was also 
put on display, is also described in excruciating detail:  
They had shaved her private parts. The nipple of one of her breasts was missing 
and her other breast was cut off. She had the marks of bites on different parts of 
her body. She was bitten all over, the compañera. She had no ears. All of them 
were missing part of the tongue or had had their tongues split apart. (178) 
 
Clearly, these descriptions are appalling, and there is little doubt that her manner of 
informing the reader of the terrible nature of torture is graphic. In describing her brother’s 
capture, Menchú says “They tied him up, they tied his testicles, my brother’s sexual 
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 For example, Beverley characterizes the torture scenes as “magic realism” (“Margin” 33). He argues that 
the specificity and “excruciating detail” of her account serve to provide her narration “a hallucinatory and 
symbolic intensity different from the matter-of-fact narration one expects from testimonio. One could say 
this is a kind of testimonial expressionism or ‘magic realism’” (“Margin” 33).  
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organs, they tied them behind with string and forced him to run. Well, he couldn’t stand 
that, my little brother, he couldn’t bear that awful pain and he cried out, he asked for 
mercy” (174). But though such passages are indeed violent, they are not “hallucinatory.” 
In fact, when she describes the specific tortures Petrocinio underwent, the specificity and 
detail make her depictions seem exactly the opposite, that is, much more like “matter-of-
fact narration”:  
My brother was tortured for more than sixteen days. They cut off his fingernails, 
they cut off his fingers, they cut off his skin, they burned parts of his skin. Many 
of the wounds, the first ones, swelled and were infected. … They shaved his head, 
left just the skin, and also they cut the skin off his head and pulled it down on 
either side and cut off the fleshy part of his face. (174)  
 
Granted, the detailed nature of this scene is so graphic that it might seem unreal. Yet the 
lack of adjectives and the scarce use of adverbs reveal an attempt to stick to the facts and 
avoid any literary devices that might push her narration into the “unreality” of horror.  
Furthermore, just when the reader begins to be appalled and awestruck by the 
atrocities described, Menchú then inserts comments that reaffirm her status as a reporter 
and offset any possibility of a “hallucinatory” effect on the reader. Her attempt to define 
the term “well” is a clear example. Rigoberta states, “And they left him in a well, I don’t 
know what it’s called, a hole with water and a bit of mud in it, they left him naked there 
all night. There were a lot of corpses there in the hole with him and he couldn’t stand the 
smell of all those corpses” (174). Her definition aims to give detail and specificity 
regarding Petrocinio’s exact situation. Such a “matter-of-fact narration” precludes any 
possibility of a “hallucination” and seeks to convey a certainty for the reader. These 
descriptions render the representation of the corpses more empirical. This emphasis on 
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the empirical facts counters any possibility of uncertainty and stresses our complete 
access to and knowledge of the events surrounding Petrocinio’s torture.  
It further serves as a reminder that these events are speakable. Rather than assert 
the unsayable nature of her brother’s death, Menchú overwrites any possible uncertainties 
with an emphasis on detail and fact. The straightforward nature of her narration presumes 
the possibility of narrating without difficulty the reality—what many would call the “non-
symbolic”—of violence and torture. This form of mimetic emphasis on detail is described 
by Elizabeth Loevlie as a “recollection” (64). Drawing on Kierkegaard, Loevlie notes that 
there is a difference between “repetition” and “recollection”: “‘Repetition and 
recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected 
has been, is repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward’” 
(Kierkegaard, qtd in Loevlie 64). In other words, “repetition” is a movement that not only 
“implies a re-peat, a re-make of what has been into the present,” but also “projects into a 
future, and therefore moves forwards” (64). For this reason, “repetition” should more 
properly be conceived of as an attempt to create something new, rather than the oft-
perceived notion of repetition as replication or duplication. Loevlie explains, “Repetition 
is usually thought of as dealing with a certain ‘content’ that is repeated. Kierkegaard’s 
text challenges this more substantial understanding of repetition by insisting rather on 
movement. In other words, the more traditional notion of repetition is discarded in favor 
of a different, less intuitive understanding” (65). For Kierkegaard and thus for Loevlie, 
the “traditional notion of repetition”—since it attempts “to repeat something, a memory, 
an experience, a content” (Loevlie 64)— is more aptly described as “recollection” since it 
does not project a forward movement. Rather than bringing the past into the present and 
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then projecting it into the future as the creation of something new, it is as if recollection 
as a literary device attempted to bring the present—the reader—into the full presence and 
plenitude of the past event. Rather than moving forward, it moves backward. 
We see the same recollection of graphic detail in her discussion of her mother’s 
death. Once her mother had been tortured, Menchú narrates that the soldiers took her out 
to a place near the town and stood watch over her body as she died. Menchú states, 
They left her there dying for four or five days, enduring the sun, the rain and the 
night. My mother was covered in worms, because in the mountains there is a fly 
which gets straight into any wound, and if the wound isn’t tended in two days, 
there are worms where the fly has been. Since all my mother’s wounds were open, 
there were worms in all of them. She was still alive. (199) 
 
The description of the worms, clearly intended for an audience unfamiliar with this 
region of Guatemala, is intended to provide documentary evidence regarding her 
mother’s death. But the manner and tone in which they are described contradict the 
intensity of Menchú’s own experience of horror. Other critics have noted the “even tone” 
in her narrations. Zimmerman writes that “perhaps what most convinces readers about the 
truth of Menchú’s narrative is her steady, even tone, as she speaks to Burgos-Debray out 
of a condition which would be absolutely traumatic and silencing for most of us” (53-54). 
That is, despite the horrors of what she witnessed in Guatemala, her voice projects a 
steadiness that belies her traumatic past.  
In fact, at several points her descriptions are almost casual, in that she includes 
specific details almost as if they were an afterthought. For example, after the intense and 
graphic depictions of Petrocinio’s torture, during which she also describes very vividly 
the deaths of twenty other men who were also tortured with Petrocinio, Menchú then 
adds, “also a woman. They had raped her and then tortured her” (174). Without access to 
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the taped interviews, there is no way to know how even Menchú’s tone was as she 
described the scene, nor is there a means of knowing the inflection of her voice as she 
mentioned the additional woman. Nevertheless, the stark contrast between the lengthy 
descriptions of her brother’s torture and the brief statement—“They had raped her and 
then tortured her”—is revealing. Rather than give further details at this point, the 
sentence appears as an afterthought. That is not to suggest that the woman’s death was 
not terrible, nor that we as readers should not be moved by her rape and torture. Quite the 
contrary, what I am suggesting is that the simplicity of the sentence projects a steadiness 
and control that contrast sharply with the nature of the torture. Rather than present the 
scenes as horror, such simple, straightforward comments bear the task of communicating 
certainty and reliability. Though the graphic images in Menchú’s narrative present the 
atrocities as “horrific,”  in the sense that they shock the reader by their violence, 
Menchú’s depiction of them is not a “horror story” (Craft 1). Hers is not a “horror story” 
because the narrative does not instill fear in the reader. The above passages, intended to 
be read by an international audience in foreign countries far from the torture and 
massacre, have been stripped of such tactics. 
Menchú’s primary goal is to convince readers of the reliability of her narrative. 
That dependability forecloses any possibilities of uncertainty regarding the nature of her 
brother’s and mother’s torture.
100
 Unlike the rumors, which were prevalent in Guatemala 
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 Though it is conceivable that Burgos-Debray removed any doubts or uncertainties from the final text, 
there is evidence to suggest that this is not the case. First, we see other moments where there are hesitations 
and pauses, indicated by ellipses or repetitions of words and phrases. Burgos-Debray did not remove these 
hesitations, so it is unlikely that she removed others. Also, as noted above, several critics have been granted 
access to the taped interviews and have noted that the final text does not diverge from the oral interviews. 
Indeed, Beverley, in his treatment of the narrative unity of the book, argues that the torture scenes in 
chapters 24 and 27 are among those “individual units [that] are wholly composed by Menchú and as such 
depend on her skills and intentionality as a narrator” (“Margin at the Center” 33). As readers, we can 
assume that these are Menchú’s words. 
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at the time Menchú gave the interview, these passages, as well as countless others in 
Menchú’s narrative, do not seek to notify the reader of impending violence. International 
readers do not need to be warned about the military’s use of torture, nor must they be 
scared into fleeing from the army. On the contrary, Menchú’s narrative seeks to expose 
the torture, violence, and terror that afflicted Guatemalan citizens. Unlike the rumors, 
which could serve as “horror stories,” Menchú’s narrative serves the opposite function. It 
presents denunciatory evidence against the military, with the primary goal of encouraging 
outrage. Menchú’s rhetoric of certainty seeks to create an empathetic bond with readers 
and thus invoke a reaction against the violence of the state.  
Menchú’s account relies not only on the heavily detailed re-presentation of 
torture, but in some cases on the personalized exaggeration of it, in order to give a more 
detailed assessment of the torture and death of her brother and mother. Given the 
military’s rhetoric of fear and the proliferation of generalized and unverifiable rumors 
regarding the massacres, it is understandable that Menchú would opt to individualize the 
generic stories of public torture and emphasize the specifics surrounding her brother’s 
death.
101
 Despite Stoll’s attempts to draw attention to the guerrillas’ role in bringing 
about the escalation of violence in Chimel and surrounding regions, the prevalence of 
rumors would give reasonable justification for Menchú’s inclusion of the attributed 
events. As Zimmerman notes, “Rigoberta’s account of her brother’s death represents 
countless stories, many of them with questionable details, about countless unquestionable 
massacres” (68).  As one representation of those innumerable atrocities, Menchú seeks to 
give the torture a certainty that it did not have in the rumors. Even when Menchú’s status 
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 For more on the escalation of violence and the military’s use of torture, as well as an analysis of the 
ways in which news of that violence spread throughout the country, see Chapter One of the present study. 
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as a firsthand witness has been put into doubt, the specificity of her narrative continues to 
evoke powerful reactions in the reader. The inclusion of sharp and vivid details—narrated 
as if her knowledge of the torture is without question—lends Menchú’s account both 
moral and legal authority, especially when presented to international readers.  
Furthermore, her detailed narration of torture, even when its specifics might 
contradict what really happened, seeks to give her account a transparency for 
international readers. It aims to repair and offset any distancing created by her secrets. In 
the passages mentioned above, the goal is exactly the opposite of her cultural 
inaccessibility: to over-write doubt and unknowing and privilege her access to the “truth” 
about the torture. Her account provides sufficient detail so that the reader attains a 
complete and stable knowledge, a truth that appears to be unmarred and undistorted. This 
emphasis on detail highlights the importance of the historical veracity of her claims about 
the violence more generally, and the torture of her brother more specifically. Because 
“terror makes epistemological doubt itself a form of domination” (Gordon 80), one mode 
of resistance would be to rely on certainty and objectivity as a mode of countering the 
seemingly irrational “knowledge-making” of the state. Speaking of the political 
resistance of human rights organizations, Gordon observes,  
Such an address must minimize the ambiguity, complicity, imagination, and 
surreality that necessarily characterize the theater of terror. It is obliged to 
communicate an unambiguous, unequivocal reality of pain and violence at the 
level of the ordinary individual body. (79) 
 
Such representations of torture will therefore seek to entail “[c]learly defined moral 
boundaries, disclosure as truth, visible evidence of injury, accessible language, verifiable 
intent, impartiality, objectivity, [and] authenticated witnesses” (Gordon 79). We see all of 
these elements in Menchú’s account of her brother’s torture, with the possible exception 
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of her role as an “authenticated witness,” even though she does adamantly affirm that she 
saw the events firsthand. Menchú’s emphasis on the “disclosure of truth” and her 
objective attempts to communicate certainty—despite Stoll’s discovery that she was not 
actually present—give her narrative an authority equal to that of an “authenticated 
witness.” Clearly, Menchú’s goal is to make sense of a violence that can often seem 
irrational or surreal in order to erase “epistemological doubt” (Gordon 80). But even so, 
how can she make sense of torture, which, as I have noted, is polysemic and resists 
meaning?   
 In order to make sense of her brother’s and mother’s torture, Menchú has to give 
torture meaning. Only by giving the torture meaning can she hope to counteract the 
violence of the state. However, rather than attempt to create new signification for torture, 
Menchú accepts the reasoning provided by the army. We see this primarily in her 
assumption that torture serves the purpose of obtaining information. Regarding her 
brother’s torture, for example, Menchú asserts that “[o]nce he arrived in the camp they 
inflicted terrible tortures on him to make him tell where the guerrilla fighters were and 
where his family was” (174). Those subversives included not only his immediate family, 
but also, by extension, other members of the community, particularly the priests who 
might have played a role in the insurgency. In Menchú’s words,  
What was he doing with the Bible, they wanted to know, why were the priests 
guerrillas? Straight away they talked of the Bible as if it were a subversive tract, 
they accused priests and nuns of being guerrillas. They asked him what 
relationship the priests had with the guerrillas, what relationship the whole 
community had with the guerrillas. (174)  
 
According to Menchú, it was precisely because of his unwillingness to answer the 
soldiers’ questions or reveal information about the guerrillas that “they inflicted those 
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dreadful tortures on him. Day and night they subjected him to terrible, terrible pain” 
(174). Her descriptions of Petrocinio’s suffering serve to communicate the extent to 
which the military was willing to go in order to obtain information from the tortured. 
Indeed, Menchú continually stresses throughout the narrative that Petrocinio was 
kidnapped and tortured in order to gain information about the guerrillas in the region. In 
her account of Petrocinio’s death, for example, Menchú notes that the officer made 
continual reference to the issue of communism: “he must have repeated the word 
‘communist’ a hundred times” (177). The insistence upon this point occurs multiple times 
in Menchú’s narration. As readers, we can see that the military had specific reasons for 
abducting and torturing Petrocinio. Once this message had been announced to the public, 
the prisoners were then soaked in gasoline and set on fire. For the military, it would 
seem, Petrocinio’s death was justified as a means of obtaining information about other 
communists and as a mechanism for preventing others from joining the communists’ 
cause. In other words, Menchú states that the military understood its actions to be 
justified.  
We see the same underpinning at work in Menchú’s description of her mother’s 
torture. After the death of Vicente Menchú in the Spanish Embassy in 1980, Menchú’s 
mother stayed in her village, despite numerous suggestions that she try to escape the 
country (195). She was kidnapped three months later, on April 19, 1980 (195). The only 
difference in Menchú’s narration of her mother’s torture is that, unlike the earlier 
kidnapping and torture, in the chapter on her mother there is no extraliterary justification 
as to how Menchú learned of the numerous details. That is, whereas the torture and death 
of her brother had presumably become public knowledge on September 24 in Chajul,the 
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circumstances surrounding her mother’s torture and death were never announced 
publicly. Nevertheless, Menchú notes that she learned “every detail of every step of the 
rape and torture suffered by [her] mother” (198), though she refuses “to reveal too many 
things because it will implicate some compañeros who are still doing their work very 
well” (198). Just as with her brother, however, Menchú suggests that her mother’s 
capture is also designed to obtain information. She states that, as in the case of her 
brother, the purpose is to determine the whereabouts of her family and other members in 
the community who were supporting the guerrillas:   
While they beat her, they asked here where we were, and said that if she made a 
confession, they’d let her go. But my mother knew very well that they did that so 
that they could torture her other children and would never let her go. She 
pretended she knew nothing. She defended every one of us until the end. (198) 
 
In both of Menchú’s narrations, torture has meaning. Despite her graphic representations 
of torture and the seeming senselessness of the violence, torture nevertheless has the 
strategic purpose of obtaining information.  
Rather than denying the military’s need for information, or challenging their 
claim that Petrocinio had access to useful intelligence, Menchú reaffirms the state’s 
rationale by accentuating Petrocinio’s status within the community. This emphasis may, 
in fact, explain one of the contradictions between Menchú’s account of her brother’s 
death and the information obtained by Stoll in his research. Menchú characterizes 
Petrocinio as “secretary of the community” (172), whereas Stoll heard him “remembered 
only as a youth who might have had a bit of schooling, not as a village catechist, 
secretary, or organizer” (66). If torture has the purpose of obtaining information—as 
Menchú implies—it stands to reason that the military would kidnap the “secretary of the 
community.” If he were not involved, as suggested by Stoll, then his kidnapping and 
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torture would appear irrational at best. Rather than assert that her brother was wrongly 
captured and tortured, or suggest that her brother’s torture was meaningless because he 
did not have access to information the army might want, Menchú reiterates that his 
torture and death was connected to the presumed presence of guerrillas and communists 
in the region. In other words, rather than privileging the unknown or the uncertain—
which would allow the atrocities to remain shadowy and hidden, known only by those 
who had witnessed the torture directly—Menchú proclaims her message before an 
international audience. In doing so, she chooses to emphasize the excessiveness and 
injustice of his torture and his death, thereby exposing what happens to those 
Guatemalans who attempt to resist the state’s campaigns. Petrocinio’s death, though 
horrible, was nevertheless rational; his abduction and torture made sense.  
Thus we can suggest that rather than being an irrational act, torture for Menchú 
remains an open and purposeful violation of the law.
102
 For Menchú, more complex 
notions of torture—either as a mechanism for producing state sovereignty (Kahn), a 
method of communicating torture’s “logic of consent” (Parry), or a means of producing a 
“background (or threatened background) of total control and potential escalation” (Parry 
205)—were of little consequence. When hundreds of thousands of people are 
disappearing or dying, debates surrounding the “epistemic value of torture” (Kahn 2) and 
escalation (Parry) are simply not a priority. Therefore, rather than privilege the 
unknowing and anxiety created by torture, Menchú turns the excessive use of pain into a 
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 Regarding the notion of torture as a violation of contemporary national and international law, Parry 
actually suggests that torture is consistent with liberal democracy and the modern notions of human rights. 
Regarding the problematic conception of torture as “aberrational,” Parry argues that “the control over 
people’s lives exercised by the modern state—including sometimes violent domination—is consistent with 
and perhaps even the fulfillment of rights discourse and liberal ideology” (96). For a more in-depth 
treatment of pervasive versus aberrational views of torture in the “war on terror,” see Parry 187 ff. 
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public and international demand for support. Her narrative—by communicating a rhetoric 
of certainty and giving torture meaning—provides prosecutorial evidence against the 
state’s campaign of terror. Thus her account takes on legal and political undertones. For 
years the state had been publicly denying its role in the torture and massacre of 
Guatemalan citizens. Menchú’s testimonio is precisely that, a testimony against the 
army’s human rights violations.  
Therefore, not only does her narrative seek to produce certainty and “minimize 
the ambiguity, complicity, imagination, and surreality that necessarily characterize the 
theater of terror” (Gordon 79); as testimony, it must also produce evidence against that 
“theater of terror” and encourage readers to respond. Menchú has assured readers that her 
story is true, and has provided ample evidence regarding the excessiveness of the army’s 
campaign of terror. Now, she must move them to respond. In Menchú’s narrative, the 
communication of that expectation takes place at the level of an empathetic as opposed to 
a logical reaction. According to Ballengee, such an empathetic appeal is not uncommon 
in accounts of torture and actually reveals the “unique rhetorical potential” of 
representations of torture in literature (9).
103
 She writes, “the audience’s response—
illogical, empathetic, immediate—feels certain, yet that certainty or authority can be 
guided in a number of directions by the rhetorician, since the various elements involved 
in the representation of torture actually resist determinable meaning” (Ballengee 9). We 
have seen how Menchú gives torture a “determinable meaning” as evidence of the army’s 
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limits itself primarily to ancient Greek texts such as Antigone, Oedipus Rex, and Leukippe and Kleitophon. 
Nevertheless, her conclusions remain relevant in discussing the use of torture in Guatemala. Indeed, in the 
epilogue to her book, Ballengee discusses the relationship between the ancient Greek texts and the more 
contemporary situations in the United States, especially the controversies surrounding the photos from Abu 
Ghraib prison and the treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay (Ballengee 127-144).  
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excess. But that meaning must now be directed by Menchú towards a specific emotional 
and immediate reaction. As Ballengee notes, representations of torture can “fail at 
sending one particular and clear message” (Ballengee 10). The emotional nature of the 
torture scenes can evoke a strong emotional response, but that response must be guided 
and specified rhetorically. But in what direction is the certainty of Rigoberta’s 
representation guided? How does Menchú, as rhetorician, guide readers in their 
empathetic response to the torture of Petrocinio? 
Despite the even tone of her narration, her account of her brother’s death actually 
concludes with a strongly emotional appeal to her readers. We first see this emotion 
textually in the repetition of certain words and phrases, which are intended to reveal 
Menchú’s difficulty in narrating the events. For example, as she narrates his death in the 
town square, she notes that “[e]veryone was weeping. I, I don’t know, every time I tell 
this story, I can’t hold back my tears, for me it’s a reality I can’t forget, even though it’s 
not easy to tell of it” (177). But these hesitations and repetitions evoke emotion and 
conviction, not doubt. Menchú hopes to provoke a reaction in readers and ignite moral 
outrage. The ultimate rhetorical goal of the representation of her brother’s torture is to 
guide the reader to action. Menchú does this by demonstrating how she and her family 
were moved to respond.  
After the prisoners are soaked in gasoline and set on fire, the crowd responds. 
Menchú states that her immediate reaction, as a witness, was not to think about the death 
of her brother, but to “do something, even kill a soldier. At that moment I wanted to show 
my aggression” (179). Given such a reaction and her description of the scene, Menchú’s 
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narration serves the rhetorical function of justifying retaliatory violence against the 
slaughter of the helpless. For that is how she describes the prisoners: 
Anyway, they lined up the tortured and poured petrol on them; and then the 
soldiers set fire to each one of them. Many of them begged for mercy. They 
looked half dead when they were lined up there, but when the bodies began to 
burn they began to plead for mercy. Some of them screamed, many of them leapt 
but uttered no sound – of course, that was because their breathing was cut off. 
(179)  
 
The repetition of the term “mercy” in this passage evokes the victims’ helplessness.  
By giving detailed descriptions of the military’s actions against the guerrillas, Menchú 
provides “evidence” of the military’s cruelty. She states, “I found it impossible to 
concentrate, seeing that this could be. You could only think that these were human beings 
and what pain those bodies had felt to arrive at that unrecognizable state” (178). Menchú 
conveys certainty to the reader by graphically and then emotionally re-presenting the 
experience of her brother’s body in pain. As Ballengee argues, “If a sense of certainty 
may be conveyed to a torture victim by means of his or her own pain, it stands to reason 
that the duress of the victim might have a similar effect upon any witnesses to the torture, 
as well, at least at the level of bodily empathy” (Ballengee 9). By noting how Petrocinio’s 
pain invoked a reaction in Menchú and her community, this passage also serves to invoke 
“bodily empathy” in the reader who also acts as the witnessing audience (Ballengee 9).As 
witness, then, the reader is called upon to act. Descriptions of the helplessness of the 
prisoners fulfill a very particular rhetorical function: to justify the people’s violent 
reaction to military coercion. In narrating the events as she does, Rigoberta encourages a 
moral judgment that will lead to confrontation.  
We can now see the ways in which Menchú’s account of her brother’s abduction, 
torture, and death relies fundamentally upon what Ballengee calls the “rhetoric of torture 
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as power” (133). Her narration remains fundamentally political: to play the power of the 
people (and its militant representatives) off the power of the Guatemalan military. 
Menchú’s rhetoric establishes a moral opposition between the people and the military in 
such a way as to invoke a confrontational response in the reader. But that moral response 
is empathetic, not logical. And thus the crowd’s empathetic reaction at the torture and 
death of the guerrillas serves the purpose of justifying a similar empathetic reaction in the 
reader. The textual representation of the torture forces readers to respond immediately 
and perhaps even violently. Menchú’s description of the crowd’s reaction, therefore, is 
designed to justify that reaction in the reader. If Menchú, her family, and her community 
felt obliged to respond with rage, our own violent responses as readers are therefore 
justified.  
Not only is it justified, it is also expected. Indeed, since Menchú is catering to a 
primarily international audience, she further stresses her own community’s inability to 
confront effectively the military’s violence. She notes, “El capitán daba un panorama de 
todo el poder que tenían, la capacidad que tenían. Que nosotoros como pueblo no 
teníamos la capacidad de enfrentar lo que ellos tenían” (“The captain gave an overview of 
all the power they had, the capacity they had. That we, the people, didn’t have the 
capacity to confront what they had” [178]).
104
 Even though she says the military left the 
plaza once they saw the anger of the people and their willingness to fight (204-205), she 
is quick to point out that “if there’d been a confrontation with the army, the people would 
have been massacred” (179). The people of Guatemala need to confront the military, but 
that would only lead to their slaughter. The clear implication is that the international 
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in which torture serves to establish a message of power to the victim. See especially pp. 46-51. I discuss 
this aspect of torture in Chapter One of the present study.  
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community, from its safer vantage point, must become involved in order to help the 
victimized Guatemalans.  
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Conclusions  
In conclusion, Menchú sought to make torture a visible presence for her reader. If 
torture is a practice that is by its very nature polysemic and without determinable 
meaning (Ballengee), then any narration that seeks to elicit a political and legal response 
from the witnessing audience must rely on a rhetoric of presence and certainty in order to 
give that act of torture meaning. In order to eliminate any possibility of epistemological 
doubt or “surreality” (Gordon 79) regarding the nature of torture in her narrative, Menchú 
bears witness to its certainty and definability.
105
 She relies on “recollection” (Loevlie 64) 
and objectivity as a mode of countering the irrational “knowledge-making” of the state. 
Rather than spreading rumors, Menchú personalizes and individualizes the torture so as 
to avoid any blurring of the boundaries between “reality” and “unreality.”
106
 The real, as 
well as the citizen’s ability to discern and narrate it, which had been purposefully unfixed 
by the state’s use of terror, is reestablished in Menchú’s narrative. By drawing readers’ 
attention away from the “unreality” axis of the state’s project, Menchú seeks to piece 
back together a history and a society that had become fragmented and scattered. Hence 
the representation of torture in Menchú’s text is primarily about informing and 
documenting, and rests upon the assumption that bearing witness to torture is 
unproblematic. Any silences or gaps in knowledge are filled in with details and specifics 
in order to erase epistemological doubt and lend certainty to the narration. The 
“evidentiary function” (Ballengee 133) of her rhetoric forecloses doubt by de-
emphasizing the language-destroying aspects of torture. By over-emphasizing the 
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 I will treat the notion of “bearing witness to uncertainty” in Chapter Three of the present study.   
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 Cavanaugh affirms that “rather than set firm boundaries between reality and unreality, it is more 
profitable for the state to leave those boundaries confused and ambiguous. Ambiguity and unknowing 
create anxiety, which in turn creates the demand for order which the state provides” (55). For more on this 
relationship, see Chapter One of the present study.  
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empirical materiality of the act and stressing those characteristics of torture that can be 
corroborated before an international audience, her rhetoric elides ambiguity in order to 
overwrite the polysemy of torture.  
The success of Menchú’s narrative in rallying international support cannot be 
overemphasized. Her narrative captivated international audiences by drawing attention to 
the suffering of Guatemalan citizens and moving readers to stand up against the 
Guatemalan military and its human rights abuses. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that 
her rhetoric of certainty did not take into account those aspects of uncertainty or 
unknowing produced by the state’s rhetoric of fear. And as I argued above, in order to 
accomplish her goals of garnering support, it could not. In the words of Gordon: 
Such an address must minimize the ambiguity, complicity, imagination, and 
surreality that necessarily characterize the theater of terror. It is obliged to 
communicate an unambiguous, unequivocal reality of pain and violence at the 
level of the ordinary individual body. Clearly defined moral boundaries, 
disclosure as truth, visible evidence of injury, accessible language, verifiable 
intent, impartiality, objectivity, authenticated witnesses, and so on are the means 
by which investigators make sense of and rationally communicate a patterned but 
irrational terror. (79) 
 
Menchú went to great lengths to make torture a visible presence for her readers. This 
emphasis on visibility and disclosure, as well as the “[c]learly defined moral boundaries,” 
allow her rhetoric of torture to counter the state’s attempts to silence and confuse. There 
is no place for ambiguity in her account. Over and against the state’s project of haunting 
and unknowing, Menchú shouts a carefully constructed message of defiant and 
evidentiary certainty.  
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Chapter Four: A Rhetoric of Uncertainty: Eroticizing Torture in the Guatemalan 
New Novel 
The closer one gets to the perfection of the 
simulacrum…, the more evident it becomes 
… how everything escapes representation, 
escapes its own double and its resemblance. 
(Baudrillard) 
 
As a Guatemalan, you know that I could not 
tell them the full truth of what is being done 
to our people, for fear no one would believe 
me.
107
 
 
The second major literary mode to emerge during the war in Guatemala was the 
new novel. The publication of Marco Antonio Flores’ Los compañeros in 1976 sparked a 
wave of new fiction that sought innovative ways to narrate the violence of the war. 
Employing diverse narrative techniques in order to play with the relationship between 
language and referent, the authors of new novels sought to question society’s capacity for 
bearing witness to the violence around them. Whereas testimonio’s emphasis on the 
visible aspects of violence signaled its commitment to a robustly empiricist epistemology 
and a profound reliance on a documentary-like “recollection” of torture, the new novel 
takes as its starting point the rejection of such empiricist modes of narration.
108
 The new 
novel thus represents an entirely different mode of confronting state terror and its 
haunting effects on society. Even though there was certainly a deep rationality behind the 
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 Perera xiv. 
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 The shift from testimonio to nueva novela is a formal, not a chronological, shift, employed for the 
purposes of my argument. Menchú’s Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú, y así me nació la conciencia (1983), 
which I analyzed in the previous chapter, appeared seven years after the publication of Flores’ Los 
compañeros (1976).  
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Guatemalan state’s control of society
109
, it must be acknowledged, in the words of Avery 
Gordon, that  
something crucial to its very modus operandi—the arbitrariness, the paralyzing 
blanket of fear, the macabre fascinations, the abundant absence of explanation, in 
short, the fundamental haunting quality of it—is lost when a rationalism of human 
behavior and social system is presumed to be the definitive measure of its 
disposition and spirit. And so too something crucial to what is needed to motivate 
the fight against it and succeed is missing. (Gordon 96-97) 
 
The new novel emerged in the 1970s in Guatemala as a concerted attempt to deal with the 
“haunting quality” of state terror. The state’s ability to blur the lines between the known 
and the unknown had succeeded in penetrating the deepest layers of the Guatemalan 
psyche. As terror and the specters of torture continued to haunt daily life, those seeking to 
describe and expose the nature of the violence soon realized that the realm they sought to 
narrate required a new language and new narrative techniques that might more accurately 
depict the experience of trauma. Fundamental to their approach to violence was the belief 
that standard forms of language could not speak the horrors of the war. In order to 
explore the ways in which the new novel attempted to narrate torture, the present chapter 
will include an analysis of two key novels: Los compañeros (1976) by Marco Antonio 
Flores and Después de las bombas (1979) by Arturo Arias. Alhough these two novels 
have received critical and popular praise for their technical innovation and artistic 
quality, other Guatemalan new novels also merit study.
110
 As I suggested in the 
Introduction, what makes these two novels stand out is their highly developed 
psychological treatment of torture and its relationship to the formation of the Guatemalan 
subject.  
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 For my discussion of this, see Chapter Two of the present study. 
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 Other Guatemalan new novels that have received critical attention include Mario Roberto Morales’ Los 
demonios salvajes (1978), Edwin Cifuentes’ El pueblo y los atentados (1979), and Arturo Arias’ Itzam Na 
(1982).  
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By the late 1970s, a growing emphasis on experimental techniques had emerged 
in Guatemala. Reflecting wider movements in the Latin American literary context, as 
well as dissatisfaction with the current artistic trends in their own country, Guatemalan 
authors broke with the traditional narrative forms of the Guatemalan literary canon. The 
criollista, costumbrista and realist styles, which had been popularized through writers 
such as Miguel Ángel Asturias and Mario Monteforte Toledo for decades, gave way in 
the 1970s to experimentation in both content and form. By abandoning the emphasis on 
old styles of realism, authors such as Flores and Arias sought out modes of narration that 
“would generate a new way of perceiving, of interpreting, and of sensing linguistic 
symbols on the part of the reader” (Arias, “Conciencia” 22).
111
  
Donald Shaw points out in his Nueva narrativa hispanoamericana that, beginning 
in the 1940s and continuing with the boom writers of the 1960s and 70s, Latin American 
writers expressed a growing mistrust in humanity’s ability to understand and depict 
reality (19). While novelists of the previous decades had been largely interested in 
documenting the economic, political and environmental landscape, by mid-century they 
began to question the simple correlation between reality and their sense-perceptions of 
that reality. Indeed, many novelists moved from the “cuestionamiento de la realidad 
convencional a la negación de la realidad, o al menos a la negación de la capacidad de 
dar razón unívoca de ella” (“questioning of conventional reality to the negation of reality, 
or at least to the negation of the capacity to give univocal reason to it” [Shaw 215]). The 
increasing emphasis on humanity’s inability to comprehend the universe gave rise to new 
emphases in literature. The new novel emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as the culmination 
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 For a more information on such self-proclaimed attempts to “kill Asturias” and the reliance on realism 
in narrative, see Morales, “Matemos a Miguel Ángel Asturias.” 
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of this rebellion against the confidence in humankind’s ability to perceive and describe 
reality.
112
  
This rebellion engendered a renewed attention to language (Shaw 217-18). Across 
Latin America, there emerged a polarization between authors who still believed in the 
possibility of comprehending the multiplicity of reality by means of the word, and those 
who rejected this possibility. No longer considered simply “como elemento estilístico o 
mero vehículo de expresión” (“as a stylistic element or mere vehicle of expression” 
[Shaw 217]), language was revealed to have “relaciones más secretas con lo real” [“more 
secretive relations with the real” [Shaw 217]). By the 1970s in Guatemala, as elsewhere, 
the majority of new novelists rejected the mimetic function of language and heavily 
criticized the possibility of historical representation. Over and against the realist authors, 
the Guatemalan new novel challenged readers’ conceptions of the real by placing 
“opposing perspectives and conflicting versions of reality within their textual discourse” 
(Millar 14).  By producing these “alternative and oppositional representations of 
Guatemalan history” (Millar 14), these authors sought to subvert and thus undermine the 
very possibility of historical representation. This represented a strong contrast to 
Guatemalan texts published prior to 1976, which had given “readers identity through the 
exclusion of the ambiguities and connotations of language” and had suggested the 
transparency of narrated action and its transformation into “reality” (Arias, “Literary 
Production” 20). What the reader read was presumably what had really happened. In 
contrast, instead of attempting to depict the chaos of the armed conflict, the new novel 
allegorized it. By emphasizing the text’s “voz persuasiva interior, que a modo de alegoría 
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juega con variantes históricas posibles” (“interior persuasive voice, which by means of 
allegory plays with possible historical variants” [Arias, “Conciencia” 44]), authors sought 
to undermine the authoritative discourses of the past and foster a more active 
participation on the part of the reader. As Arias writes, in the new novel “[i]t is the 
readers who must produce the meaning of the text” (“Literary Production” 20). The 
underlying assumption, of course, was that the text could not access that meaning itself.  
In its emphasis on the active participation of the reader, the new novel rejected the 
assumed correspondence between text and historical reality. Linguistically speaking, the 
rejection of the mimetic function of language involved a refusal to collapse the distance 
between signifier and signified; indeed, that gap became stretched and amplified. Taking 
language as its primary focus and highlighting the interplay of divergent narrative 
discourses, the new novel privileged signifiers that appeared to float relatively 
autonomously, instead of being tied to historical reality. This technique assumed a 
fundamental “impossibility of bearing witness” (Agamben Remnants 39) to reality in 
language, particularly when that reality was as horrific as it was in Guatemala during the 
Internal Armed Conflict. In other words, Guatemalan reality and the atrocities of La 
violencia had become unspeakable. As a result, the focus turned to language itself and the 
impossibility of reaching the non-symbolic. Language had become an impossibility, and 
thus all forms of violence—including torture—were rendered “unspeakable.”  
At times, the novels emphasized the heterogeneous nature of language in 
Guatemala. Drawing on Bakhtin, Arias notes that in both the novel and in life, “every 
utterance is necessarily spoken in some ‘dialect,’ ‘jargon,’ or ‘speech’ […] that carries 
and implies an attitude of those who speak in that way at a given time and in a given 
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milieu. The novelist’s art is the orchestrating of a verbal ‘polyphony’ that is itself an 
index to social and ideological conflict” (“Literary Production” 17). At other moments, 
greater emphasis was placed on revealing the impossibility of understanding the reality of 
the armed conflict. The meaning of history had become difficult to determine; it was no 
longer useful to present a single vision of reality. Therefore, literature shifted its 
emphasis from “traducir la experiencia a través del lenguaje” (“translating experience 
through language” [Arias, “Nueva narrativa” 10]) to “vivir el lenguaje a través de la 
destrucción de las representaciones convencionales de la realidad” (“living language 
through the destruction of conventional representations of reality” [Arias, “Nueva 
narrativa” 10]). The goal was to indicate the impossibility of narrating the real. This 
distrust in the possibility of portraying reality signified a corresponding distrust in 
language itself. For that reason, language became “the novel’s real protagonist” 
(“Literary Production” 25). For the new novelists, in order to illustrate the traumatic 
impossibility of narrating the violence of the war, “language must be destroyed, opened 
up, dissected, and understood for what it is” (“Literary Production” 25). Its meaning was 
purely derivative, constructed by readers as they attempted to piece together the 
kaleidoscopic and often contradictory images of the text, in the same way that they tried 
to find meaning in the chaos of Guatemalan society.  
In addition to its aesthetic aspects, the new narrative in Guatemala remained 
deeply motivated by socio-political concerns.
113
 Because previous techniques had proven 
insufficient for depicting the violence of the armed conflict and the terror which was 
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Production and Political Crisis in Central America” (1991).  
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running rampant in all sectors of society, Guatemalan authors began to explore new ways 
to “echo the destruction of … society, portray its social chaos, and pose the difficulty of 
apprehending the meaning of life itself when it is degraded by war and tragedy” (Arias, 
“Literary Production” 19). As life during the war became more unstable and uncertain, 
fiction began to accentuate the many contradictions and oppositions of society. The idea 
was that, by training readers to navigate the linguistic labyrinths of new fiction and to 
derive meaning from texts that initially seemed meaningless, these readers might also 
discover methods for coping with and perhaps even discerning meaning in the socio-
political chaos that surrounded them.   
Yet in granting more interpretive freedom to the reader, authors simultaneously 
hoped to limit the interpretive options to those of a “political nature” (Arias, “Literary 
Production” 20). Arias surmises: “It is as if the readers are privy to a brain-storm session 
in political strategy, in order to be able to determine what to do next. The novel displays 
all the possible scenarios and alternatives to the readers. But the readers have to make the 
choice” (“Literary Production” 20). The majority of Central American new novels were 
written by those who were “sympathetic to, or militants of the ‘New Left’” (Arias, 
“Literary Production” 20). As they reacted politically against the extremes of the 1950s 
communist party policies, their aesthetic choices mirrored their own political agendas, 
especially considering the fact that communist writers in the 1950s tended to write 
“realist texts with an authoritarian cast” (Arias, “Literary Production” 20).
114
 In giving 
freedom to the reader to participate imaginatively in the processes of political planning, 
authors sought to open up avenues of interaction and protest that had become impossible 
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in the wider socio-political arena. Social chaos thereby stimulated experimentation 
regarding the relationship between author, text and reader (Arias, “Literary Production” 
20). The literary text became “nothing less than a game of appearances” in which any 
possibility of deriving a simple or straightforward meaning has been lost; indeed, as the 
reader approaches the text, the best case scenario is that she will encounter “a series of 
fragmented variations like the images seen in a broken mirror” (Arias, “Literary 
Production” 25). From this fragmented presentation, the reader must attempt to construct 
meaning for herself:  
The textual material passes before the eyes of the reader and he or she perceives 
the underlying oral nature of the writing, the phonetic fact of a voice preceding 
the writing of the text. While reading the written tale, the reader must at the same 
time call upon unwritten elements in order to construct semantic meaning. In this 
way, the narrator/reader relationship is altered. The text closes upon itself in the 
ambiguity and opacity of the systems of signs that confront and respond to one 
another ad infinitum. (Arias, “Literary Production” 25) 
 
Arias draws on Bakhtin’s conception of polyphony in order to emphasize the confusion 
of semantic levels and the rupture of “syntactic linearity” in the text (Arias, “Literary 
Production” 25). In accentuating the degree to which the “narrative signposts” have been 
repeatedly erected and obscured, Arias suggests that the new novel seeks to recreate the 
uncertainty of real life in Guatemala.
115
 Thus unlike testimonio, which sought to 
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 Despite the numerous emphases on the plurality of meanings and the multiplicity of semantic references, 
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overwrite uncertainty with evidence and an emphasis on detail, the new novel celebrates 
doubt and ambiguity by employing a rhetoric of uncertainty in the text. Readers, Arias 
claims, must actively participate in finding a way out of that uncertainty by determining 
the significance of an event for themselves (Arias, “Literary Production” 25).  
 This attempt to call upon “unwritten elements” in the reader reveals startling 
similarities with current conceptions of spectral criticism and, as noted above, further 
highlights the new novel’s attempt to narrate the haunting qualities of society.
116
 When 
the text attempts to point beyond itself to “the subterranean and the absent,” a haunting 
occurs whereby certain words and phrases take on “phantomatic status” (Punter 264).
117
 
Clearly, authors of the new novel are aware of the state’s attempts to blur the lines 
between the known and the known. Their explicit attempts to construct language games 
in their texts around “the absent” seek to reveal the ways in which the state haunted the 
Guatemalan psyche.  
As I will argue throughout the remainder of this chapter, this emphasis on “the 
absent” reveals a very particular conception of the relationship between language and the 
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117
 Punter further writes, “[N]o word can be understood in terms of its own claim to status, its own referent; 
often the words we use, the words we read, can only be paradoxically understood as responses to prior 
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importance of language as the focal point in the new novel. Its language games and varied attempts to 
rupture the path between signifier and signified indicate the haunting nature of the texts.   
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non-symbolic. As I suggested in the Introduction, conceiving of the non-symbolic as 
“absent” and as the other of language is not uncommon in literature dealing with 
violence. Indeed, the new novel’s emphasis on the unspeakable and the corresponding 
attempt to “silence” violence within literature is not a new idea. In her study Literary 
Silences in Pascal, Rousseau, and Beckett (2003), Elizabeth Loevlie notes that one of the 
main critical approaches to silence has been Holocaust literature (16), which would 
extend to other literatures of genocide, including Guatemala. It is not uncommon for 
Holocaust literature to draw on silence and absence as a means to designate the 
unsayable: “that which is inhuman or an unspeakable atrocity” (Loevlie 16). For many, 
therefore, in the face of such seemingly unnameable atrocities any attempt to speak the 
evils of genocide runs the risk of reducing the horrors to everyday language. Indeed, “[t]o 
suggest that it is possible to talk of the events of the Holocaust is often seen to imply that 
these events are explicable and that they can be made meaningful” (Loevlie 16-17). Over 
and against such attempts to explain Auschwitz, thinkers such as Theodor Adorno—who 
famously asserted, “No poetry after Auschwitz”—and Hannah Arendt have argued that 
that only proper response to such horrors is silence (Loevlie 16). The problem, according 
to Loevlie, is that much of the literature concerning this tradition continues to speak of 
silence negatively, relying on a dualistic conception of silence that retreats behind the 
defense of the unsayable.  
As noted in the Introduction to the present study, silence is a seductive concept 
for many reasons. For thousands of years the “Dream of Silence” has captivated the 
imaginations and the desires of countless millions of people (Loevlie 13).
118
 
Unfortunately, however, this type of silence—which is posited as “congruent with a sense 
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of a ‘beyond’ of language, a realm that is free from discourse and linguistic ordering” 
(Loevlie 11)—ends up becoming the dualistic other of language. According to Loevlie, it 
is true that such a conception of silence can serve as a viable means of dealing with that 
which is “unsayable” and “can accept that which the verbal expression must dismiss as 
irrational or illogical” (11). Yet with respect to the new novel in Guatemala, positing the 
existence of a realm of experience that is beyond language often results in a dualistic 
conception of language and silence that create problematic consequences. Before I turn to 
the novels in question, we must explore Loevlie’s conception of simple and complex 
repetition (76-83). 
After her treatment of the “now” in Kierkegaard’s Repetition and Abraham’s “act 
of faith” in Fear and Trembling, Loevlie proceeds to explore the distinction between 
what she terms “simple and complex repetition” (76).
119
 She begins by noting that simple 
repetition is “the standard or dominating movement by which the literary text deals with 
the non-symbolic, with that which it cannot express” (76). In language very similar to 
Arias’ discussion of the fragmentation and confusion inherent in the new novel, Loevlie 
suggests that simple repetition is a “relationship of frustration”: 
It is the text’s relationship, one might say, to its own end, its defeat in face of the 
unsayable that it strives none the less to say. Caught in this frustration, the text 
must create a dynamic or a gesture by which it indirectly says: ‘out there, beyond 
me, is the truth of what I am trying to say.’ The intention is to indicate the silence 
of the non-symbolic as the negative other of the text. The text attempts to gesture 
towards this silence, hint at it, point its readers in a special direction, lead them 
outside itself. (76) 
 
This frustration establishes a “limit” of the literary text beyond which it places the non-
symbolic. By placing the non-symbolic beyond the text and thus beyond language, simple 
repetition gropes and gestures at the non-symbolic, thereby “creating a certain ‘logic’ or 
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 For my treatment of “complex repetition,” see Chapter Four of the present study. 
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‘system’ that refers the reader to the beyond” (76). This dualistic conception of the 
relationship between silence and language continually repeats itself throughout the 
literary text.
120
 The result of this repetition is to train the reader “to seek an ‘outside’ of 
the text where truth might be found. As the text affirms its own limit, it bestows existence 
to that which lies beyond the limit” (Loevlie 76). As Arias has suggested, that was the 
precise goal of the new novelists: to provide readers a “brain-storm session in political 
strategy” (“Literary Production” 20) that would move them to seek a political “truth” 
outside the text in “real” life.   
In short, by placing the non-symbolic outside language, truth is also pushed 
beyond language and outside of the text. In the words of Loevlie, “[s]imple repetition is 
the text’s means of affirming the non-symbolic negatively as that which cannot be stated: 
the non-symbolic is what lies beyond me” (76-77). Much like negative theology in the 
Christian tradition— which approaches the silent non-symbolic of God by emphasizing 
God’s otherness and inaccessibility from theological discourse—“simple repetition, by 
insisting on the non-symbolic in its complete distance from language, is a negative 
affirmation of the non-symbolic” (Loevlie 77). According to Loevlie, the effect of this 
negative affirmation is “stabilatory”: 
We might for a moment imagine that the text and its relationship to the non-
symbolic behave in regards to each other like water and oil. In other words, their 
boundary is absolute, but fluid. Simple repetition ensures the stability of these two 
elements by continually reaffirming them as opposites, by making sure that no 
‘reaction’ takes place that would destabilize the relation. (77) 
 
                                                 
120
 Loevlie describes this dualistic dynamic in the following manner:  
It operates according to dualistic opposites such as inside-outside, within-beyond, present-absent, 
silent-speaking, me-other, etc. According to these dualisms, the text defines the text according to 
its inside (the actual text) and its outside (the non-symbolic), and consequently defines language in 
terms of an inside and an outside: the expressible versus the non-expressible. Simple repetition 
relies upon and keeps reproducing, repeating, this dualistic machinery that maintains the non-
symbolic as the opposite of language. (77, italics in original) 
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Simple repetition ensures that the boundary between the text and the non-symbolic—and 
thus between the reader and the lost object—remains absolute. The new novel reaffirms 
this boundary by continually testing it and probing its stability. In the end, however, the 
“other of language” remains inaccessible.
121
 As I will suggest, the new novel celebrates 
this dualistic conception of language and silence, particularly regarding attempts to 
narrate violence and torture. And though many of the Guatemalan new novels explore the 
trauma of torture, none go so far in their examination of its psychological and linguistic 
effects as Flores and Arias. In an effort to reveal the ways in which these haunting 
elements emerge in the Guatemalan new novel, the remainder of this chapter will focus 
on Flores’ Los compañeros and Arias’ Después de las bombas. 
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 Loevlie writes, “We can conclude that simple repetition is a dynamic that repeatedly ensures and 
stabilizes the Dream of Silence as the other of language. It follows that it is a dynamic that precludes 
literary silence. If the non-symbolic is posited as the dualistic opposite of the text, silence becomes the 
beyond. Within such a schema literary silence cannot take place. Literary silence requires a certain shifting 
of the border between the text and the non-symbolic. […] Only in the destabilization of this border can 
literary silence happen as the expression of the non-symbolic through literature. In other words, the 
dualistic system must somehow break down or dissolve in order for literary silence to occur. This 
destabilization describes the work of complex repetition, namely to transform or destabilize simple 
repetition and the stable conditions it has procured and thereby create the potential for literary silence” (78). 
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The Founding Text of the Guatemalan New Novel 
The quintessential work of the Guatemalan new narrative is Marco Antonio 
Flores’ Los compañeros (1976). Called the “texto fundador de la nueva novela 
guatemalteca” (“the founding text of the Guatemalan new novel” [Hernández]), Los 
compañeros became an instant phenomenon in Guatemala. Critics outside Guatemala 
also have recognized the significance of its style and narrative voice. The Spanish author 
and literary critic Juan Maestre Alfonso, for example, goes so far as to suggest that the 
novel is “una de las mejores obras de la literatura latinoamericana actual” (“one of the 
best works of current Latin American literature”) and of the stature of works by García 
Márquez, Donoso and Vargas Llosa (18). While such a characterization of Flores’ work 
may be exaggerated, there is no doubt that with this novel Flores successfully broke with 
the established literary tradition and founded a new movement in Guatemala.
122
  
 The novel is structured around the narratives of four friends—El Bolo, Chucha 
Flaca, El Rata, and El Patojo—and one lover—Tatiana—who, despite the different 
trajectories of their lives, all find themselves traumatized and haunted by the violence of 
the war. The events depicted in the novel occur between 1942 and 1967, and though each 
chapter carries a specific date, the narration jumps with apparent randomness from the 
present to numerous and seemingly unrelated pasts. El Bolo, considered by many to be a 
semi-autobiographical representation of Flores himself, could easily be considered the 
most significant of the four protagonists. After all, five of the thirteen narrative sequences 
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 Rivera remarks that the significance of this work lies in the fact that it marks the end of a “prolongado 
silencio” (59). He notes that after the novels of Asturias and Monteforte Toledo, “no se había escrito en ese 
país una obra que trascendiera los linderos locales. Las novelas aparecidas en un lapso de más de veinte 
años resultan excesivamente limitadas en cuanto a su interés temático y su calidad literaria” (59). In fact, he 
further suggests that this paucity of ground-breaking novels could be extended to apply to all of Central 
America, the only possible exception being Nicaragua’s Trágame tierra, by Lizardo Chávez Alfaro (Rivera 
59). 
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are dedicated to him (chapters 1, 4, 9, 11 and 13), more than to any other character, even 
though he is politically the least involved of the revolutionaries. His participation in the 
guerrilla movement is limited to a single trip to Cuba in 1962; other descriptions of his 
life are almost exclusively of a personal nature, focusing primarily on his relationship 
with his intrusive mother. Only at the end of the novel does El Bolo equate this tyranny at 
home with the terror of life in Guatemala:  
No voy a volver nunca más, no voy a regresar nunca mi pinche guatemalita de la 
asunción, a meterme a ese hoyo que me destruye, que me ningunea, que me 
asfixia […] no voy a regresar a casa de mi madre, al lado de mi madre, al país de 
mi madre, al país de mi padrequenoexiste, a mi país donde no puedes nunca estar 
solo ni ser libre, porque a todos conoces y todos te conocen y matas y te matan y 
tienes que huir que esconderte porque si no te desaparecen te encarcelan te matan 
te torturan te cortan los huevos te sacan los ojos te cortan la mano izquierda te 
cogen te violan asaltan tu casa te roban todo lo que hay adentro no te dejan vivir 
en paz […] te dicen lo que tienes que hacer y lo que no […] se meten contigo y te 
mortifican y te matan a pausas o de un tiro y allí está tu madre y está el tirano de 
turno y está la policía que en cualquier momento y por cualquier razón te ficha te 
persigue y te mata. (298-99)
123
 
 
The descriptions of his mother blend seamlessly with the violence and torture of a 
country that destroys and asphyxiates, echoing the extent to which trauma has permeated 
all levels of Guatemalan society. If the possibility of return has been foreclosed, he 
suggests, then the only remaining option is to flee. Interminable flight becomes one result 
of the impossibility of making sense of the violence. Just as the new novel seeks to 
amplify the distance between signifier and signified, so too must its characters seek an 
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 “I’ll never return to my wretched little Guatemala to sink back into that hole that destroys me, that 
despises me, that suffocates me. […] I’ll never return to my mother’s side, to my mother’s country, to the 
country of my non-existent father, to my country where you can never be alone or free, because you know 
everybody and everybody knows you and you kill and are killed and you have to flee and go into hiding 
because otherwise they ‘disappear’ you they imprison you kill you torture you cut off your balls stab out 
your eyes cut off your left hand fuck you rape you attack your house steal everything that you possess 
never let you live in peace […] tell you what to do and what not to do […] meddle in your life and mortify 
you and kill you by degrees or with a bullet and where your mother is and the dictator of the day and the 
police who at any moment and for any reason put your name on file persecute you pursue and kill you” 
(231-32).  
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escape from the violence, creating space between themselves and the reality they can no 
longer bear. El Bolo himself thus becomes a signifier that floats endlessly from place to 
place, instead of being tied to the Guatemalan historical reality.  
Chucha Flaca, the central character in three of the thirteen chapters (2, 5 and 12), 
is also seeking a way out of Guatemala. He has embezzled funds from the Communist 
party and has then defected from the revolution. Fearful of both the police and the 
revolutionaries, he flees to Mexico in 1967 to live in exile. His escape paints an 
extraordinarily dark picture of Guatemalan life and takes on deeply psychological 
implications: “Pero huiré. Me iré de aquí. Tengo que hacerlo. La muerte ronda todas mis 
pestañas. Seguiré huyendo como siempre: de mis padres, del colegio, de los maestros, de 
la facultad, de la policía, de mí” (“Yes I’ll flee. I’ll leave here. I’ve no choice. Death 
haunts my eyelids. I’ll go on fleeing as I’ve always done, from my parents, from the 
school, from the teachers, from the university, from the police, from myself” [31, 27]). In 
fleeing Guatemala, he attempts to escape even from himself. His ambivalence towards his 
own life reveals the success of the state’s program of social control. This same theme of 
“fleeing”—escaping one’s reality in search of something better—is repeated throughout 
the chapters on Chucha Flaca.     
During his escape, Chucha Flaca is aided by El Rata, who has renounced his life 
as a revolutionary and is now—rather unhappily—married to Chayo, whom he considers 
a monster (188). El Rata is the focus of only two of the thirteen chapters (2 and 8).
124
 He 
lives his life from paycheck to paycheck, spending beyond his means in order to satisfy 
Chayo whom he cannot stand because of her constant demands and nagging (165). Yet he 
spends what little cash he has on beer and women, in order to add some excitement to the 
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 Chapter 2 is shared between Chucha Flaca and El Rata.  
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banality of his life: “qué vida más aburrida la mía de la casa al trabajo del trabajo a la 
casa los sábados a ponerme bien a verga los domingos a aguantar las puteadas de mi 
mama y las trompas de la Chayo el lunes otra vez a la misma mierda” (“what a boring life 
I lead from home to work and back again getting drunk on Saturday suffering my 
mother’s endless tirades and Chayo’s sulks on Sunday then back to the same old shit on 
Monday” [182, 143-144]). The same theme of flight is repeated again with El Rata who, 
though he does not attempt to flee the country, does attempt to escape from the boredom 
of and dissatisfaction with his current life.
125
 His recurring feelings of worthlessness and 
his continual self-beratings lead to multiple and varied attempts to replace his lost hopes 
and ideals with sex and alcohol.
126
 
The fourth major character is El Patojo, the central character in three of the 
thirteen chapters (3, 7 and 10). In all three chapters, El Patojo is being held in a detention 
center where he is tortured. The descriptions of his torture are gruesome and presented in 
great detail. Though it is true that the other characters reveal various dimensions of 
trauma, the camera is unrelenting in its portrayal of El Patojo. The reader is given 
extended looks into El Patojo’s thoughts and desires, more so than with any other 
character, and the hypervisibility of torture creates much more focused attention on his 
haunted psyche. Though he ultimately dies at the hands of his torturers, he does not give 
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 For a detailed treatment of the relationship between flight and notions of ambivalence, see Butler The 
Psychic Life, 174-79.   
126
 Butler offers profound insight into a possible connection between El Rata’s self-beratings and the new 
novelists’ concern about language’s inability to describe Guatemalan society. In The Psychic Life of Power, 
Butler suggests that the state can regulate citizens’ desires and the feelings of self-worth. Indeed, regarding 
the state’s “social power,” she writes, “The violence of social regulation is not to be found in its unilateral 
action, but in the circuitous route by which the psyche accuses itself of its own worthlessness” (Butler, 
Psychic Life 184). Butler further suggests that this worthlessness can lead to a “loss of speech” (184). 
Following Butler’s argument, we can see in both El Bolo and Chucha Flaca a “splitting of the ego into 
parts” and the creation of an internal “antagonism” that manifests itself in “self-beratements” (Butler). For 
more on the relationship between power, grief, and language, see Psychic Life, particularly the chapter on 
“Psychic Inceptions: Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage” (167-198). 
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up any information about the guerrilla movement and can die knowing that he has been 
faithful to his comrades. 
Before analyzing the torture scenes in detail, however, it is crucial to emphasize 
the overwhelming agreement among critics concerning the novel’s pessimistic tone, 
noting especially their conclusions regarding its political message. Attention to the 
pessimistic elements has led to two standard interpretations of the novel. Either the 
readers come away with an utter loss of hope for the future of Guatemala, and therefore 
experience intense feelings of apathy and indifference; or they cling to the idea that El 
Patojo’s heroic martyrdom might offer a glimmer of hope in his noble and even herculean 
ability to withstand the state’s escalating violence. As I will demonstrate, a close reading 
of the torture scenes will render both of these approaches
127
 problematic and instead will 
present the reader with a third option: the production of unfulfilled desire.  
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 To date, critics have not framed the alternatives in this manner. The grouping of certain critics into 
group one and others into group two is my own reading. It should also be noted that, while it may appear 
that the novel has been well studied, the vast majority of the referenced secondary materials appeared in a 
single collection of essays in 2001. Several of these were previously published as reviews in the 1970s and 
80s.  Despite the seemingly large array of critics mentioned in my discussion, the novel has not been 
widely studied.  
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Loss and Language: The Flight into Nothingness  
Given the extraordinarily negative nature of Los compañeros, as well as the 
seemingly indeterminate nature of language, the vast majority of critical attention to this 
novel has focused on its hopelessness. In her dissertation on the use of scatological 
terminology in the Guatemalan new novel, Ana Yolanda Contreras discusses how the 
narrative style and irreverent language in Los compañeros seek to “llevar a cabo una 
réplica de la destrucción de la sociedad guatemalteca, representar el caos social en que 
había caído el país, y las dificultades de encontrarle sentido a la existencia en medio de la 
degradación producida por la violencia y la muerte” (“carry out a replica of the 
destruction of Guatemalan society, represent the social chaos into which the country had 
fallen, and the difficulties in making sense of existence in the midst of the degradation 
produced by violence and death” [3]).
128
 Both in its language and in its presentation of 
Guatemalan life, Contreras reads Los compañeros as a novel that is “irreverentemente 
desacralizante y radical” (“irreverently desacralizing and radical” [70]). Following this 
line of thought, the use of scatological language remains purely destructive, offering no 
possibility for the implementation of societal change. Thus according to Contreras, the 
only political meaning that could be derived from such a narrative would be the 
unfortunate loss of hope in the utopian dream (i).  
Mario Roberto Morales agrees with such a pessimistic conclusion, not only 
regarding the current government, but also in terms of the possibility that the leftist 
position might transform society.
129
 In his article, “Marco Antonio Flores y la nueva 
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 Her dissertation focuses on the works of three authors: Marco Antonio Flores, Arturo Arias, and Mario 
Roberto Morales.  
129
 Morales is one the major contributors to the growth of the new novel in Guatemala, and his novel Los 
demonios salvajes (1978) is often included as one of the three most important representative pieces.  
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novela,” in which he discusses Flores’ tremendous impact on the emergence of the boom 
in Guatemala, Morales also notes the importance of deriving political conclusions from 
the Guatemalan new novels:  
Aunque el uso del lenguaje varía sustancialmente en relación con el realismo 
social, la ‘nueva novela’ siguió preocupándose de la indagación antropológica, 
sociopolítica y cultural, pero con una diferencia: el realismo social efectuó esta 
búsqueda por medios más racionales y analíticos, y la ‘nueva novela’ por medios 
más obviamente intuitivos y poéticos” (34).
130
  
 
Yet, like Contreras, Morales interprets the results of this “indagación” (“investigation”) 
as completely ineffectual. The novel remains, for him, a “[n]ovela de la derrota interior, 
de los derrotados en su espiritualidad y moralidad” (“a novel about interior failure, about 
failures of one’s spirituality and morality” [33]). In addition to its portrayal of the violent 
excesses of the Guatemalan military and police, the novel also paints a startlingly 
pessimistic view of the Guatemalan left. The novel’s profound negativity portrays 
characters who are “escamados, cínicos, descreídos y, sobre todo, moralmente derrotados 
ante el fracaso militar del movimiento insurgente, que los arroja al exilio” (“suspicious, 
cynics, unbelievers, and, above all, morally defeated before the military failure of the 
insurgent movement, which casts them into exile” [Morales 33]). Widespread 
disillusionment with Guatemala’s leftist groups inspired a wave of “irreverent” writers 
who emerged after the failure of the late 1960s guerrilla movement. Hence Flores’ 
criticism from within the Guatemalan left produces a novel that, politically speaking, 
only succeeds in revealing the “submundo de la frustración política” (“underworld of 
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 “Even though the use of language varies substantially in relation to social realism, the ‘new novel’ 
continued to worry about anthropological, sociopolitical, and cultural investigation, but with a difference: 
social realism carried out this search through more rational and analytical means, and the ‘new novel’ 
through more obviously intuitive and poetic means” 
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political frustration” [34]). More than any other of the texts of los irreverentes,
131
 Los 
compañeros invited criticism from both leftists and the more conservative Guatemalan 
status quo.
132
 Flores’ bitter portrayals of his protagonists, clear analogies of the actors of 
the failed guerrilla movement, reflect only skepticism and indifference regarding the 
future hopes for change in Guatemala.
 
Indeed, the overwhelming sense of apathy that 
characterizes the novel has led critics to suggest that Los compañeros proposes no 
constructive political solutions, but rather presents protagonists who are confronted with 
a nothingness in which the only remaining option is despair.
133
  
This despair is further exasperated by the problematic nature of language and its 
ability to describe historical reality. El Bolo remarks, “Tú no tienes ahora futuro, ni 
presente, ni pasado, eres un tonel lleno de palabras, de imágenes que no podrás borrar 
nunca, que te perseguirán siempre” (“Now it’s you who have no future, nor present, nor 
past, you’re a barrel of words, of images that you’ll never be able to erase, that will 
pursue you forever” [210, 165]). While El Bolo’s past, present and future have been lost, 
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 Other members of “los irreverentes” include Ana María Rodas, Mario Roberto Morales, Manuel José 
Arce and Enrique Noriega. See Canel 1992.  
132
 His novel also brought commentary from those who criticized the problematic absence of any mention 
of the “Indian question” in the novel. See, for example, Zimmerman and Contreras. Méndez de Penedo 
seeks to explain such an omission, pointing out that this novel treats only the failures of the first phase of 
the guerrilla movement, thus the absence of “tres figuras protagónicas de la segunda fase de la lucha 
armada: el indio, la mujer y el cristiano comprometido” (36).  
133
 Rafael Menjívar, in his article “Marco Antonio Flores, cronista de la desesperanza,” writes that despite 
the technical innovations and the “riqueza del juego idiomático” in the novel, the novel remains a “novela 
de desesperanza” (29). Readers perceive “amargura de un sector de una clase media que en la lucha no 
logró trascenderse ideológicamente y, ante el fracaso, se decide por el escepticismo, la apatía, ciertos 
oportunismos o por lo que vendría a ser un suicidio del alma” (Menjívar 29). Despite this “suicide of the 
soul,” Menjívar nevertheless hopes to mitigate the skepticism of Los compañeros, at least minimally, by 
suggesting that Flores’ criticism is limited to his own experience in the leftist movements of the 1960s, and 
is therefore not an absolute denunciation in principle of all revolutionaries:  
Marco Antonio Flores no absolutiza a la hora de la crítica; queda claro, sin duda, que no todos 
sufrieron de los vicios y deformaciones—radicalismos e idealismos, en suma—que caracterizan a 
la parte sustancial de los personajes y a la parte de la historia guatemalteca de la que es cronista. 
Se restringe a una capa de la revolución—la suya, quizá—que no trascendió hace dos décadas el 
manual guerrillero, y que convirtió su sensibilidad en dogma y cambió su realidad por otra que no 
aceptaba … un complejo aparato político-ideológico como base fundamental de cualquier lucha. 
(Menjívar 31) 
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words always remain with him. Yet, as noted above, they lose their traditional mimetic 
function, and instead take on a highly disjunctive and fragmented role. For critics like 
Mario Roberto Morales, the gap between signifier and signified remains untraversable 
and the text “cumple la función literaria de iniciar en Guatemala el camino del buceo 
verbal, entendido como elemento estructurador del texto, para expresar el país, su gente y 
sus hechos” (“fulfills the literary function of initiating in Guatemala the path of the verbal 
dive, understood as the structuring element of the text, in order to express the country, its 
people and its events” [“La nueva novela” 83]). This “buceo verbal” (“verbal dive”) is 
clearly visible in the novel, even from the opening chapter. El Bolo’s arrival at the Cuban 
airport is intercalated with various scenes from his past, focusing more often than not on 
his abandonment of his mother’s home. With each step down the stairs, the scene jumps 
temporally and he recalls his mother’s words as he left her home:   
Me detuve en el primer escalón y respiré fuerte. Por poco me ahogo del 
chiflonazo caliente que me quemó hasta el diafragma: azotón de pulmones. Miré 
el horizonte […] Puse el pie en el segundo escalón, entonces los sentí: apretados, 
por todos lados los pelados. Comencé a bajar la escalerilla. “Siempre te he vivido 
cantando -¡puta, mariachi!- que seás un hombre decente y que hagás algo para el 
futuro. No siempre voy a vivir yo – ¡gracias a dios! – para mantenerte. Es 
necesario que busqués el camino del bien, esas juntas … no te van a llevar a 
ninguna parte. (13)
134
  
 
Her words prove fittingly prophetic. On the last page of the novel, he gives up hope of 
returning or of continuing his journey. He will remain in that nowhere: “Aquí sentado me 
voy a quedar / Chupando / Oyendo los bongos” (“Here I’ll stay / Sitting / Drinking / 
Listening to the bongos” [299, 232]). When he finally sets foot on the “ultimo escalón de 
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 “On the first step I stopped and took a deep breath. A great blast of hot air burned right down to my 
diaphragm searing my lungs, nearly suffocating me. I surveyed the horizon […] I put my foot on the 
second step, then I felt them: tight all over, the buggers. I started down the steps. ‘I’ve spent my entire 
life—sounds like the start of some bloody mariachi song—trying to get you to be a decent man and make 
something of yourself. I’m not always going to be here—Thank God!—to keep you. You have to find the 
right path. All those political meetings […] aren’t going to get you anywhere” (13). 
147 
 
la escalerilla (interminable)” (“last tread of the (endless) steps” [16, 15]), the scene 
returns to his mother’s home and he mutters, “Qué largo es el pasillo” (“God, this 
corridor’s long” [16, 15]). As time shifts back and forth throughout the chapters on El 
Bolo, the parallel between the escalerilla and the pasillo becomes ever more focused. 
Though time has fragmented, the seemingly interminable nature of his life remains. El 
Bolo laments on multiple occasions that “la escalerilla es interminable” (15, 16), 
implying that his escape from Guatemala will have no end. Yet because he refuses to 
return to Guatemala, “ese hoyo que me destruye” (“that hole that destroys me” [298, 
231]), his journey becomes an aimless transnational wandering. This loss of 
eschatological hope signals how pervasive the fragmentation of life has become. He is 
alone and without course in a world that lacks meaning. His attempts to piece together the 
fragments of his life, so as to derive meaning in such a fragmented world, cannot but 
appear pointless within the novel. There are no clear structural triggers that cause the 
temporal jumps, and no clear causal relationship is drawn between El Bolo’s present 
situation and the memories he recalls. As the path between signifier and signified 
diverges into nothingness, El Bolo realizes that there is no final destination; the path has 
become untraversable. The “buceo verbal,” like the stairs at the gate, goes on ad 
infinitum. Even when we appear to reach the “último escalón” (“last step”) of meaning, 
time jumps again and we are right back in the “buceo verbal.” The fragmentation of time 
and the continual search for meaning culminate in the final line of this initial chapter as 
everything begins again: “Comencé a subir la escalerilla” (“I started to climb the steps” 
[29, 25]).  
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The impossibility of deriving any meaning from reality reveals two difficulties: 
that reality has no meaning, and that even if it had meaning, language would be unable to 
signify it. Indeed, Gloria Hernández, in her introduction to Los compañeros: texto 
fundador de la nueva novela guatemalteca, writes:  
Los cuestionamientos que permean la obra revelan una profunda inquietud por el 
confrontamiento con la nada y por la imposibilidad de justificar plenamente las 
decisiones que se deben tomar. El sentimiento que reflejan los personajes se 
asemeja mucho a la náusea sartreana que no es otra cosa que el reconocimiento de 
la pura contingencia del universo. (11)
135
  
 
Nevertheless, despite the “pure contingency of the universe,” there remains in Flores the 
desire for social justice. Hernández writes, “Flores cree que algún día llegará para 
Guatemala la hora de la justicia social, aunque no por los medios que la novela describe” 
(“Flores believs that some day the time of social justice will arrive, though not by the 
means described in the novel” [11]). Of course, that does not mean that the desire itself 
does not figure forth in the text. In fact, this desire manifests itself in several ways, the 
first of which concerns language itself.  
Despite the clear disruption between signifier and signified—and the 
corresponding construction of the non-symbolic as the other of language and its 
relocation in a realm beyond language—the desire for language’s lingering ability to 
signify remains. I must stress “lingering” because the text seems to suggest that language 
does retain, at particular moments, the ability to create from the ruins of society a glimpse 
of its reconstruction. Even though the Guatemalan new novel sought to amplify the gap 
between signifier and signified, it also hoped to retain some form of political meaning, 
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 “The questionings that permeate the work reveal a profound restlessness because of the confrontation 
with nothingness and because of the impossibility of fully justifying the decisions that must be made. The 
feeling that the characters reflect compares strongly to the Sartrean nausea that is nothing other than the 
recognition of the pure contingency of the universe.” 
149 
 
not within but rather outside the text. Hence my previous discussion of Arias’ emphasis 
on the text as a “brain-storm session in political strategy” and the need to retain political 
meaning, even when it would seem that language has lost all possibility of signification 
(“Literary Production” 20). Thus there are readers and critics who come away from the 
text with a renewed hope for the future of Guatemala. Because the reader is 
encouraged—like the characters themselves—to flee from current reality in search of 
new possibilities, the interpretive freedoms given to the reader are simultaneously 
multiplied and limited. The idea is that just because someone like El Bolo did not find 
justice and became lost in that “interminable corridor,” that does not mean such justice is 
impossible. The suggestion, therefore, is that it may in fact be possible to come away 
from the text with glimmers of hope. For this reason, the first interpretation of the 
novel—the overwhelming emphasis on despair and the loss of hope—is often 
complemented by other more hopeful readings. But where do we find hope in a novel so 
focused on failure and destruction? Paradoxically, it is only upon examination of the 
torture scenes in the novel that critics begin to perceive the possibilities of an alternative 
political meaning. 
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The Negative Epistemic Value of Pain  
The torture scenes in Los compañeros generate a more lasting impact on the 
reader than any of the other scenes depicted. Yet despite their very graphic nature, the 
chapters describing the torture of El Patojo have received extraordinarily little attention 
from critics. Even articles that purport to treat the violence in the novel make only 
occasional reference to them. Rivera, for example, makes only a passing comment during 
his summary of the novel’s plot:  
Unos sucumbirán en acción entre la metralla del ejército o de la policía; otros 
habrán de ser asesinados, expuestos al sadismo de los torturadores; otros, 
perseguidos constantemente, se exilarán o simplemente desertarán, huyendo de la 
muerte, psíquica y moralmente agotados. Esta es, de manera sintética, la trama de 
la novela. (60)
136
  
 
The most sustained critical treatment of these scenes can be found in a 2001 article by 
Elisa Nuila,
137
 but her discussion limits itself to the function of the interior monologue 
and the ways in which the perspective shifts when El Patojo loses consciousness.
138
 She 
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 “Some will die in action among the shrapnel of the army or the police; others end up murdered, exposed 
to the sadism of the torturers; others, continually pursued, will exile themselves or simply desert, fleeing 
from death, both psychically and morally exhausted. This is, in a synthetic manner, the plot of the novel.” 
137
 Note that this article (published in Hernández’s book) is an extract from her doctoral thesis, which was 
published in Guatemala in 1996. I have tried to find a copy, but have been unable to do so. 
138
 Nuila notes that the novel utilizes two basic types of interior monologue: “el monólogo interior indirecto 
narrado” and “el monólogo interior directo” (90). The first type is rarely used in the novel, “puesto que la 
intención del autor es dejar que sus personajes se manifiesten libremente, sin intermediarios” (94). 
Nevertheless, though it is only employed three times in the entire novel, all three occur in the torture 
scenes. Nuila suggests:  
El narrador, en tercera persona, interviene para dar a conocer aspectos que, por las mismas 
circunstancias no nos los puede hacer saber el protagonista. En efecto, durante las sesiones de 
tortura, el Patojo perdía por algunos momentos la conciencia y es entonces cuando interviene el 
narrador, o bien, para describir las acciones de otros […] No podía ser el Patojo quien nos 
informara puesto que él estaba desmayado. (94-95) 
Despite Flores’ exclusive use of this type of monologue in the torture scenes, Nuila does not suggest a 
reason for this, other than to conclude that “estamos frente a un narrador en tercera persona con actitud 
omnisciente” (95).  
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does not suggest what political meaning these scenes reveal about torture, nor does she 
discuss its use by the state during the war.
139
 
If, as suggested above, Los compañeros is a novel of violence, not just because of 
the content, but because of the ways in which it rips apart signifier and signified, then one 
might conclude that the torture of El Patojo, which contains the most violent scenes in the 
novel, would be even more violent in rending apart the path between signifier and 
signified. If, as Rivera suggests, there exists a “violencia en la misma verbalización” (“a 
violence in the verbalization itself” [61-62]), the goal is to provoke a violent reaction in 
the reader: “las palabras no sólo se leen, se escuchan, se sienten, rompen las barreras del 
texto escrito y crean su propia dimensión radicalizándose en el momento más inesperado. 
Esta es una cualidad poética, la de infundir a las palabras connotaciones múltiples y 
provocar asimismo multiplicidad de sensaciones en el lector” (62). It is precisely its 
ability to provoke a multiplicity of sensations in the reader that makes Los compañeros so 
violent, and that makes its rhetoric of torture so captivating. For the few critics who do 
treat the chapters concerning El Patojo, however, the linguistic violence and the rending 
apart of signifier and signified are ignored. For many, the scenes gain a political meaning 
and purchase, and of all the characters in the novel, El Patojo is the only one who has 
inspired a measure of hope in readers. Seymour Menton calls him the “purest of the 
novel’s revolutionaries” (95). Lancelot Cowie argues that, of all the characters in the 
novel, “sólo Patojo es el más firme y comprometido ideológicamente. No vacila en el 
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 Regarding the use of interior monologue, Flores reveals in an interview that his use of this technique 
was inspired by the phenomenon of déjà-vu:  
Sobre esa sensación está asentada la estructura de la novela porque la idea de que eso ya me pasó, 
está ligada a través de la experiencia de la psicología a que algunas sensaciones que has vivido las 
volvés a vivir bajo diferentes circunstancias. Pero es una sensación que ya quedó establecida en tu 
subconsciente, de tal manera que cuando decís eso y ya me pasó es que esa sensación bajo otras 
circunstancias y otros hechos, de alguna manera, y te quedó grabada. (Hernández 189) 
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proceso revolucionario” (“only Patojo is the most ideologically firm and committed. He 
does not falter in the revolutionary process” [166]). According to such interpretations, El 
Patojo’s ability to withstand the intense pain of torture confers upon him a strength of 
character and an unflinching loyalty to the revolutionary cause. In fact, describing his 
death, Leona Nickless suggests that “a pesar de las circunstancias humillantes y su falta 
de sentido, la suya es una muerte noble y heroica puesto que permanece fiel a su 
compromiso” (“despite the humiliating circumstances and its lack of sense, his is a noble 
and heroic death since he remains faithful to his commitment” [133]). According to this 
second group of critics—those who see a glimmer of optimism in the novel—El Patojo 
provides readers with the hope that the revolutionary struggle has not been in vain.  
Unfortunately, such readings remain largely superficial, trusting faithfully, and 
often blindly, not only in El Patojo’s own interior monologues and his perception of the 
situation, but also in other characters’ thoughts about his detainment and death. For 
example, Chucha Flaca clearly romanticizes El Patojo’s suffering:  
Lo más jodido fue que no petateó de a vergazo, sino que herido se lo llevaron al 
cuarto cuerpo y allí lo morongasiaron cuatro días seguidos hasta que lo hicieron 
reventar. … Debe ser jodido que lo maten a uno a palos. Pero a cada quien lo 
suyo, aquél era huevudazo; debe haber aguantado como los machos hasta el 
final. Ojalá. Ninguna de las casas que él conocía cayó. (44-45, italics in 
orginal)
140
  
 
In suggesting that El Patojo held out against the torturers, Chucha Flaca idealizes his 
torture as an event that demonstrated not only El Patojo’s fidelity to the movement, but 
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 “The bugger is that he didn’t die straight away, he was wounded and taken to the 4
th
 Precinct and there 
they tortured him for four days consecutively until they killed him. […] It must be terrible to be beaten to 
death. But every man meets death his own way. He had balls. He must have resisted like a man right to the 
end. I hope so. None of the safe houses that he knew about fell” (38). 
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also his manhood.
141
 This, of course, assigns torture a meaning that, as we saw in chapter 
one of this study, is highly questionable. Even El Patojo romanticizes his own situation: 
… entonces me escupieron con desprecio / comunista maldito, te vamos a matar, 
¿oíste? / Nada me importaba, estaba cansado, hicieran lo que hicieran no me iban 
a sacar una sola palabra, si yo hubiera hablado caen todos los dirigentes de la 
Resistencia Central, pero no iban a sacarme nada. Gritaban, gesticulaban, 
buscaban, hurgaban, pero nunca supieron nada … (231-32)
142
  
 
Implicit in his argument is the idea that the interrogators are torturing him solely in order 
to extract information; hence El Patojo can die victorious, knowing that he has not 
betrayed his comrades. The optimistic interpretations of his torture ultimately collapse, 
however, because in presenting El Patojo’s capture and torture as having occurred for the 
purposes of interrogation, the text implies that even though El Patojo held out, others may 
not. This possibility is compounded in presenting El Patojo as noble or heroic. Other less 
heroic characters, such as Chucha Flaca or El Bolo, might well have given up the “los 
dirigentes de la Resistencia Central” (232). 
In fact, a closer examination of the scenes—when coupled with a reading of 
theorists like Scarry, Kahn, Ballengee, and Parry and their more robust understanding of 
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 These are found in one of the interior monologues of Chucha Flaca. His thoughts are actually 
intercalated with the conversation of El Rata:  
Debe ser emocionante morir combatiendo, verá vos. Yo siempre me he imaginado cómo fue la 
muerte del Patojo. Según decía el comunicado de las FAR, aquél cayó combatiendo en la montaña 
/ que montaña, en el cuarto toro le dieron negra a puro vergazo / después de haber caminado 
cinco días “los valientes combatientes se vieron obligados por la sed a salir a campo abierto para 
llegar pronto al […] río”. Así decía el boletín que leí. (44) 
“It must be exciting to die in combat, don’t you think? I’ve always imagined how the Lad died. 
According to the communiqué from the FAR he fell fighting in the mountains / What bloody 
mountains? They beat him to death in the 4
th
 Precinct / after walking for days ‘the valiant 
combatants were forced by conditions of extreme thirst to come into the open to reach […] the 
river’. That’s what the report that I read said” (38). 
In contrasting the public information received by El Rata with that known by Chucha Flaca, the text 
insinuates that Chucha Flaca in fact knows the real story, thereby lending legitimacy to his version of 
events.  
142
 “… so they spat on me contemptuously / Bloody communist, we’re going to kill you, do you hear? / I 
didn’t care, I was exhausted, whatever they did they wouldn’t get a word out of me, if I’d talked all the 
leaders of the Central Resistance would have fallen, but they would get nothing out of me. They shouted, 
gesticulated, sought, pried but they never got a thing” (181). 
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the way in which torture functions—reveals that if we describe his death as noble or 
heroic, we assign a very problematic meaning to the event. When El Patojo assumes that 
there is in fact a reason for his detainment and the ensuing sessions of torture, his 
revelation has two consequences. First, it lends legitimacy to the state’s narrative by 
assuming there is an epistemic value in pain (Kahn). Ignoring the more insidious nature 
of torture as truth production (Kahn), such a conception fails to realize that one of the 
primary goals of torture is not obtaining information (Scarry), but rather spreading terror 
and creating a perceived background of social control (Parry). Second, in his desperate 
search to find meaning for his torture, El Patojo succeeds only in establishing the ground 
for its eroticization. As the linguistic violence rips apart signifier and signified, pushing 
the non-symbolic of torture outside the text, this creates a strong ambiguity regarding 
torture and opens the possibility for substituting other meanings. I will examine these two 
consequences in turn. 
First, regarding the nature of torture itself, when critics like Nickless suggest that 
“a pesar de las circunstancias humillantes y su falta de sentido, la suya es una muerte 
noble y heroica puesto que permanece fiel a su compromiso” (133), such a conclusion 
presents a contradictory “sense” of heroism and loyalty to Patojo’s death, which the 
humiliating circumstances and their “falta de sentido” seemingly preclude. How can one 
remain true to—or give political meaning to—a suffering that is seemingly without 
“meaning”? Furthermore, such a conclusion also presumes that there exists an “epistemic 
value” in torture (Kahn 2). As noted in Chapter One of the present study, the public 
“spectacle of torture” has been replaced in modernity with the penitentiary. Because 
criminal procedure had become “skeptical of the epistemic value of torture” and its 
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relationship to public admissions of guilt, the significance of torture shifted (Kahn 2). 
Torture continued to be practiced not because of any trust in its ability to discover the 
truth, but rather because of the ways in which the state employed it in order to create truth 
(Kahn 3). Torture became a secret practice of truth production that haunted the social 
sphere:  
The torture that survives occurs in places closed to public regard, under 
conditions of deniability, and by agents whose relationship to the state is likely to 
be ‘shadowy.’ The modern phenomenon of torture has the opaque presence of the 
‘deniable.’ It must be known but not seen; it must be spoken of but never speak 
itself. It is a political practice that cannot exist in public space. Nevertheless, to be 
effective the threat of torture must taint the public space. It is always just beyond 
view. (Kahn 3)  
 
Therefore, we must approach these scenes of torture in Los compañeros not as if they 
represent violations of the law, but rather as demonstrations of a more profound political 
phenomenon, in which the relationship between individual citizens and sovereign power 
is revealed (Kahn; Parry). As I have noted, torture continues to be practiced not for the 
purposes of interrogation, even though the “question” remains a central component of the 
act, but rather as a contest between the state and the victim:  
Torture was deployed in a contest over the character of the sacred. That contest 
leads to the confession because we cannot know the meaning of the body as 
signifier until that final act of speech in which the victim names his god. Every act 
of torture is a competition between the power of the torturer to demand confession 
and the power of the victim to refuse and die as a martyr to his own sovereign. 
(Kahn 30)  
 
Yet once the practice passes from public spectacle to the “shadowy” confines of 
detention centers, as it does in Los compañeros, the possibility for martyrdom disappears. 
Since the state controls the flow of knowledge, it also controls the meaning of the 
tortured body as signifier. As discussed in Chapter One, even though torture is by nature 
polysemic, tortured bodies in Guatemala are given a very particular meaning within the 
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state’s strategic production of terror.
143
 Whether we trust in the characters’ ability to 
know if El Patojo actually held out against the torturers becomes irrelevant. The crucial 
factor is that their inability to understand the tortured body as a signifier within the state’s 
narrative—which we witness in their assumption that he was detained for the purpose of 
extracting information—reaffirms the state’s narrative and reveals the characters’ 
inability to assign torture new meaning.
144
 Hence El Patojo’s body, over and against 
those critics who want to interpret his actions as noble or heroic, can no longer signify 
anything outside the narrative of the state. This narrative includes the state’s project of 
creating a perceived background of social control in which escalation and the “logic of 
consent” (Parry) are the primary goals of torture. Moreover, being a hero backfires for 
two additional reasons regarding the citizens’ ability to resist the violence of the state. 
First, it forecloses resistance by elevating death as the heroic option. Second, because all 
other characters in the novel assume they are not and will never be heroes, their survival 
means nothing. So what is the point in their continued fighting?  
 As for the second major consequence of these passages—that is, concerning 
linguistic violence and the relegation of the non-symbolic of torture into a “beyond” that 
is outside the text—we must begin by noting El Patojo’s desire to find meaning in his 
abduction and torture. Unlike the situations of other characters in the novel, who become 
lost in the chaotic and melancholic “buceo verbal” of Guatemalan society and who 
because of their interminable fleeing never find a “meaning” for their suffering or a 
glimpse of a better society, the romanticization of El Patojo’s death and the elevation of 
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 Here I mean that bodies are essentially “polysemic” and only attain meaning within a specific context. 
As noted in chapter two of the present study, within the state’s production of terror, bodies come to 
“signify” and gain specific meaning.  
144
 These critics (and the novel, as we will see below) seem to be trying to justify the practice of torture; it 
seeks to give it a meaning that is highly problematic.  
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desire allow for the perceived possibility of closing the gap between signifier and 
signified. Therefore, despite the problematic conception of the purposes of torture by the 
novel’s characters, the scenes nonetheless continue to be informative in what they reveal 
about El Patojo’s psyche. 
To begin, El Patojo believes that he has retained his capacity to think and reason: 
“Me van a volver a dar moronga. De ésta no salgo, de plano. ¿Por qué podré pensar 
todavía? Lo peor es que estoy completamente lúcido, la madeja de recuerdos está intacta, 
la película sigue rodando, tal vez en sentido contrario” (“They’re going to torture me 
again. I shan’t come out of this one alive. Why am I still able to think? The worst thing is 
I’m still lucid, the skein of memories is still intact, the film still running, although, 
perhaps, in reverse” [233, 182]). Yet it is clear that his psyche has fragmented. For 
example, if the linearity of time was ruptured in other chapters in the novel, here it is 
utterly destroyed. The torture scenes are punctuated continually by descriptions of 
various events in El Patojo’s life, and it becomes clear that, despite his affirmations to the 
contrary, lucidity now escapes him. His confusion is apparent, and as he seeks to 
understand his current circumstances, he leaps mentally to two primary occasions: his 
birth and his first sexual experience.  
 The flashbacks to his own birth clearly reveal the psychological attempt to regress 
to his mother’s womb. They also reaffirm my argument that the breach between language 
and the non-symbolic remains impassable. Indeed, the desire to regress to the womb 
represents a popular means of gesturing toward the “beyond” of language. As Loevlie 
notes, many who attempt to narrate their discontent with language will present the non-
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symbolic in literature by drawing on psychoanalysis, specifically its emphasis on the pre-
linguistic stage of the infant.
145
 Loevlie writes,  
In the Imaginary the infant experiences a continuous relationship with the 
surroundings. Its reality is immediate, not organized, fragmented, or separated by 
means of symbols. The entry into language is experienced as a major loss and 
rupture […] in that it fragments and discontinues the continuous sense of being. 
Silence is identified with the pleasure of immediacy, of wholeness that precedes 
reflexivity and language.  (14) 
 
Therefore, El Patojo’s desire to be somewhere “más comoda” (“more comfortable” 
[139]) may reveal a deeper concern to return to the “pleasure of immediacy, of wholeness 
that precedes reflexivity and language” (Loevlie 14). As he is beaten and tortured, El 
Patojo returns to the womb because “[a]llí todo era tranquilidad, soledad y oscuridad 
eternal” (“There it was all peace, solitude and eternal soothing, calming, beneficent 
darkness” [67, 55]). More than anything, he desires to return to that “silencio” (67). 
During the torture sesssion, when he begins to black out, he thinks: “[t]odo comenzó a 
ponerse negro, negro como su jeta y no dejaba de pegar y de insultarme / comuniste 
maldite / Todo negro, negro, hondo, hondo. Parecía que flotaba en un túnel de sonido” 
(“Everything began to go black, black like his mouth, he didn’t stop hitting me and 
cursing me / Communist bastard / Everything black, black, deep, deep. I seemed to be 
floating in a tunnel of sound” [62, 51]). He remembers the feeling of uncertainty as he 
was pulled by forceps from the womb, his “globo de alabastro” (“alabaster sphere” [62, 
51]). The violence of his death thus forces him to recall the violence of being born. But 
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 As noted above, another primary source of the “Dream of Silence” in the Western tradition is 
Christianity and its story of the Creation and the Fall. Loevlie writes,  
The Fall into sin was also the fall into language. In other words, man is forever doomed to speak 
in fallen language, a language that can never grasp God or the Absolute and that constantly 
distorts any immediate reality. This story consequently defines silence as congruent with the sense 
of plenitude, peace, and a continuous relationship with God that existed before the Fall. (13)  
Therefore, in addition to the continued disappointment with the proliferation of words and language, the 
association of silence with the pre-Fall or pre-Symbolic gives the Dream of Silence a powerful seductive 
appeal that is almost impossible to ignore. 
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the violence of his birth is also highly sexualized. The verb “eyacular” (“to ejaculate”) is 
used to describe the sudden release of calm as he leaves the womb (62). He hears 
“grititos de placer” (62). The amniotic fluid surrounding him is described like semen: 
“líquido viscoso, cremoso, blanco” (“viscous, creamy white liquid” [62]). These images 
make it difficult to discern whether he is referencing birth or sexual fulfillment. And thus 
the desire for his mother’s womb—for silence and the pre-symbolic peace and “pleasure 
of immediacy, of wholeness that precedes reflexivity and language” (Loevlie 14)—is 
gradually substituted with erotic desire. 
This uncertainty is further complicated by the sexualized descriptions of the 
violence itself. The first chapter devoted to El Patojo opens with him receiving first a 
“culatazo en la frente” and then a “bofetón” that makes him bleed (59). Descriptions of 
this beating, however, soon become very sexual: “El vergazo lo zarandeó más de lo 
acostumbrado, sintió que la sangre bajaba bajaba por todo el canal intestinal y quemaba 
el recto, el colon; el hoyo del culo se cerró instintivamente: esfinterazo. Aguantaré” 
(“The blow made him stagger more than usual, he felt that the blood was going down 
down through his whole intestine, burning his rectum, his colon; his anus closed 
automatically sphincterised. I can take it” [60, 50]). The term vergazo, clearly derived 
from verga (“penis”), is now a popular term for a “beating” in Guatemala.
146
 The sexual 
nature of the scene is amplified by the blood which runs down through his intestines and 
colon until it burns his rectum, culminating with El Patojo’s desire to close his sphincter: 
esfinterazo. To be a real man, his closed mouth must parallel his closed sphincter:  
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 It is claimed that during the dictatorship of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, the secret police would cut the 
penises off bulls, and then fill the skins with sand or small pebbles. These vergas were then used as 
weapons by the police during torture sessions to beat the victims. Hence verguear became a popular term 
for punishing or beating someone, and is still used today. 
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“Aguantaré” (“I can take it” [60, 50]). Later, in another scene, El Patojo reflects that it 
seemed the soldier “[d]aba como si en ello le fuera el sexo, la vida, el alma” (“was hitting 
me as if all his sex, his life, his soul were in it” [51, 62]). From there he slips into the 
“túnel de sonido” (“tunnel of sound”) discussed earlier. The moves between pain, 
darkness, birth, and sex become an unbroken continuum of signification, with each 
eventually coming to signify the other.   
In fact, the feelings of being tied hands and feet, of dragging himself toward the 
light (which also recalls the phrase used earlier for giving birth), of fear, and of holding 
on (aguantar) combine to stimulate recollections of his first sexual experience: 
Traté de arrastrarme hacia las rejas, pero estaba amarrado de pies y manos, 
siempre esa sensación de estar atado de pies y manos, cuando traté de darle el 
primer beso sabía que estábamos solos, que no había nadie cerca, que la abuela se 
había ido a la iglesia y el abuelo al traspatio, que ella quería, sin embargo me 
sentía atado de pies y manos. Me arrastraba para llegar a la luz. Pero era mi prima 
(tus hijos serán como cerdos, con cabeza enorme y ojos saltones) y el temor me 
ataba, me inmovilizaba, me impedía tomarla, poseerla. Me puso las manos en los 
hombros insinuándose, la erección instantánea me detuvo, tenía que cogerla, no 
podía aguantar más, traté de estrujarle una chiche, levanté la mano con lentitud, 
pero no pude, la tenía atada, entonces me arrastré lentamente hacia las rejas de la 
celda. (64-65)
147
 
 
As the scene progresses, the distance between his birth, his first sexual experience, and 
his death by torture completely collapses.
148
 Readers lose clarity regarding where one 
memory ends and the other begins. His mind and language can no longer distinguish one 
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 “I tried to drag myself towards the bars, but I was tied hand and foot, always that feeling of being tied 
hand and foot, when I gave her the first kiss I knew that we were alone, that there was nobody around, that 
her grandmother had gone to church and her grandfather was in the rear courtyard and that she wanted it, 
but still I felt tied hand and foot. I dragged myself to the light. But she was my cousin (your children will 
turn out like pigs, with big heads and bulging eyes) and fear tied me, immobilized me, stopped me from 
taking her, from possessing her. She put her hands on my shoulders flirting with me, my instant erection 
stopped me, I had to fuck her, I couldn’t stand it anymore. I tried to squeeze one of her tits, I lifted my hand 
slowly but it was tied, then I dragged myself slowly towards the bars of the cell” (53).  
148
 Two lines later, he notes that his head feels “hueca”. It should be noted that for a Guatemalan reader, 
this use of the term “hueca”, especially when accompanied by such a highly erotic description, would take 
on another possible interpretation. In Guatemala, hueco is the most common derogatory term used to refer 
to homosexuals.  
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from the other, and thus the reader cannot discern where the torture ends and his birth 
begins, or where sex ends and torture begins. Thus language becomes confused. This is 
most clearly visible at the end of the chapter, where the episodes blend almost 
seamlessly: 
¡Malditas tenazas que me sacaron de mi globo de alabastro! Ahora el vacío y este 
silencio que me aplasta los ojos y la garganta. No hay que hablar, no hay que 
decir nada, solo abrázame y bésame. Yo atado de pies y manos y sus ojos azules 
metiéndose hasta lo más hondo de mis nervios. Sentí todo su cuerpo pegado al 
mío, doliéndome, erectándome, excitándome, haciéndome correr la sangre, 
entonces rompí las ataduras y de mis muñecas comenzó a salir el sangrerío, los 
lazos abrieron surcos líquidos, el cuerpo me comenzó a doler, sobre todo el bajo 
vientre y los huevos. Me había ido al aire. La miré con vergüenza amishado, sin 
atreverme a decir nada, sin hacer nada, quieto, tieso, como mi pantalón que se 
empezaba a secar con todo y el semen. Ella no se dio cuenta de lo que había 
pasado. Sentí asco. Me moví para despegarme el pene del calzoncillo. El frío se 
metió por los barrotes de la celda y me desamarré los pies. Me paré. (67)
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There are no clear transitions between one memory and another. Given the erotic nature 
of the scene, even the final verb of the passage (“Me paré”) can take on alternative 
interpretations. Either he stood up, or he became sexually aroused. Either interpretation is 
possible.
150
 The point is that one description could just as easily describe either action. If 
torture is equated with sex, and if the violence of torture is tied to the violence of birth, 
then the allegorical mode of substituting one object for almost any other then becomes 
possible.  
                                                 
149
 “Damned forceps that force me from my alabaster sphere. Now the void and this silence that crushes my 
eyes and my throat. Don’t speak, you don’t need to say anything, just hold me in your arms and kiss me. 
Me, tied hand and foot and her blue eyes boring into the very depths of my nerves. I felt her whole body 
clinging to mine hurting me, exciting me, rousing me to erection, making my blood race, then I broke the 
bonds and blood began to gush from the liquid furrows that the ropes had cut into my wrists, my body 
began to ache, especially my lower belly and my balls. I had come. I looked at her timidly, ashamed, not 
daring to say a thing, doing nothing, quiet, stiff like my trousers on which the semen was beginning to dry. 
She didn’t realize what had happened. I felt disgusted. I moved to unstuck my penis from my underpants. 
The cold came through the bars of the cell and I untied my feet. I stood up” (55). 
150
 We see this same verb used in a similar fashion in Arias’ description of torture. See below. 
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Of course, El Patojo’s confusion makes sense following psychoanalytic 
conceptions of desire, according to which the continual substitution of one object of 
desire for another reveals an even deeper need to continue to desire. Desire, according to 
Lacan, remains a misrecognition of fullness. As noted above, the infant’s entrance into 
language marks a profound rupture, for in the pre-linguistic stage, “the infant experiences 
a continuous relationship with the surroundings. Its reality is immediate, not organized, 
fragmented, or separated by means of symbols” (Loevlie 14). The passage into language 
is experienced as a loss of fullness since “it fragments and discontinues the continuous 
sense of being” (Loevlie 14) of the pre-symbolic. Because of this irreplaceable loss, we 
construct a fantasy version of fulfillment, and thus the desired object—as misrecognized 
fulfillment—bears no real relationship to the materiality of the object, but is rather an 
illusion. Thus desire is experienced most fundamentally as a lack. What we really desire, 
according to Lacan, is not the attainment of a particular object, but rather the persistence 
of desire. It is a “desire to desire,” and thus desire is continually propelled by its own un-
fulfillment and impossibility. Because this desire is a construction of the psyche, it can be 
regulated (and manipulated) by cultural and sociopolitical ideologies. According to Judith 
Butler, in fact, the state plays an enormous role in regulating our desires, even to the 
point that we might come to desire our own wretchedness and subjection (Psychic Life 
79). Butler writes that “a subject will attach to pain rather than not attach at all. For 
Freud, an infant forms a pleasure-giving attachment to any excitation that comes its way, 
even the most traumatic, which accounts for the formation of masochism and, for some, 
the production of abjection, rejection, wretchedness, and so on” (Psychic Life 61). 
Because the illusive original lost object may, in some situations, be replaced with pain 
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and even torture, from a psychoanalytic standpoint, we can see how El Patojo’s might be 
excited and even aroused by his torture and subjection at the hands of the state. The 
confusion in the text regarding the objects of desire—and thus between signifier and 
signified—is understandable.  
That it is understandable, however, does not imply that the confusion is 
unproblematic. After all, as I noted at the beginning of this section, numerous critics look 
optimistically upon El Patojo’s “noble” and “heroic” death. What these critics fail to 
note, however, is the extent to which El Patojo might desire the state’s use of violence. It 
is true that Flores’ attempt to blend the descriptions together and thereby confuse the 
relationship between signifier and signified epitomizes one of the fundamental goals of 
the Guatemalan new novel, namely to reveal the failures of language to describe the 
horrific nature of the Guatemalan reality. The result of these confusions, however, is that 
in addition to being “unspeakable,” torture becomes desirable.
151
 The equation of torture 
and sex, when coupled with the strong erotic nature of the language used by Flores, 
allows the reader to question whether El Patojo might desire his own torture and 
subjection. Textually, Flores does not offer a clear answer. The novel remains 
ambiguous, and in doing so, suggests that all are possibilities. The absence of a clearly 
defined object of desire creates a vacuum that El Patojo is unable to fill or understand. In 
creating this vacuum, Flores’ novel makes a strong statement about the ambivalent nature 
of the relationship between state’s use of violence and erotic desire. Clearly Flores’ re-
presentation of the tortured body plays with the relationship between language and 
referent. In doing so, however, his rhetoric of torture can never succeed in wresting 
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 We might go so far as to suggest that, psychoanalytically, it is desirable precisely because it is 
unspeakable. As its silent non-symbolic is pushed into a realm that is beyond (or perhaps, given the 
context, pre-) language, it becomes an increasingly seductive concept, much like silence. 
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control of language away from the state; rather, it only reaffirms and intensifies the 
uncertain nature of torture and its potential to create situations that “resist linguistic 
signification” (Ballengee 7, italics in original). As noted in Chapter One, the state’s use 
of torture during La violencia had as its goal the creation of ambiguity and unknowing. 
The military, through its use of torture and disappearance, established the boundaries of 
the social through a process that Judith Butler describes as “melancholic ambivalence” 
(Psychic Life 167-68). Unlike mourning, in which the object can be declared lost, 
melancholia is the result of the loss of a loss: “the object is not only lost, but that loss 
itself is lost” (Butler, Psychic Life 183). In Guatemala, this “unavowable loss” prevented 
the melancholic from knowing and speaking about that loss, thereby hindering the 
process of grieving. In regulating, and often impeding, the processes of mourning, the 
state played a fundamental role in the formation of its subjects. Its active participation in 
the formation of the individual’s critical agency created situations that not only resisted 
linguistic signification, also provoked a deep anxiety of the unknown. As noted earlier, 
such anxiety often creates the demand for an order that the state alone can provide 
(Cavanaugh). The resulting confusion regarding whom to trust and what to believe 
produces a strong ambivalence with respect not only to the state, but to life itself. This 
ambivalence or “mala saña” (Perera 44) is the “struggle that loss occasions between the 
desire to live and the desire to die” (Psychic Life 193). This confusion, Butler argues, 
may very well culminate in the desire for subjection at the hands of the state (Psychic Life 
79), thereby rendering denunciation and counter-memory impossible.  
In Los compañeros, we see the effects of the state’s project in the descriptions of 
El Bolo, Chucha Flaca and El Rata, but especially in the torture scenes of El Patojo. 
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Unfortunately, however, Patojo’s continued confusion regarding the object of his desire 
reveals a strong ambivalence between life, death, and erotic stimulation. In the end, even 
though Flores’ novel does attempt to counter-narrate the state’s message of fear, its 
narration of torture succeeds only in eroticizing a practice that was always already 
intended to be a “striptease.” It remains questionable, therefore, whether there is truly a 
model of political resistance in his novel and what role it can play in challenging the 
rhetoric of the state. Because of the overemphasis on uncertainty and doubt, at best, the 
message is ambivalent, in which case El Patojo’s sovereign remains an unfulfilled and 
ambivalent “desire to desire.” The production of ambivalence is merely a “simple 
repetition” of the state’s own project. 
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Specters of Torture: Arturo Arias’ Después de las bombas 
… sometimes in the dead of night, when 
libidinal fulfillments have their way, the 
ghost of the crypt comes back to haunt the 
cemetery guard, giving him strange and 
incomprehensible signals, making him 
perform bizarre acts, or subjecting him to 
unexpected sensations.
152
 
  
What does the ghost say as it speaks, barely, 
in the interstices of the visible and the 
invisible?
153
 
 
We see a similar production of desire in Arturo Arias’ Después de las bombas 
(1979). Undoubtedly one of the most important works of fiction to come out of 
Guatemala in the last 40 years, Arias’ novel narrates the life of Máximo, a young aspiring 
writer whose life was permanently affected by the U.S. Intervention in 1954 and the 
bombing of the capital.
154
 Not only did the Intervention greatly alter the future of the 
country as a whole, but it also resulted in the disappearance and presumed death of 
Máximo’s father. The opening chapter of the novel follows Máximo’s mother as she 
seeks refuge during the bombardment and worries over the fate of her husband. The 
second chapter, which begins after the bombs cease, describes Máximo as a child, 
wandering through the streets of Guatemala City and trying to avoid the puddles of blood 
and the piles of corpses, as he tries to find his father.  
Máximo’s journey, however, soon becomes not only a search for his father, but 
also for words. Máximo states, “Encontraré a mi padre a través de las palabras. Lo traeré 
de vuelta a la vida con las palabras” (“I’ll find my father through words. I’ll bring him 
back to life with words” [140, 167]). As he grows older, Máximo realizes that there was a 
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 Abraham and Torok 130. 
153
 Gordon 24.  
154
 For more detailed information on these events, see Chapter One of the present study.  
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time “antes de las bombas” (“before the bombs”), but that no one will talk about it. His 
goal is “[d]evolverle las palabras al pueblo, llenar los espacios en blanco, los blancos” 
(“[t]o return words to the people, to fill in the blank spaces, the blanks” [117, 140]). In an 
interview, Arias notes the impact of these “espacios en blanco” (“blank spaces”) on the 
Guatemalan population, suggesting that the enforced silence during the war produced a 
profound existential crisis (qtd. in Volpendesta 19). As I noted in the Introduction, this 
enforced silence was widespread, and the dangers of speaking in public about politics 
created an atmosphere of silence. Confronted with this silence and “with an 
incomprehensible and absurd social existence,” Arias’ generation “dwelt in a prolonged 
state of political limbo” (Volpendesta 19). Volpendesta notes that Máximo embodies that 
“state of political limbo” in his continued use of a child’s rubber pacifier, which 
“signifies the subsumed political rage of his generation and its frustration at not being 
able to comprehend the source of its anger” (Volpendesta 19).  The pacifier, according to 
Arias, stands as a symbol of “prolonged political innocence” (qtd. in Volpendesta 19). By 
his own admission, Arias purposefully creates symbols that “lend themselves to a 
multiplicity of interpretations, and therefore open themselves to multiple readings and to 
many points of view” (qtd in Volpendesta 19). According to Arias,  
The sense was that since there was no knowledge of what had happened before 
and no context in which to apprehend … reality—one is in a vacuum, in the 
middle of a tunnel without any light. All of that delays the process of the 
comprehension of reality. And there is the contradiction between the felt 
perceptions, which are intense, and the intellectual apprehension of that reality. 
(qtd in Volpendesta 19)
155
  
 
Máximo’s state of unknowing represents the trauma that affected all citizens during the 
war. The REMHI report, in its treatment of the effects of the culture of fear, notes that the 
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 This idea of being “in the middle of a tunnel without any light” reinforces the previous discussion of El 
Patojo’s regression to the birth canal in Los compañeros.  
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Guatemalan state succeeded in distorting “the boundaries between the real and the 
imagined” (11). As noted in Chapter One, state terror often purposefully sought to create 
such “blank spaces” in order to erode the citizens’ ability to discern what was real and 
what was unreal. As Cavanaugh argues, “Rather than set firm boundaries between reality 
and unreality, it is more profitable for the state to leave those boundaries confused and 
ambiguous. Ambiguity and unknowing create anxiety, which in turn creates the demand 
for order which the state provides” (Cavanaugh 55). In Después de las bombas, we see 
the effects that this ambiguity and uncertainty inscribe on the individual psyche.  
Máximo’s life undoubtedly remains in a constant state of unknowing, and this 
aspect of his life, fueled by Arias’ own statements about the novel, continues to be 
emphasized by most critics. Zimmerman, for example, in discussing Máximo’s trauma, 
highlights the effect of the bombs on Máximo, noting specifically his “chronic case of 
hives” and continual use of a pacifier (Zimmerman 161). Notwithstanding the trauma 
experienced by Máximo and the silence surrounding what happened “antes de las 
bombas,” critics have failed to give due attention to one of the most shocking events in 
the novel: Máximo’s torture at the hands of the state. The scene is rather graphic, and in 
order to explore its significance fully, it first warrants an extended description of the 
violence involved.  
The scene begins as Máximo and his love interest Karen are walking through Las 
Conchas park (89). Suddenly, they are confronted by six soldiers armed with machine 
guns, who demand to see their “huellas” (“ID’s” [91, 110]). The soldiers search the 
pockets of Máximo and Karen but do not find them. They suggest that a “registro más 
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enérgico” (“a more thorough search” [92, 112]) is necessary and demand that they 
remove their clothing. They tear off Máximo’s clothing and search him first: 
…lo forzaron a abrir la boca mientras otro le metía dos dedos dentro de ella y 
sentía la náusea formándose y el hombre sacó la mano y salieron dos hilitos de 
vómito por la orilla de su boca. Le levantaron la verga para ver si no tenía nada 
escondido y luego hicieron lo mismo con los testículos. Lo voltearon y dos le 
sostuvieron las nalgas abiertas mientras otro introducía sus dedos en el ano. No 
hay huellas, dijo. (93)
156
  
 
When they turn to Karen, Máximo protests and is beaten until he becomes quiet. When at 
last he looks up, he sees that they have begun to search her as well: 
Le habían arrancado la blusa y otro buscaba el broche del brassiere. El temblor de 
ellos aumentaba y algunos sudaban casi tanto como él. El brassiere había caído y 
sus calzones iban hacia abajo y ella ya no gritaba ni pateaba. No hacía nada. 
Como una muñeca de trapo. La empujaron al suelo y le abrieron la boca mientras 
otro le metía los dedos hasta la garganta. Él veía que ella lloraba copiosamente 
pero no escuchaba ni un solo gemido, solamente el peso del pecho subiéndole y 
bajándole, le pellizcaban los senos y le daban vueltas y vueltas a su oreja postiza. 
Le levantaron las piernas al aire con uno de los hombres sentado sobre su panza y 
las siguieron levantando hasta que los pies casi tocaban las orejas. El hombre le 
introdujo los dedos en el ano, se sorprendió de no encontrar nada y trató otra vez. 
No hay huellas, dijo. (93-94)
157
  
 
It is imperative to note the public nature of this spectacle. There is no attempt on the part 
of the soldiers to hide what they are about to do. They are in a public park, and 
presumably, open to the gaze of all.  
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 “They … forced him to open his mouth while another shoved his fingers down his throat and he felt the 
nausea rising and as the man removed his hand two streams of vomit appeared at the corners of his mouth. 
They lifted his penis to see if he had anything concealed there and the same with his testicles. They turned 
him around and two of them separated his buttocks while a third stuck his fingers into his anus. No ID he 
said” (113). 
157
 “They had ripped her blouse off and and another was fumbling for the fastener of her bra. They were 
trembling more and more and a few were sweating almost as much as he was. Her bra was on the ground 
and her panties were coming off but she had stopped shrieking and kicking. She did nothing. Like a rag 
doll. They pushed her to the ground and opened her mouth while one stuck his fingers deep inside. He saw 
that she was weeping, the tears streaming from her eyes but not a sob could be heard, only her chest rising 
and falling, they pinching her breasts and turning her artificial ear around and around. They raised her legs 
in the air with one of the men astride her belly and kept forcing them forward until her feet were almost 
touching her ears. The man stuck his fingers into her anus, and surprised not to find anything, tried again. 
No ID, he said” (113). 
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When one of the soldiers offers to continue by searching her vagina, he realizes 
that she is a virgin. They beat Máximo until he confesses that he is a virgin as well. 
Máximo and Karen are then forced to have sex. Just as we saw in the above discussion of 
the torture of El Patojo, despite the disturbing nature of the forced encounter, the 
language used is strongly erotic: 
Abriéndole las piernas la sentaron gentilmente sobre el miembro que la esperaba, 
con cuidado para asegurarse que cada parte entrara donde debía. Uno de los 
hombres le sostenía la verga en posición de firmes. La empujaron a ella hacia 
abajo por los hombros y los muslos y ella se sumergió lentamente dando los más 
fuertes alaridos que había oído ninguno de ellos … Cuando por fin él estaba 
completamente dentro de ella, ella se había desmayado… (95)
158
  
 
Unable to revive her, the soldiers turn them over “para que él terminara encima de ella” 
(“so that he would end up on top of her” [95, 115]). They strike him again and again to 
keep him moving: “Sacaron dos cachiporras más y empezaron a pegarle en la espalda, los 
muslos, las piernas, hombros y costillas. Él twisteaba lleno de dolor y la excitación de 
ellos crecía con el ritmo de sus movimientos” (“They drew two more truncheons and 
began to beat him on the back, thighs, legs, shoulders, and ribs. He was twisting with 
pain and their excitment mounted with the acceleration of his movements” [95, 115]). 
The soldiers, as the primary witnesses to the torture, become sexually aroused. Their 
reaction, of course, accentuates the pornographic nature of the scene and its heavily erotic 
language.
159
 When Máximo slows down or stops, they beat him to keep him 
                                                 
158
 “Opening her legs they sat her politely over the waiting member, carefully, to make sure the parts met 
properly. One of the men held the penis at attention. They let her down by the shoulders and thighs and she 
submerged slowly giving vent to the loudest howls any of them had ever heard, but he didn’t want to hear 
the screams, didn’t want to hear them. When finally he was all the way into her, she had fainted…” (115). 
159
 In his discussion of the 2006 report on the mistreatment of detainees in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, Kahn 
highlights the relationship between torture and sexual images. He writes that the detainees  
lost control of the meaning of their suffering. Instead of being forced to bear the image of the 
American sovereign, however, the power of the political was confused with a fantasy of the 
pornographic. These two forms of ecstatic power are deeply related. Has there ever been a war in 
which the enemy was not represented in a pornographic image? The grotesque character of the 
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“twisting.”
160
 The last words in the scene (and chapter) belong to one of the soldiers: 
“Primer amor […] No hay nada como él” (“First love […] There’s nothing like it” [96, 
116]).  
Despite the graphically sexual nature of the experience, however, critics have 
often allegorized this torture scene. Zimmerman, for example, suggests that “the 
nightmarish forced sexual initiation in Arias’ book is perhaps the most dynamic 
expression he can give to the rape of values which comes with the new military regime” 
(162). For Máximo, of course, the scene is much more than a mere “rape of values,” and 
he cannot forget the experience, despite his repeated attempts to try. Indeed, textual 
evidence suggests that his torture has affected him even more profoundly than the bombs 
and the disappearance of his father. When the next chapter begins, three years have 
passed. We learn that Karen returned to the United States soon after her rape and torture 
and that she later died in a motorcycle accident. Despite the amount of time that has 
passed, however, her ghost continues to haunt him:  
Máximo quisiera olvidar. Máximo no podía olvidar. Se le aparecía su cara en el 
aire, transparente, viéndolo. Pasaba donde menso se lo esperaba, hablándole 
quedito. Saldría él a jugar fut y allí estaría ella. Había estado en un funeral hacía 
un par de días. La había visto en la esquina de Libertad y Mentiras. Ciertamente 
se había aparecido en la casa de Amarena. Pero lo peor del caso. Empezaba a 
dominar las pocas, vergonzosas páginas que empezaba a escarabajear. ¿No 
acabaría nunca? (98)
161
  
                                                                                                                                                 
pornographic displaces with comedy the tragic character of martyrdom. Ridicule stands with 
torture as a form of degradation. Again, the point is to destroy the symbolic space of sacrifice by 
seizing the entire domain of the possible representation of bodily suffering. (Kahn 165-66)  
The relationship between sex and the comic in Máximo’s later suggestion to kill the generals with laughter 
(Arias, Después 183) raises similar questions.  
160
 When Máximo stops twisting, they beat him again: “Él gritaba no, no, y le decían que siguiera 
twisteando si no quería que le pegaran más. ¡Twist, twist, twist! El hombre dejó de pegarle y él siguió 
twisteando. ¡Twist, twist, twist! ¡Cómo estaba de moda el twist en esos días! ¡Twist, twist, twist!” (95-96).  
161
 “Máximo wanted to forget. Máximo wasn’t able to forget. Her face appeared to him in the air, 
transparent, looking at him. It came by in places where he least expected, talking softly to him. He went to 
play soccer and there it would be. He saw it as he went from bar to bar. He had attended a funeral a few 
days before. He saw her on the corner of Liberty and Lies. Of course, it had also appeared to him at 
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In this appearance of Karen’s ghost, we see the ways in which past violence can continue 
to haunt the psyche. Gordon, in her study of ghosts and the sociological imagination, 
reveals the important sociopolitical aspects of such a haunting, when the “over-and-done-
with has come alive” (Gordon xvi). The ghost, she suggests, “is not simply a dead or 
missing person, but a social figure, and investigating it can lead to that dense site where 
history and subjectivity make social life. The ghost or the apparition is one form by 
which something lost, or barely visible, or seemingly not there to our supposedly well-
trained eyes, makes itself known or apparent to us” (Gordon 8). Ghosts make themselves 
known in order to bring us the message that “the gap between the personal and the social, 
public and private, objective and subjective is misleading in the first place” (Gordon 98). 
They appear in order to give evidence of a loss (Gordon 63).
162
  
It is interesting that her appearance occurs shortly after he has decided to start 
writing. Though he has decided to write, he cannot; the blankness of the pages terrifies 
him. He initially believes that his fear and inability to write stem from his lack of 
something to say. That is, presumably because he has not yet learned about the time 
“antes de las bombas”, he lacks the requisite knowledge with which to fill in those 
“espacios in blanco.” Hence the importance and often-cited significance of his journey in 
search of words. Máximo seeks to find the language that will fill in those blank spaces. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amarena’s house. But worst of all. It began taking over the few, abashed pages he was finally scribbling. 
Would it ever go away?” (118-119). 
162
 The relationship to Butler’s treatment of the formation of the subject should be apparent. According to 
Butler, for the melancholic, “a loss suffered in the world becomes now the characteristic lack in the ego” 
(Psychic Life 187), a lack which must be continually reconstituted and reaffirmed. In this sense, we might 
interpret the ghost as “interpellation” (Butler Psychic Life 99) and therefore a “trace of alterity” (Butler 
Psychic Life, 196) that not only forms the subject as melancholic, but also threatens to undermine the 
coherence of the subject himself. For more on the subject as “reiteration” or “rearticulation,” see Buter, 
Psychic Life 99.   
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As already noted, most interpretations of Arias’ novel entail such an interpretation of his 
search, drawing attention to the theme of words and Máximo’s conception of language as 
a means for resisting the state. According to Zimmerman, for example, the novel 
reaffirms a notion of revolution that highlights “the value and importance of literature as 
a counter or resistance discourse opposed to the discourse of power” (Zimmerman 163). 
He concludes that Después de las bombas “comes to constitute a mode of discursive 
opposition to the world created by the military state which arises with the intervention” 
(Zimmerman 161). According to such a view, the silence imposed by the state exists 
purely as a void or absence that can later be filled in order to resist.
163
  
Such a conception of silence, however—akin to a “semantic void” in which 
language does not exist—becomes highly problematic once we understand that the 
Guatemalan state did not merely silence its victims, but rather replaced their language 
with its own. As I suggested in Chapter One, through the proliferation of rumors and the 
very public nature of the violence, the state publicized its escalation of violence and thus 
provided multiple opportunities for the people to describe what they had witnessed. 
Rather than simply disappearing the violence and hiding it in the shadows of detention 
centers, in many cases, the acts of violence such as those described in Después de las 
bombas were performed in the open and in public spaces. Diana Taylor describes a 
similar situation in Argentina where “people were forced to focus on the given-to-be-seen 
and ignore the atrocities given-to-be-invisible, taking place around them. Signs indicated 
what the population was to see and not to see” (119). Taylor employs the term 
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 Volpendesta describes this silence as an absence of political voice, noting that it severely limited what 
could be said in public. He writes that “implicit in Máximo’s declaration is the notion that language is the 
means to subvert the suffocating atmosphere of historical silence that the coup … imposed upon the 
country, a silence that … also polluted the normal, everyday discourse of the country’s populace” 
(Volpendesta 19). See Después de las bombas 117, 141.  
174 
 
“percepticide” to describe this “self-blinding of the general population” wherein certain 
acts of violence were “given-to-be-seen” and others were “given-to-be-invisible” (Taylor 
119). In Guatemala, as I argued in Chapter One, citizens did not cease talking about the 
violence, but rather the stories and descriptions of torture increased. This proliferation, 
however, only further confused the citizens’ ability to distinguish between what was real 
and what was not. In fact, as I noted, the state used a combination of strategies such as 
disappearance and torture that were “specifically designed to break down the distinctions 
between visibility and invisibility, certainty and doubt, life and death” (Gordon 126) in 
order to produce a society of ghosts and force the population to participate actively in the 
production of its narrations/fictions. In playing with the relationship between the presence 
and absence of violence, the state successfully realized a blurring and “merging of the 
visible and the invisible” (Gordon 24) that rendered all speech acts (rumors) 
simultaneously “silent,” and all violence both visible and “un-visible.”
164
 The appearance 
of Karen’s ghost thus suggests a more profound crisis, a recognition that the “blankness” 
of the pages is not so much an absence of words, but rather the seething presence of a 
violence that has penetrated the very fabric of existence. To live in such a haunted society 
is to live “in the vestiges of your own shadow, in the gray shades of an everyday life 
charged with a phantom reality” (Gordon 124). Hence the appearance of Karen’s face 
represents an opportunity for challenging that “phantom reality” and reexamining the 
distinctions between “there and not there” (Gordon 6).  
Yet Máximo continually refuses to acknowledge the ghost’s “seething presence.” 
Though he is haunted by Karen’s face, he tries to ignore it. He sees the ghost, but he 
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 I borrow the concept of violence as “un-visible” from Gordon’s discussion of Ellison’s Invisible Man as 
representing the “unvisibility of the hypervisible” (17).  
175 
 
refuses to let it speak. Her specter continues to haunt him, however, refusing to go away: 
“[l]a cara negándose a desaparecer” (“[t]he face refusing to disappear” [101, 122]). His 
continued refusal to acknowledge her ghost reveals his possible inability to deal with 
what happened to him in the park. Rather than writing about his own torture and rape, 
Máximo continues to obsess about the Intervention in 1954: “Quería saber cómo había 
sido el mundo antes de las bombas. Sí, eso. Sabía, poco le interesaba más que eso. Bueno, 
una que otra cosita, tal vez. / Estaba aquel otro rostro” (“He wanted to know what the 
world was like before the bombs. There, that was it? Now he knew, few things interested 
him more than that. Well, one or two other small matters, maybe. / There was that other 
face” [106, 127]). Karen’s face relentlessly pursues him, and he is unable to “sacar eso de 
la cabeza” (“get it out of [his] head” [106, 127]). His hope, his desire, is that by writing 
about the bombs, he will finally be able to “destruir el rostro que lo perseguía, que no lo 
dejaba en paz” (“make the face that pursues him, that gives him no peace, vanish” [101, 
121]). As I noted in Chapter One, it is certainly true that the Intervention forever altered 
the history of Guatemala, marking the country’s transition into the time “después de las 
bombas” (“after the bombs”). Thus Máximo is right to be concerned about it. But Karen’s 
face did not begin to haunt him until after their shared experience in the park. Though 
Máximo had been traumatized by the bombings and the loss of his father, he was not 
haunted by them. Haunting can be differentiated from trauma because a haunting 
produces a “something-to-be-done” (Gordon xvi).
165
 Following Gordon’s description, the 
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 Regarding the difference between trauma and haunting, Gordon writes:  
Haunting is not the same as being exploited, traumatized, or oppressed, although it usually 
involves these experiences or is produced by them. What’s distinctive about haunting is that it is 
an animated state in which a repressed or unresolved social violence is making itself known, 
sometimes very directly, sometimes more obliquely. I used the term haunting to describe those 
singular yet repetitive instances when home becomes unfamiliar, when your bearings on the world 
lose direction, when the over-and-done-with comes alive, when what’s been in your blind spot 
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appearance of Karen’s ghost not only reveals the ways in which he has been traumatized 
by his torture; it also reveals that there is something he can do about it. In order for that to 
happen, however, he must give the ghost his attention (Gordon xvi). In order to 
understand the nature of the loss, he must allow the ghosts to speak to him. He must be 
willing to follow them.  
Máximo, however, will only concede to talk to the ghost if he fails to destroy it: 
“Y fracándose en eso, de establecer un diálogo con él” (“And failing that to establish 
dialogue with it” [101, 121]). He finally succeeds in banishing Karen’s face, but only 
after being seduced by Amarena, a gringa prostitute. In addition to being unable to write, 
Máximo’s experience of being forced to have sex with Karen has also rendered him 
“desinflado” and incapable of performing sexually (110).
166
 His “healing” occurs in two 
stages. First, he learns from his friend Chingolo of the revolution of 1944, and convinces 
his mother to tell him of the time before the bombs. His conversation with her is only 
intimated at the end of chapter 5 when she tells him to sit down and pay attention (118). 
The actual content of their discussion is not revealed until later when Máximo goes to see 
Amarena. Lying in her bed—while she is “jugando con él, contenta” (“playing with him 
happily” [139, 166])—Máximo tells Amarena what he has learned from his mother about 
his father’s disappearance:  
                                                                                                                                                 
comes into view. Haunting raises specters, and it alters the experience of being in time, the way 
we separate the past, the present, and the future. These specters or ghosts appear when the trouble 
they represent and symptomize is no longer being contained or repressed or blocked from view. 
The ghost, as I understand it, is not the invisible or some ineffable excess. The whole essence, if 
you can use that word, of a ghost is that it has a real presence and demands its due, your attention. 
(xvi) 
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 In one particular scene with Amarena, he screams that he cannot complete the sexual act: “Gritó que no, 
se disculpó, volvió a gritar que no, y a disculparse, no podía, no, los labios de ella en contacto con su verga. 
Cerró los ojos, su mente llena de algo que no era nada. Aquellos hombres, emplumándolo. No. Se mordió 
los labios. No” (109). 
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No creo que se haya escapado sin embargo. Hubiéramos oído de él. Las 
autoridades mexicanas dicen no tener un récord de su nombre. 
Los dientes de ella mordiéndole la oreja. Él dejaba, sus manos deslizándose por la 
espalda, esa espalda, suavecita. 
Debe estar muerto. Debe haber muerto en las calles defendiendo… 
Metete dentro de mí. 
Hubiera muerto antes de someterse al dominio extranjero. Morir para que yo 
pudiera vivir. Y ahora puedo tratar de contar el cuento que todos están  tratando 
de olvidar.  
Sus caderas ya rodando, ella sí, contenta. Él pálido pero sin ofrecer resistencia, 
dejándose guiar, sus caderas rodando al ritmo de las palabras, sus dedos 
hundiéndose en esas nalgas morenas. 
Tengo que contar el cuento Amarena. Tengo que contarlo palabra por palabra. Mi 
estilo mejora cada segundo. 
¡Ya lo creo! (140)
167
 
  
At this point he declares he will find his father “a través de las palabras. […] Crearé al 
país con mis palabras. En mis palabras encontraré al universo y entenderé el eterno 
presente a través de mis palabras” (“through words. […] I’ll create a country with my 
words. In my words I’ll find the universe and I’ll understand the eternal present through 
my words” [140, 167]). He then turns to Amarena and stares uncomprehendingly, 
“descubriendo por primera vez, ¿qué le había pasado?” (“discovering for the first time. 
What had happened to him? [141, 166]). He seems surprised that he has suddenly been 
able perform sexually. Not only has he finally succeeded in talking about the time before 
the bombs, he has also—unknowingly—been seduced by Amarena in the process. He has 
doubly performed, so to speak, and can now return home to write. Only now has Karen’s 
face disappeared. No longer haunted by her ghost, Máximo discovers that the words 
begin to flow.  
                                                 
167
 “I don’t think he escaped, though. We would have heard about him. The Mexican authorities say the y 
have no record of his name. / Her teeth biting his ear. He letting her, his nads slipping over her back, that 
back, gently. / He must be dead. He must have died in the street defending… / Come inside me. / He would 
have died before giving in to foreign domination. To die so that I could live. And now I can try to tell the 
story that everybody is trying to forget. / Her hips now rolling, she happy, yes. He pale but unresisting, 
letting himself be led, his hips rolling to the rhythm of his words, his fingers burying themselves in those 
brown buttocks. / I have to tell the story, Amarena. I have to tell it, word by word. My style is getting better 
every second. / I’m sure of it!” (166). 
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Yet for several reasons we must doubt the extent to which he has been “cured.” 
First, Máximo has completely refused any attempt to work through the trauma of his own 
torture. Following Gordon’s description of the ghost as a social figure, the appearance of 
Karen’s face clearly indicates a loss that Máximo has suffered, one which he himself has 
not yet come to understand fully. But because Máximo refuses to acknowledge the 
haunting, he refuses to understand and work through what has happened to him. 
According to Gordon, haunting “draws us affectively, sometimes against our will and 
always a bit magically, into the structure of feeling of a reality we come to experience, 
not as cold knowledge, but as a transformative recognition” (8). Only by resting uneasily 
in the presence of the ghost and allowing it to speak will bring about such 
“transformative recognition.” In disappearing Karen’s ghost, however, Máximo 
forecloses any possibility of a substantive transformation. In fact, he is only able to 
disappear her with the aid of Amarena—who happens to be “gringa y diplomática y todo 
eso” (“a gringa and with diplomatic status and all” [168, 198]). Though the possibility 
that she is working for the government is never directly suggested, we do know that she 
has been intimate with high-ranking government officials in the past. And that appears to 
be how she succeeds in sneaking him out of the country. When Máximo asks her where 
she obtained the “pasaje alrededor del mundo” (“ticket for around the world” [187, 218]) 
for example, she simply replies “secretos diplomáticos” (“diplomatic secret” [187, 218]). 
When he presses her for her source, she says she attained them from Mr. Wright, “[u]n 
amigo de mi viejo” (“[a] friend of my father’s” [187, 219]).
168
 Though he has learned the 
truth about the time before the bombs and expressed his desire to create a new country—
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 See also the moment where she states, in English, “My dear Mr. Wright! Lovely to see you again!” 
(172). This scene is intercalated with the torture of Chingolo, lending further legitimacy to the possibility 
that she is aware of Chingolo’s detention and may, in fact, be involved.  
179 
 
to find his father and find the universe through his words—before he leaves Amarena’s 
apartment, he appears to capitulate to Amarena, saying, “Exageraré. Mentiré. … Es otra 
manera de penetrar dentro de alguien. Empezar mintiendo rápido y furiosamente y 
empezarán a oírme. Las mentiras son sagradas Amarena” (“I will exaggerate. I will lie. 
[…] It’s another way of getting inside a person. If I begin lying fast and furious they’ll 
begin to listen to me. Lies are sacred, Amarena” [142, 168]).
169
 Her seduction has clearly 
affected him because suddenly, rather than exposing the truth about his father and the fall 
of Ubico, he chooses to exaggerate and lie. In fact, we must question the words he pens 
not only because he proposes to lie, but also because his inspiration is aided by a parrot. 
Though he has been thinking of purchasing one for some time, it is only during the sex 
scene that he makes the final decision to buy it, finally coming to understand that it will 
help him write (140). Immediately after having sex with Amarena, he buys one. And 
though readers, for obvious reasons, immediately doubt the effectiveness of a parrot, its 
arrival does happen to coincide with his writing. Readers then begin to wonder how much 
his writing is being affected by the “parrot” and to what extent his words will succeed in 
resisting the state’s control of language. Indeed, the parrot’s effect on Máximo is further 
questioned when it is revealed that the only statement the parrot makes in public is 
“Todos contra el paredón” (“All against the wall” [144, 171]). This raises doubt as to 
whether Máximo has become a voice of the state, ready imitate and “parrot” the fictions 
it constructs. 
In fact, though he claims to have learned about those times “antes de las bombas,” 
his knowledge of the time “después de las bombas” remains woefully inadequate. While 
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 He says this just a few lines after claiming he wants to “decir todas esas cosas que callan los demás. 
Recordarle al pueblo de aquellos grandes años antes de las bombas, ese pasado que nos fuerzan a olvidar” 
(141). 
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Máximo is in hiding, Amarena tells him that his mother’s house has been searched and 
that all his papers were burned (168). When he asks about his mother, she lies to him, 
insisting that she is safe: “Ella está escondida también, dijo Amarena, y no te podrá ver 
antes que salgás” (“She’s hiding, too, Amarena said, and can’t see you before you leave” 
[168, 197]). He hesitates, not sure whether to believe her, but her seduction is too strong. 
He thinks to himself “what the hell” and then asks about his other friends and Chingolo. 
She responds, “Vivitos y coleando. Sólo andan tras la gente cuyo nombre empieza con 
M” (“Alive and bushy-tailed. They’re only after people whose names begin with M” 
[168, 198]). The reader knows that Amarena is lying to him, deceiving and seducing him 
once more without his realizing it. His mother has already been disappeared. A dozen 
men with machine guns abducted her in a “carro sin marcas” (“unmarked car” [166, 
195]). On the page following Máximo’s conversation with Amarena, we learn that 
Chingolo has also been seized and taken to “la inteligencia” (171). There the military 
tortures him repeatedly with electric shock “a ver si habla” (175).
170
 Though his death is 
never mentioned, the growing fragmentation of the narrative suggests that his death is 
imminent.
171
 As for Máximo’s mother, though readers never learn directly of her fate—
only that she has been abducted—because of what we learn of Chingolo, we assume that 
she is also tortured and killed. Máximo never learns about either incident.  
                                                 
170
 Once again, we see the problematic conception of torture in relation to the confession and the discovery 
of truth.  
171
 The final description of his torture fragments into a chaotic jumble of ellipses and “blank spaces”:  
Oyó la puerta abrirse. No… Listo… no… No abriría sus ojos… La risa… ¿para más? No… la música… 
¡Twist! ¡Twist! ¡Twist!... La risa… Se irían si no abría los ojos… No… No… Sintió una mano en su 
tobillo. Estaba caliente… la risa… Lo jalaban… no más… Se resbalaba. Se resbalaba dentro de un sueño… 
No… Era niño… Los chuchos ladraban… La risa… Estaba caliente debajo. Frío encima… ¿Listo para 
más? No… Los chuchos ladraban. Alsita gritó… La música…” (177, all ellipses are in the original text).   
That is the last the readers learn of Chingolo. 
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Máximo, it would seem, is just as uninformed and unknowing as ever. In fact, 
after his seduction by Amarena and after he has begun writing, he witnesses the torture of 
a woman in the same park where he himself was tortured. As he walks throughout the 
city, he seems to be wandering aimlessly, unaware of where he is heading (149). But he 
ends up in Las Conchas park where he witnesses the torture of a beauty queen:  
Escuchó los gritos. ¿Eran gritos los que escuchaba? Los soldados ya estaban en el 
parque y tenían a la reina de belleza tirada en la tierra. ¿Era la reina de belleza no? 
Ya le habían quitado la blusa. Grandes senos, sólidos. ¿Agresivos? Uno de los 
soldados se arrodillaba frente a ella. Estaba arrancándole los pezones con los 
dientes. ¿Estaba arrancándole los pezones con los dientes? Ella gritaba y gritaba y 
gritaba y gritaba y gritaba. El soldado tenía sangre en la cara. Máximo se paró. 
Habían otros soldados también. Y le sonreían. Él se paró. Ellos le sonreían. El 
toro seguía mordiéndola. Grandes senos, sólidos. ¿Agresivos? Ella gritaba, 
twisteaba, gritaba, twisteaba. Ella colaboraba con las guerrillas le dijeron los 
soldados y se encogieron de hombros. El loro les gritó ¡Todos contra el paredón! 
(149)
172
  
 
His constant questioning during this torture scene attests to the emptiness of his words 
and the “impossibility of bearing witness” (Agamben Remnants 39) to the violence 
around him. He does not really know and cannot describe what he witnesses, and yet we 
must recognize the possibility that he is sexually aroused by it. His description of the 
scene is strongly erotic. Even though the verb “se paró” could be interpreted to indicate 
that he stopped to watch, the repetition of the verb three sentences later, coupled with the 
confusion of subjects, could also be interpreted to mean that he became sexually aroused. 
Hence we see repeated the same production of desire that we witnessed in Máximo’s own 
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 “He heard the screams. Were those screams he was hearing? Soldiers were already in the park, the 
beauty queen thrown to the ground. It was the beauty queen, wasn’t it? They had torn off her blouse. Large, 
full breasts. Aggressive ones? A soldier was kneeling next to her. He was tearing off her nipples with his 
teeth. Was he tearing off her nipples with his teeth? She was screaming and screaming and screaming and 
screaming and screaming. The soldier had blood all over his face. Máximo stopped. There were other 
soldiers around, too. And they smiled at him. He stopped. The other one kept biting her. Large, full breasts. 
Aggressive ones? She was screaming, twisting, screaming, twisting. She was collaborating with the 
guerrillas the soldiers told him and shrugged. The parrot screeched at them All against the wall!” (176). 
182 
 
torture scene, yet despite the strong similarities, he never relates this event to his own 
past experience.  
One primary clue to the persistence of his past trauma is the continued repetition 
of the verb “twistear.” The term, first used during Máximo’s own torture, is the one term 
which is most consistently repeated in the other torture scenes.
173
 Its continued repetition 
in later scenes, particularly violent ones in which Máximo is haunted by his past 
experience, attests to the fact that he has not been completely successful in disappearing 
or silencing his past trauma, despite the fact that he ignores it and moves on. David 
Punter, in his treatment of spectral criticism, asserts that hauntings often include the 
compulsive repetition of certain bizarre elements. Repeated words, images, or phrases are 
“[l]ike a stranger, like a ‘foreign body’ within the self, like a ventriloquist, calling into 
question the ‘authenticity’ of the words we speak even as we speak them, reminding us 
that ‘our’ words are always simultaneously the residues, the traces, of the words of 
others” (Punter 265). The repeated use of “twistear” when Máximo witnesses the 
violence of Guatemalan society thus calls into question the “authenticity” of his words, 
reminding the reader of the “trace” and “residue” of torture in his descriptions.  
Indeed, the use of the term “twistear” during Máximo’s carnivalesque escape 
from the country signifies that he will carry these traces with him when he leaves. He 
cannot escape the specters of torture from his past, even though he believes he has 
disappeared them. Once again, despite the numerous critics who see in Máximo an 
attempt to construct a language that can resist the violence of the state, we must seriously 
question the authenticity and efficacy of that revolution. Zimmerman, for example, posits 
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 Even the torture of Chingolo, which Máximo does not witness firsthand, employs the same terminology: 
“Oyó la puerta abrirse. No… Listo… no… No abriría sus ojos… La risa… ¿para más? No… la música… 
¡Twist! ¡Twist! ¡Twist!... La risa…” (177, all ellipses are in the original text). 
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that in the new novel words are organized “to go against the norms of spoken silence, the 
norms even of existing literary discourse, to create new distortions to get beyond the 
distortions created by Guatemala’s successive military governments” (Zimmerman 164). 
Yet if the new novel’s distortions, expressed in the repetitious use of terms such as 
“twistear,” are merely residues or traces of past trauma, then its languages cannot get 
beyond the state’s narrative. The specter of that past trauma has not yet been disappeared 
completely, despite Máximo’s renewed attempts at literary production. Because of his 
refusal to deal with his own torture and give its ghost the attention it deserves, Máximo 
will never be able to narrate the ways in which that which was “lost, or barely visible, or 
seemingly not there to our supposedly well-trained eyes” (Gordon 8) continues to make 
itself present.  
 In Después de las bombas, Arias seeks to present a voice that will find “some 
way out of the labyrinth of military-oligarchic power which has made of the national 
space one ripe for that polyphonic mix of realism and fantasy, testimonio and fiction” 
(Zimmerman 166). Unfortunately, however, Máximo cannot be such a voice. Granted, 
there exists ample evidence in the novel to suggest the ways in which Arias has attempted 
to question the relationship between visible and invisible, knowing and unknowing, 
signifier and signified, thereby seeking to wrest control of language away from the state 
and allow words to recover that which the state has rendered invisible. Zimmerman 
accurately points out that “the book is absolutely relentless in its playing—its reshuffling 
of historical symbols and tropes. The names of presidents, city streets, and highland 
locales become so much material in what is ultimately a ludic manipulation of space and 
time in a war of words against a military world” (164). In the end, however, we must 
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question the efficacy of Máximo’s ability to give voice to that trauma. Máximo’s refusal 
to speak to the ghost, coupled with his seduction at the hands of the gringa and the 
erasure of his own memory, reveals his inability to understand and work through what is 
happening around him. If Karen’s face is “the specter of what the state has tried to 
repress” (Gordon 127), in vanishing it, Máximo merely assists the state in its project of 
repression and disappearance. In other words, Máximo can only repeat and “parrot” the 
state’s narrative. His writing, far from being a way out of the labyrinth, simply refuses to 
acknowledge its existence. Arias has presented readers with a character who can see 
ghosts, a victim who has begun to see that “invisible things are not necessarily not-there” 
and that “that which appears absent can indeed be a seething presence” (Gordon 17). 
Unfortunately, rather than allowing the ghost to speak “in the interstices of the visible 
and the invisible” (Gordon 24), Máximo tries to make it disappear. 
We can also see the ways in which this refusal to attend to the ghost—when 
coupled with his seduction at the hands of the American diplomat—also affects his 
search for words, preventing him from finding a language able to describe his reality. His 
inability to decide on the appropriate terms to describe the scene with the beauty queen is 
not simply an accident, but the stated goal of the Guatemalan new novel and its emphasis 
on floating signifiers. Arias’ defends this strategy of the Guatemalan new novel: 
Se reconoce que la palabra no puede referirse puntualmente a los hechos 
históricos. Los evoca, los toca tangencialmente. Es ese juego de deseo y rechazo 
que conduce a una escritura que, lejos de buscar la transparencia expresiva, se 
vuelve crispada sobre sí, se hace cada vez más laberíntica, más digresiva. 
(“Conciencia” 44)  
 
As I have argued, however, this digressive and desire-producing nature of language—
notwithstanding its self-proclaimed labyrinthine rupturing of signifier and signified—at 
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the very least produces ambivalence regarding torture, and in many cases can end up 
eroticizing it. Indeed, Arias’ insistence on a “juego de deseo y rechazo” elevates desire in 
its impossible search for the “hechos históricos.” As we saw in Los compañeros, this 
impossibility succeeds only in producing a “desire to desire” as desire is continually 
propelled by its own un-fulfillment and impossibility. However, because this desire is a 
construction of the psyche, it can be regulated (and manipulated) by cultural and 
sociopolitical ideologies. As Judith Butler reminds us, the state and its various 
apparatuses play an enormous role in regulating its citizens’ desires, even to the point that 
we might come to desire our own wretchedness (Psychic Life 79). The scene witnessed 
by Máximo in Las Conchas park reveals not only the soldiers’ pleasure in torturing the 
beauty queen, but also the possibility that their stimulation arouses Máximo. As we saw 
in Los compañeros, the insistence on presenting violence as unspeakable—rather than 
wrest language away from the state—establishes a linguistic violence that rips apart 
signifier and signified, pushing the non-symbolic of torture outside the text. Instead of 
challenging the state’s narrative, however, the “absence” of the torture’s meaning (its 
non-symbolic) creates only ambiguity and opens the possibility for substituting other 
meanings, namely the eroticization of torture. We see the same situation in Después de 
las bombas. Despite Arias’ use of a rhetoric of uncertainty, signification has been neither 
foreclosed nor repressed, but is rather maintained in the repetition of the state’s narrative 
and in the eroticization of the violence that Máximo sees in society.  
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Conclusions 
The appearance of Flores’ Los compañeros in 1976 and Arias’ Después de las 
bombas in 1979 signaled an attempt to find alternative ways to narrate the violence of the 
war. Employing diverse narrative techniques in order to play with the relationship 
between language and referent, Flores and Arias sought to question society’s capacity for 
bearing witness to the haunting quality of state terror. Yet more so than any of their 
contemporaries, Flores and Arias recognized the critical role that the practice of torture 
played in that terror and sought to portray its effects in their novels. The state’s use of 
torture to blur the lines between the known and the unknown had succeeded in creating 
an invisible form of violence that penetrated the deepest layers of the Guatemalan psyche. 
What makes these two novels stand out is not only their recognition of the critical role of 
torture during the war, but also their highly developed psychological treatment of torture 
and its relationship to the formation of the Guatemalan subject.  
The Guatemalan new novel, as Arias suggests, seeks to combat that state-induced 
terror. By pushing the reader to give meaning to torture, not only does the new novel 
suggest that the truth about torture is out there beyond the text and beyond language; it 
also instills in its readers a desire for meaning and by extension, political action. Authors 
create voids and ruptures in the text precisely so that they can be filled and mended by 
the reader. Even though the texts seemingly reject a simple collapsing of the distance 
between signifier and signified, in the end, however, they create a situation in which the 
means for traversing that distance becomes ambivalent. Despite their attempts to create a 
“plurality of narrative signposts interwoven to the point of breaking syntactic linearity 
and confusing semantic levels” (Arias, “Literary Production” 24), in both novels the 
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torture scenes are strikingly similar in their erotic treatment of the violence. Indeed, over 
and against those critics who see in the new novel an attempt “to create new distortions to 
get beyond the distortions created by Guatemala’s successive military governments” 
(Zimmerman 164), I have shown that the “new distortions” in both Flores’ Los 
compañeros and Arias’ Después de las bombas succeed only in producing desire. 
Consequently, by emphasizing the “unspeakable” nature of torture and relying heavily on 
a rhetoric of uncertainty, the new novelists create the possibility for torture’s 
eroticization.  
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Chapter Five: A Rhetoric of Masking: Repetitions of Silence and Unknowing in 
Rodrigo Rey Rosa’s El cuchillo del mendigo 
The point about silencing and the fear 
behind silencing is not to erase memory. Far 
from it. The point is to drive the memory 
deep within the fastness of the individual so 
as to create more fear and uncertainty in 
which dream and reality commingle.
174
  
 
[H]ow silent are silences?
175
 
 
There is little doubt that testimonio and the new novel were the two major literary 
movements during the Armed Conflict—as evidenced not only by the number of texts 
published but also by the amount of critical and public attention they received both inside 
and outside Guatemala. Whereas testimonio’s emphasis on the visible aspects of violence 
signaled its commitment to a robustly empiricist epistemology, the new novel took as its 
starting point the rejection of such modes of narration.
176
 With the appearance of the new 
novel in Guatemala in 1976, we witness a shift to a more direct emphasis on the uncertain 
aspects of torture and fear in Guatemala. By accentuating the impossibility of reaching 
the signified, the new novel pushed the non-symbolic of torture beyond the text into a 
space that was the other of language. Because Arias and Flores both posited a non-
symbolic that was outside of language—in the realm of the non-verbal—they thereby 
established a dualistic dynamic between the uncertainty of the text and an unattainable 
certainty beyond the text. But testimonio and the new novel were not the only literary 
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 Taussig, Nervous System 27. 
175
 Sanford 17. 
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 The shift from testimonio to nueva novela is not a chronological shift, but rather a stylistic one 
employed for the purposes of my argument. Menchú’s Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú, y así me nació la 
conciencia (1983), which I discussed in Chapter 2, was published 7 years after the appearance of Flores’ 
Los compañeros (1976).  
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modes to emerge. Other voices began to appear during La Violencia in order to attempt to 
narrate the atrocities of the war. One of those voices was Rodrigo Rey Rosa. 
Rodrigo Rey Rosa (1958- ) has been one of the most prolific Guatemalan authors 
of the last 30 years. Because of the violence in Guatemala, he spent the majority of the 
most violent years of the war in voluntary exile (1979-1994), travelling between New 
York, Morocco, and India. However, his family witnessed that violence firsthand. In 
1980, his uncle was killed in the burning of the Spanish Embassy. The following year, his 
mother was kidnapped and held for ransom for six months. Several of his friends were 
tortured and killed throughout the 1980s. Without a doubt the violence had a deep and 
personal impact on Rey Rosa. When asked recently about the ways in which that violence 
haunts his writing, Rey Rosa responded: 
Es el inconsciente el que me la impone. Cuando comencé a escribir, tenía 
pesadillas increíblemente violentas. En ese tiempo mataban a cincuenta personas 
por día, en el campo y en la ciudad, y yo no había podido escribir aún sobre la 
muerte de mi tío quemado, sobre un amigo que apareció castrado y asesinado. 
Cuando tuve la oportunidad de irme, me fui. Estaba odiando todo. Sí soñaba con 
eso, soñaba cómo matar a ese general hijo de puta... Recién comenzaba a escribir, 
todavía no había llegado a Marruecos, pero estaba con esta vasca (sic), esta 
náusea. (n. pag.)
177
   
 
From the very beginning, this “retching” and “nausea” permeated his writing. In this 
chapter, however, I will be focusing only on his first collection of stories: El cuchillo del 
mendigo (1985
178
). As I will argue, the “retching” described by Rey Rosa makes its 
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 “It is the unconscious that imposes it upon me. When I began to write, I had incredibly violent 
nightmares. At that time, they were killing fifty people a day, in the country and in the city, and I had not 
even been able to write about the death of my burned uncle, about a friend who appeared castrated and 
murdered. When I had the opportunity to leave, I left. I hated everything. If I dreamed about that, I dreamed 
about how I would kill that son of a bitch general… Soon I began to write, I still hadn’t arrived in Morocco, 
but I had this retching, this nausea.”  
178
 Please note that this text was not published in Guatemala until 1986. Nevertheless, I include it here 
because even though it was not available in Guatemala until 1986, it had been written several years 
previously and its English translation (by Paul Bowles) had already been published by City Lights Books in 
1985.  
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presence felt in various ways in the stories of this collection, but most concretely through 
the recreation of fear and unease. 
Unlike the new novel—which pushed the silent non-symbolic beyond the text into 
a realm of unchained signifieds and melancholic loss—Rey Rosa’s El cuchillo del 
mendigo preserves the uncertainty within the text. More specifically, I will argue that Rey 
Rosa, over and against previous attempts to narrate the violence of the war, seeks to mask 
the silent non-symbolic within language itself. In El cuchillo del mendigo, torture no 
longer has an immediate presence within the text as we saw with testimonio, where 
narrating torture became a means of presenting documented evidence for international 
audiences. Nor is torture a mediated absence, pushed beyond the text and language to a 
realm that cannot be reached by signifiers. Rather, Rey Rosa structures his descriptions of 
torture around a gap that cannot be named, but that nonetheless must be narrated. Rey 
Rosa does not seek to overwrite the uncertainty and irrationality of torture with 
documentary evidence; nor does he symbolize torture to the degree that we witnessed in 
the new novel.
179
 Rather, by destabilizing the boundaries between the real and the unreal, 
the certain and the uncertain, Rey Rosa is able to repeat—to recreate—the spectral fear of 
torture. Criticizing the “hard realists” for their attempts to document reality, Rey Rosa 
suggests that reality is never that clear or certain. In an interview with Marisol García, he 
states, “Hay todo un aspecto de la realidad que no vivimos como si fuera historia dura. 
Entonces me parece que introducir el elemento imaginativo es darle aire a tu texto e 
incluso hacerlo más verosímil” (“There is a whole other aspect of reality that we do not 
live as if it were hard history. So it seems to me that introducing an imaginative element 
gives air to your text and even makes it more credible” [n. pag.]).  In order to understand 
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 For my treatment of these options, see Chapters Two and Three of the present study. 
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how the nausea of violence, which has infected the depths of Rey Rosa’s unconscious, is 
presented in El cuchillo del mendigo, we must again revisit Loevlie’s concept of the 
“silent non-symbolic” and its relation to literary silence.
180
 Only by analyzing this notion 
in greater detail will we be able to see how Rey Rosa silences torture in his writing, 
allowing it to occupy that “zone of indistinction” where one can bear witness only to the 
“impossibility of bearing witness” (Agamben Remnants 39).  
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 For my previous treatments of Loevlie’s work, see the Introduction and Chapter Three of the present 
study. 
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Writing the Silent Non-Symbolic: On Simple and Complex Repetitions 
He can say everything, but one thing he 
cannot say, and if he cannot say that –that 
is, say it in such a way that the other 
understands it—then he is not speaking.
181
 
 
Neither silence nor speech is possible. […] 
He speaks without speaking. (Loevlie 73) 
 
The attempt to “silence” violence within literature is not a new idea. Indeed, in 
her study Literary Silences in Pascal, Rousseau, and Beckett (2003), Elizabeth Loevlie 
notes that one of the main approaches to silence has been Holocaust literature (16). It is 
not uncommon for such literature to draw on silence as a means to designate the 
unsayable as the “spectre of the unspeakable, namely that which is inhuman or an 
unspeakable atrocity” (Loevlie 16). For many, in the face of such atrocities any attempt to 
speak the evils of genocide runs the risk of reducing the horrors to everyday language. 
Indeed, “[t]o suggest that it is possible to talk of the events of the Holocaust is often seen 
to imply that these events are explicable and that they can be made meaningful” (Loevlie 
16-17). Over and against such attempts to explain the Holocaust, thinkers such as 
Theodor Adorno—who famously asserted, “No poetry after Auschwitz”—and Hannah 
Arendt have argued that that only proper response to such horrors is silence (Loevlie 16). 
The problem, according to Loevlie, is that much of this established tradition continues to 
speak of silence negatively, relying on a dualistic conception of silence that retreats 
behind the defense of the unsayable. As noted in the Introduction to the present study, 
silence is a seductive concept. Loevlie reminds us that for thousands of years the “Dream 
of Silence” has captivated the imaginations and the desires of countless millions of 
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 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling 113, qtd in Loevlie 72. 
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people (13).
182
 Unfortunately, however, this type of silence—which is posited as 
“congruent with a sense of a ‘beyond’ of language, a realm that is free from discourse 
and linguistic ordering” (11)—ends up becoming the dualistic other of language. 
According to Loevlie, it is true that such a conception of silence can serve as a viable 
means of dealing with that which is “unsayable” and “can accept that which the verbal 
expression must dismiss as irrational or illogical” (11). Yet as we have just witnessed 
with respect to the new novel in Guatemala, positing the existence of a realm of 
experience that is beyond language often results in a dualistic conception of language and 
silence that can become problematic. In order to see the ways in which Rey Rosa moves 
beyond this dualistic conception of the relationship between silence and language, we 
must revisit Loevlie’s treatment of the different between simple and complex repetition 
(76-83). 
The reader will recall from my discussion in the Introduction and in Chapter 
Three that simple repetition concerns the textual dynamic by which the silent non-
symbolic is defined as existing outside the text (Loevlie 76). By placing the non-symbolic 
beyond the text and thus beyond language, simple repetition gropes and gestures at the 
non-symbolic, thereby “creating a certain ‘logic’ or ‘system’ that refers the reader to the 
beyond” (76). The text establishes itself as the limit between language and silence, and 
thus the text “bestows existence” (76) to the silence as an object beyond the limit of the 
text. In short, by placing the non-symbolic outside language, truth is also pushed beyond 
language and outside of the text. This distancing creates a “relationship of frustration”:  
It is the text’s relationship, one might say, to its own end, its defeat in face of the 
unsayable that it strives none the less to say. Caught in this frustration, the text 
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 For a more sustained treatment of the “Dream of Silence,” see the Introduction to the present study. 
Unless otherwise noted, all quotations in this section come from Loevlie’s text.  
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must create a dynamic or a gesture by which it indirectly says: ‘out there, beyond 
me, is the truth of what I am trying to say.’ The intention is to indicate the silence 
of the non-symbolic as the negative other of the text. The text attempts to gesture 
towards this silence, hint at it, point its readers in a special direction, lead them 
outside itself. (76) 
 
The new novel is caught up in this simple repetition. By pushing the reader to give 
meaning to torture, not only does the new novel suggest that the truth about torture is out 
there beyond the text and beyond language; it also produces a never-ending desire for the 
lost object. Consequently, torture remains unsayable. Thus simple repetition is “the text’s 
means of affirming the non-symbolic negatively as that which cannot be stated: the non-
symbolic is what lies beyond me” (76-77, italics in original).
183
 By negatively affirming 
the existence of the non-symbolic, simple repetition functions according to a dualistic 
dynamic.
184
  
According to Loevlie, the effect of this negative affirmation is “stabilatory”: 
We might for a moment imagine that the text and its relationship to the non-
symbolic behave in regards to each other like water and oil. In other words, their 
boundary is absolute, but fluid. Simple repetition ensures the stability of these two 
elements by continually reaffirming them as opposites, by making sure that no 
‘reaction’ takes place that would destabilize the relation. (77) 
 
Despite its desire-producing effects, simple repetition ensures that the boundary between 
the text and the non-symbolic—and thus between the reader and the lost object—remains 
absolute. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the new novel reaffirms this boundary 
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 More obvious examples of simple repetition include negative theology, which approaches the silent non-
symbolic of God by emphasizing God’s otherness and inaccessibility from theological discourse (Loevlie 
77). 
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 Loevlie describes this dualistic dynamic in the following manner:  
It operates according to dualistic opposites such as inside-outside, within-beyond, present-absent, 
silent-speaking, me-other, etc. According to these dualisms, the text defines the text according to 
its inside (the actual text) and its outside (the non-symbolic), and consequently defines language in 
terms of an inside and an outside: the expressible versus the non-expressible. Simple repetition 
relies upon and keeps reproducing, repeating, this dualistic machinery that maintains the non-
symbolic as the opposite of language. (77, italics in original) 
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by continually testing it and probing its stability. In the end, however, the “other of 
language” remains untouched.
185
  
Complex repetition, on the other hand, challenges the “stabilatory” nature of this 
dualism (77). If simple repetition produces “a concrete end-product, namely the 
delineated, negatively defined non-symbolic as that which lies beyond the text” (78), then 
complex repetition disrupts its “well-functioning ‘machinery’” and undermines the 
“stable, negatively defined notion of the non-symbolic” (78). Complex repetition disrupts 
the stabilizing dualism posited by simple repetition. Loevlie suggests that, abstractly, 
complex repetition is “the movement through which the border between the text and the 
non-symbolic is momentarily suspended” (78). It is a disruptive movement that 
“disorganizes” and “destabilizes” the dualistic repetition of the non-symbolic as beyond 
the text. Considered in terms of the metaphor of oil and water, complex repetition might 
designate some chemical reaction wherein “oil and water suddenly infiltrate each other” 
(78). According to Loevlie, the border between the two “desolidifies,” revealing itself to 
be “porous, thereby causing a certain ‘flooding’ between the text and its beyond” (78). 
This flooding prevents the non-symbolic from being relegated to some place outside the 
text. And perhaps more importantly for my purposes here, by refusing to define the 
“unsayable” as the other of language, complex repetition allows the text to speak about 
torture “without speaking” (Loevlie 73).  
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 “We can conclude that simple repetition is a dynamic that repeatedly ensures and stabilizes the Dream 
of Silence as the other of language. It follows that it is a dynamic that precludes literary silence. If the non-
symbolic is posited as the dualistic opposite of the text, silence becomes the beyond. Within such a schema 
literary silence cannot take place. Literary silence requires a certain shifting of the border between the text 
and the non-symbolic. […] Only in the destabilization of this border can literary silence happen as the 
expression of the non-symbolic through literature. In other words, the dualistic system must somehow 
break down or dissolve in order for literary silence to occur. This destabilization describes the work of 
complex repetition, namely to transform or destabilize simple repetition and the stable conditions it has 
procured and thereby create the potential for literary silence” (78). 
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Complex repetition is “first and foremost a movement” (79). Unlike simple 
repetition, which produced a stable conception of the beyond of the text and thus 
functioned as a repetition of “something” (79), complex repetition “has nothing to repeat, 
no pattern to reinstall” (79). It is not productive, but rather disruptive. Loevlie describes it 
as follows:  
If we return to the image of simple repetition as a well-functioning machine that 
keeps producing stable versions of the beyond, complex repetition designates a 
certain flaw in this machinery, or rather a derailment. […] It is this actual moment 
of derailment that I designate as complex repetition. It is the moment of a 
destabilization of the system, a moment when simple repetition turns into 
complex. (79) 
 
Therefore, according to Loevlie, we must note that simple and complex repetition are 
intimately linked.
186
 Though the precise nature of that relationship is not relevant to my 
argument here, we do begin to see how complex repetition is freed from the dualistic 
dynamic of simple repetition and is thus no longer bound by a negative conception of the 
non-symbolic (Loevlie 81). What this means, of course, is that the non-symbolic can 
move within the text itself. The silent non-symbolic can penetrate the text: “Silence, like 
water, infiltrates porous stone and leaves its trace in caverns and canals that it traces 
through the text” (81). The text can create silence (Loevlie 81).  
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 To better understand this connection, Loevlie proposes the concept of a “hologram” whose images shift 
depending on our perspective:   
One angle reflects the well-functioning production line—the product being the silent beyond. The 
other angle shows how this production line is, in every ‘now’, a series of potential interruptions, 
derailments, tensions, discontinuities that disrupt the production line and preclude the end product. 
The advantage of the hologram is that it shows how both movements exist at the same time, and 
that whichever one you see is dependent upon the perspective from which the system is observed. 
(80) 
No matter how we conceive of the relationship, the critical point is to understand that both repetitions exist 
simultaneously within the text. Complex repetition is not a derailment that causes the machinery of simple 
repetition to stop: “Rather we have to imagine a production line that keeps producing while it derails, and a 
derailment that keeps derailing despite the production line” (79). It might be helpful to think of complex 
repetition as always existing “in between” production and derailment. (80). 
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 Rather than relegating the non-symbolic to a space outside the text, complex 
repetition also brings the “absurd” into the text and into language. The text then becomes 
neither speech nor silence, but rather that “third option” (Loevlie 82) explored by 
Kierkegaard in his treatment of the sacrifice of Isaac:  
By speaking, Abraham has not broken with the dualistic system in the sense that 
he has not chosen either speech or silence. The dualism is therefore sill valid on 
one level; he must still be silent as he cannot speak the ethical language of others. 
But exactly within this dualism he sees a parallel option: to speak while 
maintaining silence. On this level the dualism is destabilized by an in-between 
option: to speak in a language that is not universal. In this act of speaking, the 
relationship between language and silence changes from the strict either-or 
opposition to a new fluidity: he can speak silence. (82)  
 
The possibility of speaking silence signifies a non-dualistic relationship with the non-
symbolic. If the non-symbolic is no longer outside of language, and thus no longer 
outside of the text, the seemingly “unspeakable” horrors of torture need not be pushed 
outside the text. These atrocities can be spoken in the “in-between” language of the 
literary text. Before we explore the non-symbolic in Rey Rosa’s text, it is necessary to 
note precisely how these “in-between” movements function within a text.  
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Aporia and Impasse: Existing in the In-Between  
Aporia […] is born of the knowledge that 
there can be no certain knowledge. It brings 
to light the failure of our attempts to seize 
that truth of the world.
187
  
 
Loevlie notes that the “in-between” language of complex repetition occurs at 
those instances where “the text behaves differently, where it somehow slips away from, 
or transforms” the dualistic conception of the non-symbolic (82). In those instances, the 
text “slips” and its acts of gesturing become “weird,” “disturbing,” and often 
“meaningless” (82). Loevlie describes those instances as aporias: 
The aporia originally means impasse and hence designates the place from which 
no further advance is possible. It has been used as a rhetorical term to signify the 
doubt arising from two incompatible but equally valid views on a subject matter. 
The aporia arises when there are two potential outcomes, both of which rule the 
other one out, but both of which are true. In other words, both outcomes, both 
‘paths’, are true, but they are incompatible; choosing one, I am immediately 
thrown back on to the other, and so on. The only possible locus within the aporia 
is therefore the in-between. (83, italics in original) 
 
These aporias exist as instances in-between two conceivable alternatives. To put the 
matter more concretely, we might conceive of these aporias as existing in-between the 
two options of recollection and (simple) repetition, or in the terms of my current project, 
between testimonio and the new novel.
188
 To recap, Menchú attempts to “recollect” the 
past and make it fully present within her narration. The emphasis on a rhetorical certainty 
and the elimination of doubt precludes the “truth” from being placed or defined outside of 
the text. It is the promise of plentitude, immediacy, and full presence. The new novel, on 
the other hand, pushes that truth beyond the text. The silent non-symbolic is always 
already a mediated absence, forever just beyond language. Similarly, I believe that Rey 
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 Melzer 1986: 4, qtd in Loevlie 84-85. 
188
 For a more detailed engagement with my analysis of testimony as “recollection” and the new novel as 
“simple repetition,” see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the present study.  
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Rosa’s text does not posit an “either/or,” but neither does it suggest a “both/and.”
189
 In 
his text, we find instances “in-between” these two options, between presence and 
absence, between certainty and uncertainty, between speech and silence. These aporias 
and “in-between” moments emerge as impasses within the text where the reader is left 
hesitating.
190
 
 More concretely, we can see a direct comparison between this conception of 
aporia and the in-between nature of torture. As I suggested in Chapter One, torture causes 
everything beyond the pain of the victim’s body to lose meaning, creating a 
“disintegrating perception” (Scarry 30) that ultimately fragments the psyche of the 
tortured.
 
According to Elaine Scarry, in torture, the intractable materiality of the body is 
inflicted with an indescribably intense pain for the sole purpose of destroying the victim’s 
world and language. The pain inflicted is so severe that everything beyond the immediate 
sensations of the body ceases to exist, both spatially—“either the contraction of the 
universe down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to fill the 
entire universe”—and temporally—there is no past or future, only the immediate 
presence of the body in pain (Scarry 35). The restriction and enclosure of the victim’s 
world allows the imagining of a space and time in which the prisoner ceases to exist 
relationally. Or rather, there is an attempt to re-school the prisoner by rendering all 
                                                 
189
 Rather than choosing between a “both/and” or an “either/or”, Rey Rosa somehow operates between the 
two, just as Loevlie describes Beckett’s ability to exist “in between […] production and derailment” (80). 
Perhaps we can suggest that Rey Rosa’s text posits “both a ‘both/and’ and an ‘either/or.’” 
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 There is no resolution of these in-between moments. Loevlie compares them to Paul de Man’s 
conception of reading. In  his Allegories of Reading (1979), de Man posits that reading “will always lead to 
the confrontation of incompatible meanings between which it is necessary but impossible to decide in terms 
of truth and error. If one of the readings is declared true, it will always be possible to undo it by means of 
the other; if it is declared false, it will always be possible to demonstrate that it states the truth of its 
aberration” (de Man 1979: 76, qtd in Loevlie 84). Reading exists at this impasse, in the back-and-forth 
movement between these two options.  
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relationality unthinkable.
191
 As the prisoner’s world shrinks due to the pain, it becomes “a 
mere sketch” (Scarry 38), and she loses the imaginative capacity to form a positive, 
constructive relationship with her surroundings. Torture, as a crime committed against 
the imagination, not only deprives the victim of an imaginative vision and thus the ability 
to interact with her surroundings, but it also deprives her of the ability to distinguish 
between what is real and what is not. Therefore, the unmaking of the victim’s world and 
language has a drastic impact on her ability to comprehend what has happened and robs 
her of the ability to give meaning to the event. No longer able to give meaning to her own 
torture, the tortured exists permanently in-between the real and the unreal.  
We see a similar aporetic “in-between” in Loevlie’s treatment of “suspension,” 
which she describes as follows: 
It is the impasse between a past and a future. Repetition cannot be identified 
merely with the past as this past is always also a becoming into a future. 
Furthermore it cannot be identified merely with the future, as it is also always a 
past. In other words, repetition, as described by Kierkegaard, is an aporetic 
experience. It is the constant experience of an impasse between a past and a future 
that leaves one suspended in the present, in the in-between. The actual ‘now’ 
therefore becomes the only ‘true’, or possible experience of repetition. It is the 
only position that can account for repetition’s relation to the past and the future. 
So the ‘now’ is the aporetic position of a constant in-between, a constant 
mediation between a past and a future. To experience the ‘now’ is to bear the full 
pressure of the aporia, to remain standing in the impasse, to not think the past or 
the future, but be absorbed in the in-between movement of the aporia. (84)  
 
The connection with my previous treatment of torture is clear. Torture—as a practice that 
forces the victim to exist “aporetically” in both the immediate “here” and “now”—exists 
always in the in-between. It would stand to reason, therefore, that one successful means 
of exploring and narrating torture is to recreate this in-between state in the text and thus 
narrate torture “aporetically.”  
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 For more on this process, particularly as it relates to the processes of de-objectification and unmaking, 
see Chapter 1 of the present study. 
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Indeed, such aporetic narrations can be extremely fruitful because they allow the 
opportunity for imagining alternative forms of silence. If torture—on a continuum, of 
course, with other forms state-sponsored violence—is continually referred to as an 
“unspeakable” atrocity, thereby begging a form of silence in those who have borne 
witness to its horrors, then discovering new conceptions of the relationship between 
speech and language may allow us to speak of torture in a way that does not “imply that 
these events are explicable and that they can be made meaningful” (Loevlie 16-17). One 
such possibility mentioned by Loevlie is the discovery of a language that “speaks without 
speaking” (Loevlie 73). According to Loevlie, this third option—in-between standard 
conceptions of “speech” and “silence”—arises “when one remains in the aporia, when 
one stands in the ‘now’ of the impasse and thereby experiences how both potential paths, 
hitherto incompatible, ‘merge’ and transform, providing a ‘new’ opening” (85). Though 
existing within the “aporetic instance” implies a “leap of logic” and a willingness to 
succumb to the unthinkable (Loevlie 85), as we have just seen, living in the aftermath of 
torture implies a similar situation. For that reason, I find Loevlie’s approach to literary 
silence so illuminating. It opens up new possibilities for analyzing narrations of torture, 
particularly in Rey Rosa’s El cuchillo del mendigo, since I believe his texts “move 
towards a language that can both be and not be silence, towards a silence that can both be 
and not be language” (Loevlie 86). Therefore, in treating Rey Rosa’s El cuchillo del 
mendigo, I will seek to explore “the constant in-between of the silent non-symbolic and 
the literary text” (Loevlie 86), those instances where the reader is asked to “abandon a 
mere rational understanding” (Loevlie 86) and rest uneasily with the specter of torture. 
Before proceeding, however, I must briefly note the risks of such a venture.  
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When asked why he had not critically engaged Samuel Beckett’s work, Jacques 
Derrida responded by saying, “How could I write, sign, countersign performatively texts 
which ‘respond’ to Beckett? How could I avoid the platitude of academic language?” 
(Derrida 1992: 60, qtd in Loevlie 193). The suggestion behind Derrida’s comment is that 
any critical or philosophical treatment of Beckett’s work would inevitably miss it. In 
Beckett’s work, he suggests, there will always be something that “slips away from any 
philosophical or analytical meta-discourse” (Loevlie 193). The poetic language employed 
by Beckett behaves differently than everyday language; it “resists any congruence with 
an external set of philosophically defined ideas as it does not relate to any knowable […] 
‘out there’” (Loevlie 194-195). Those who approach Beckett’s work with this attitude in 
mind are able to safeguard the text’s “signature”—that is, what Derrida calls “this 
remainder which remains when the thematic is exhausted” (Derrida 1992:61, qtd in 
Loevlie 193). The temptation of such an approach is to come away from a text like 
Beckett’s by renouncing every possible interpretive reading. But such anti-conclusions 
run the risk of reducing the work in question to “a certain private, privileged realm” 
(195). Such an a priori dismissal of all philosophical or meta-discourse approaches to a 
text restricts all interpretation to the act of reading, even though it does protect the 
“experience” of the text (Loevlie 195).  
The same set of questions could be asked of Rey Rosa’s El cuchillo del mendigo. 
That is, there is something within the text that “slips away” from philosophical discourse. 
This is perhaps one of the reasons why he himself remains suspicious of overly 
theoretical engagements with his work. There are clearly benefits to approaching Rey 
Rosa’s text with an a priori dismissal of all philosophical or meta-discourse approaches. 
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Foreclosing “any philosophical or analytical meta-discourse” (Loevlie 193) has the 
benefit of privileging the experience of reading Rey Rosa’s work and thus safeguarding 
its “signature.” Yet as Loevlie has pointed out with regard to Beckett, “[a]though such an 
approach avoids the philosophical temptation to define the non-symbolic, it runs into an 
impasse where there is nothing further to say” (196). My exploration of Rey Rosa’s work 
will attempt to move beyond this impasse. I have drawn heavily on Loevlie’s work 
because she provides a critical framework that allows me to navigate between these two 
dangers: first, the temptation to name the non-symbolic; and second, to reject such a 
naming by discarding philosophical or theoretical approaches in order to privilege the 
experience of reading (Loevlie 196). Loevlie’s conception of literary silence allows me to 
“‘test’ the fragility of the experience, to talk about it without losing it” (196). In the 
following sections, I try to avoid suggesting what specific texts “mean” because I hope to 
show how Rey Rosa’s language operates according to an altogether different dynamic 
that escapes signification. That is, we can see in Rey Rosa a language that is ultimately 
unlike “useful, everyday language” (Loevlie 194), or to borrow Agamben’s terminology, 
a language “that no longer signifies” (Remnants 39). The following sections provide 
various ways to approach Rey Rosa’s stories and indicate how it is possible to rest 
uneasily in the presence of the specter of torture in his text, and to accept its haunting.  
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Seeing and Unseeing: The Dissolution of the Real 
No, no symbols—not for me.  
(Rodrigo Rey Rosa
192
) 
 
Sus ojos estaban abiertos, pero el contorno 
de las cosas era irreal.
193
  
 
Lo que veía, era y, al mismo tiempo, parecía 
no ser.
194
  
 
 Rey Rosa’s primary means of narrating torture is unlike the two literary modes 
previously analyzed in this study. Torture never appears as fully present in his stories, as 
it does in Rigoberta Menchú (Chapter Two). In fact, in Rey Rosa there are no clear or 
direct descriptions of torture scenes, and the word torture appears rarely throughout the 
entire collection. To be sure, an initial reading of El cuchillo del mendigo might leave the 
reader wondering if torture is a theme at all in the text. That is not to suggest, on the 
contrary, that the non-symbolic of torture is fully absent, pushed into a space beyond 
language, as we saw in the new novel (Chapter Three). Rey Rosa has been adamant that 
he continually seeks to avoid the use of symbolic language in his writing. By their very 
nature, symbols push the non-symbolic into a realm that is somewhere “out there,” 
somewhere beyond language in a place that cannot be accessed by language. As Rey 
Rosa says, “No, no symbols—not for me.”
195
 Rather than push the silent non-symbolic of 
torture beyond the text, I suggest that Rey Rosa has masked it within language itself.
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 Rey Rosa, “La entrega” (in El cuchillo del mendigo) 3.  
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 Rey Rosa, “El monasterio” (in El cuchillo del mendigo) 21. 
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 Regarding the silencing and masking of torture in Rey Rosa’s stories, it should perhaps be noted that 
Rey Rosa has incorporated citations from Ludwig Wittgenstein in his fiction, particularly El material 
humano (2009). Perhaps no other philosopher is more widely cited concerning the relationship between 
silence and language. Wittgenstein was an Austrian-born philosopher whose theories of language often 
addressed the relationship between silence and language. Indeed, perhaps the most often-cited quote of 
Wittgenstein comes from the end of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921): “Whereof one cannot 
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Given my previous discussion of the non-symbolic, we might say that torture exists 
aporetically in his stories; it is always in-between. In other words, what we see in the 
stories of El cuchillo del mendigo is a phenomenon that I will refer to in this chapter as 
the “masking” of torture. Torture, I will argue, is there, its phantasmal presence masked 
just below the surface of the text. Its presence, as I will show, remains silenced, though it 
does make itself felt. In these stories, torture is both there and not there—both seen and 
unseen— just as it was during the Armed Conflict: “Lo que veía, era y, al mismo tiempo, 
parecía no ser” (“What I saw was there, and at the same time seemed not to be” [21, 
25]).
197
 Throughout this chapter, I will examine the various ways in which Rey Rosa 
“disappears” torture within the text. In his stories, torture has what Gordon would call a 
“muted presence” or a “seething absence” (21). To see how the “in-betweenness” of 
torture functions in the text, we begin by examining two stories in the collection: “La 
entrega” (“The Release”) and “El vidente” (“The Seeing Eye”).
198
 Significantly, these 
stories—the first and the last in the collection—both depict a blinding that forces the 
reader to ask whether or not something has been hidden or disappeared from the reader’s 
view—and if so, what is it?    
                                                                                                                                                 
speak, thereof one must be silent.”  Such an affirmation, of course, posits silence as the opposite of 
language, implying that silence can “give meaning to all those experiences, insights, intuitions, feelings, 
states ‘whereof one cannot speak’” (Loevlie 11). It follows that silence can deal with those facets of reality 
that somehow escape language. Yet in his later work—Philosophical Investigations, which was written in 
the late 1940s—Wittgenstein posits “reality as a reflection or product of language, hence questioning to 
what extent there is a reality beyond language” (Loevlie 11 n.). This latter view permits a more robust 
conception of language and would consequently challenge the form conception of silence as the beyond of 
language. Though we cannot be certain to what extent Rey Rosa is familiar with these divergences within 
Wittgenstein’s corpus, I believe we see evidence within Rey Rosa’s writing to suggest, if not an affinity 
with Wittgenstein’s later work, then at the very least, an attempt to think through similar difficulties. See 
his use of Wittgenstein in El material humano. 
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 Unless otherwise noted, the English translations included here have been taken from Paul Bowles’ 
translation of Rey Rosa’s text.  
198
 The term “entrega” actually means “delivery,” though I have decided to leave Bowles’ translation of the 
title as it is. Whether the title indicates a “delivery” or a “release” is not crucial to the story itself.   
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In the first story, “La entrega,” it is the confusion between the main character’s 
conscious and unconscious states that initially obscures and masks the reader’s ability to 
understand precisely what has happened to the protagonist. The story opens with a man 
being awakened very early in the morning. An old friend of his father is shouting at him 
from outside, telling him “Llamaron. Dicen que vayas a la Plaza de Tecún” (“They’ve 
called. You’re supposed to go to the Plaza of Tecún” [1, 1]).
199
 The mention of the “Plaza 
de Tecún” is significant. Most importantly, it is one of the few sites specifically 
mentioned by Rey Rosa throughout the entire collection. As I will explore in greater 
detail below, the vast majority of the stories in this collection are not localizable 
geographically. That is, it is impossible to determine if the settings are in Guatemala, 
Morocco, the United States, etc.
200
 Though I will return to the question of space below, it 
is important to note that this particular story can be located geographically within 
Guatemala. Whether or not the “Plaza de Tecún” refers to the Plaza in the city of Ayutla, 
which is located in Western Guatemala and is more commonly referred to as the city of 
Tecún Umán, it is nevertheless almost certain that the story takes place in Guatemala, 
where Tecún Umán remains a celebrated historical figure of the ancient Maya and a 
symbol of continued resistance to foreign, imperial control.  
The ensuing scenes briefly describe the main character as he follows a map out of 
the city in order to hand over a ransom for the release of his wife, who—as we learn in 
the final paragraph of the story—has been kidnapped. During the delivery of the money, 
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 The English translations referenced in this chapter are those done by Paul Bowles and published in The 
Beggar’s Knife (1985).  
200
 I mention these three countries as possible locations for several reasons. First of all, these are the three 
countries in which Rey Rosa had lived prior to his writing El cuchillo del mendigo in the early 1980s. That 
is not to suggest, of course, that he could not have written about another country. I offer it merely as a 
biographical observation that is perhaps strengthened by my second point, which is that most—if not all—
of Rey Rosa’s other texts clearly take place within these three countries. Thus the lack of a determinable 
geographical location forces El cuchillo del mendigo to stand out within his corpus.   
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however, the man himself is abducted. He is beaten, drugged, and then returned to a 
house in the city where he is locked in the basement and left for the entire day. Though 
he appears to spend a long time unconscious, we do not know what happens to him 
during that time. Is he tortured? Does he spend the entire day drifting in and out of 
consciousness? What happens to him in that “cuarto subterráneo” (“underground room” 
[4, 5]) that has become a living hell (4, 5)? The simple fact is that readers do not know. 
There are indications that he awakens at one point: “Abrió los ojos y movió lentamente 
las pupilas” (“Then he raised his eyelids and moved his eyes slowly” [4, 5]). And there 
are suggestions that he is either tied down or too weak to move: “Intentó mover una mano 
y no lo consiguió” (“He tried to move his hand and was not able to” [4, 5]). Though there 
are no detailed descriptions of him being tortured, the only thought that he can elaborate 
is that he is in Hell: “‘El infierno’, pensó, y el pensamiento resonó y resonó en su interior, 
pero cada vez más débilmente. […] No le fue posible elaborar otra frase; las ideas 
aparecían y desaparecían, una tras otra, inconexas” (“‘This is Hell,’ he said to himself, 
and the thought resounded within him, but with increasing feebleness. […] He could not 
form another sentence in his mind. Unrelated ideas appeared and disappeared one after 
the other” [4, 5]). He had been beaten when he was abducted, and thus it is possible that 
he is also beaten in the “underground room.” We simply do not know. The next event that 
appears to occur with certainty happens later that evening, though once again, the 
prisoner—from whose perspective the story is recounted—has been drugged and 
continues to drift in and out of consciousness, and we have reason to doubt his ability to 
comprehend his own reality or understand the events that follow. In the narrative, 
someone rushes into the room and says their conspirators have been caught with the 
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money and that they have to move the prisoner. The man is placed back in the car and 
driven out of the city. Face down on the road, he hears one of them say, “Yo creo que ya 
está muerto” (“I’d say he’s already dead” [4, 6]). Without hesitation, the kidnapper pulls 
out his revolver and “sin mirar, hizo fuego” (“fired it absently into the body” [4, 6]). 
Incredibly, however, the man appears to survive the gunshot.  
We must highlight the appearance of survival, for when he opens his eyes, he is 
blinded: “una intensa luz lo encandiló” (“the intense light dazzled him” [4, 6]). The use 
of the verb encandilar draws attention to the fluidity of the boundaries between conscious 
and unconscious states, and thus signals the further destabilization of the boundaries 
between the real and the unreal. The verb encandilar has several meanings. According to 
the RAE, it can mean “deslumbrar acercando mucho a los ojos el candil o vela, o 
presentando de golpe a la vista una cantidad excesiva de luz” (“to dazzle by bringing a 
lamp or candle close to one’s eyes, or suddenly introducing into view an excessive 
quantity of light”). This blinding makes sense in the context; a man awakened in a 
hospital after being left for dead would be temporarily blinded by the sudden brightness. 
But does he awake in a hospital? The reader infers this possibility, but it is immediately 
put to doubt. According to the RAE, the verb can also mean “deslumbrar, alucinar, 
embelesar” (“to dazzle, to hallucinate, to fascinate”), which gives the passage other 
possible interpretations, including the possibility of trickery or fantasy. That is, the 
“blinding” might in fact be an act of bewitching or enchantment. In fact, according to the 
Diccionario de la lengua española (Espasa-Calpe), the verb encandilar also means 
“deslumbrar con apariencias o engaños” (“to fascínate with appearances or delusions”) 
and is a synonym of hechizar (“to cast a spell on”) and embrujar (“to bewitch”). By 
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drawing attention to this verb, we can see that what follows in the story loses its certainty. 
The strong tie to “reality” has been severed, and thus the end of the story may not be as 
clear or defined as the preterit verbs indicate. After his blinding/enchantment/bewitching, 
the man sees a woman approaching: “Sus labios movieron, pero él no la pudo oír. La 
miró en los ojos, y le pareció que sus cuencas estaban vacías. ‘Son bonitos’, pensó, y 
trató de decírselo, pero las palabras quedaron en su boca. La mujer le puso los dedos 
sobre los párpados y se los cerró” (“Her lips formed words but he could not hear her. He 
looked into her eyes, and it seemed to him that they were empty sockets. ‘They’re pretty,’ 
he thought, and tried to tell her but no word came out. The woman put her fingers on his 
eyelids and pressed them shut” [4, 6]). Her “cuencas vacías” (“empty sockets”) give her 
an eerie presence in the story, as does the fact that she closes his eyes. Yet the immediate 
effect of her touch produces an even greater sense of the uncanny in the reader: 
Él sintió un estallido en el tórax. Una voz le preguntó: ‘¿Estás dormido?’ Él 
asintió mentalmente, pero ‘Estoy muy despierto’ pensó para sí. ‘¿Sabes quién 
soy?’ siguió la misma voz. No trató de responder, pero comprendió que era su 
mujer. La habían libertado. Luego sintió otro golpe: un sonido débil. ‘Es mi 
corazón’, pensó, y para sus adentros: Es suficiente. Que se detenga. (4-5)
201
  
 
The cracking in his thorax is confusing, and readers do not exactly know what is 
happening. Has he been stabbed or shot? Did the woman with the empty sockets do 
something to him? Is there a chance that he has been returned to the “underground 
room”? Or is he free? We simply do not know with any certainty. Indeed, the man’s 
confusion regarding his conscious state leads the reader to question his ability to relate to 
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 “Something cracked in his thorax. A voice asked him: ‘Are you asleep?’ In his mind he said yes. But to 
himself he said: ‘I’m wide awake.’ ‘Do you know who I am?’ the same voice went on. He did not try to 
answer, but he understood that it was his wife. They had let her go. Then he felt another blow: a faint 
sound. ‘It’s my heart,’ he thought, and inside himself: ‘It’s enough. Let it stop’” (6). It should be noted that 
this story has an additional line in Bowles’ English translation. After the man thinks, “Let it stop” (6), there 
is a concluding sentence: “He died then” (6). There is no indication of this conclusion in the original 
Spanish. 
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his immediate surroundings. How can he mentally assent to being asleep, but at the same 
time think to himself that he is very awake? More than anything else, this passage reveals 
his continued confusion between waking and sleeping. That is, he still does not have a 
firm grip on his state of consciousness. So when he recognizes the woman’s voice as his 
wife’s, and states that she has been freed, readers must decide whether or not to believe 
him.
202
 Is he a reliable witness? We have just witnessed the complete dissolution of his 
ability to discern what is real. To add to this confusion, we do not know whether this is 
the same woman he saw earlier, the one with empty sockets who had closed his eyes. 
Once again, we must ask ourselves: has he been freed? Or is he constructing an alternate 
vision of reality in order to cope with the horror of the experience? The beating of his 
heart is painful and seemingly foreign to him; it “cracks” in his thorax. To live with this 
confusion is to live in-between the real and the unreal.  
The legacy of torture forces both the victims and the witnesses to live 
permanently at the threshold, and thus in order for their narrations to bear witness to their 
condition, the general senselessness of bearing witness must make itself felt in the text. 
But not to the degree that it pushes all meaning outside the text. It is certainly true that for 
many Guatemalans, the terror produced by the legacy of torture seemed “senseless” and 
“meaningless”—hence my continued emphasis throughout this project on its 
unspeakability. But as I argued in Chapter One, this unspeakability was purposeful. That 
is, the state intentionally provoked terror in order to blur the boundaries between fact and 
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 To suffer the kidnapping of a family member was an immensely traumatizing experience for countless 
thousands of Guatemalan citizens. And it was a phenomenon with which Rey Rosa had a deep personal 
connection. This story quite significantly carries the following dedication: “Para mis padres” (“For my 
parents”). Rey Rosa’s mother was kidnapped and held for ransom in 1981. Though Rey Rosa has not 
spoken in great detail about her abduction in public, he includes a description of that experience in his 
recent novel El material humano (2009).  
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fiction and thus preclude any effort to make sense of torture. So while that terror may 
have seemed “senseless,” it would be more precise to assert that it actually “makes a 
mockery of sense-making” (Gordon 80). It does so “not because terror is senseless but, 
on the contrary, because it is itself so involved with knowledge-making” (Gordon 80). 
The confusion between fact and fiction wreaked havoc on the social imaginations of 
citizens. Shifting continually between “unbelievable facts and potent fictions” (Gordon 
80), the terror of torture “makes epistemological doubt itself a form of domination” 
(Gordon 80). Narrating that “mockery of sense-making” in literature will require textual 
strategies that attempt to repeat that doubt within the text. As Loevlie reminds us, in order 
to bear witness to the aporia, the text must also falter, and its acts of gesturing must 
become “weird,” “disturbing,” and often “meaningless” (82). In “La entrega,” we 
encounter several impasses where our ability to discern between what is certain and what 
is uncertain—between presence and absence, between speech and silence—is also 
disrupted.  
 As we can see from this story, the collection opens by destabilizing the 
boundaries between seeing and unseeing, thereby establishing a very close relationship 
between themes of blindness, self-delusion (or bewitching), and violence. The collection 
ends by reinforcing this thematic in the final story, “El vidente” (“The Seeing Eye”).  The 
story “El vidente” begins with a confession of envy: “Reconozco que lo envidiaba. Yo 
asociaba su imagen—la piel metálica, el pelo tan oscuro que parecía azul, su mirada 
suave y vacía—con mi idea de un hombre que ha logrado contacto con Dios” (“I admit 
that I envied him. With his skin like metal, his hair so black that it seemed blue, his soft 
empty gaze, he fitted my concept of a man who has made contact with God” [75, 93]). 
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This man who has seemingly made contact with God is blind, and the narrator proceeds 
to recount his first experience of envy: “el impulso de cegarme” (“the impulse to blind 
myself” [75, 93]).
203
 As the two of them walk arm in arm through a crowd, hearing the 
loud voices of the children, the narrator is suddenly struck by the desire: “mirar la 
oscuridad y verla para siempre” (“to look into the darkness and see it always” [75, 93]). 
This desire does not abate, and a few months later, as the narrator is driving with the 
blind man, he closes his eyes and experiences the desire once again, noting the 
“sensación de libertad” (“sensation of freedom” [75, 93]) in not seeing: “Fue entonces 
cuando, con los ojos cerrados, me vi envuelto en una nube dorada, densa, pero a la vez 
luminosa y transparente. Deseé estar ciego, y me dije en silencio, con una voz que no era 
mía: ‘Que me convierta en esto’” (“It was then, with my eyes still closed, that I saw I was 
enveloped in a gold-colored cloud, heavy but luminous and transparent. I wanted to be 
blind, and I said to myself in silence, in a voice that was not mine: ‘If only I could be like 
this’” [75, 94]). This passage presents several striking difficulties for the reader. First, we 
must note the narrator’s false experience of blindness. That is, with his eyes closed he 
still sees, experiencing a vision of luminosity: “a gold-colored cloud, heavy but luminous 
and transparent.” Biologically, his eyes still function. And thus closing his eyes on the 
world does not render him completely blind. He can still see, although his vision has now 
been altered and skewed. The relevance of this feigned blindness to Taylor’s conception 
of “percepticide” should be obvious. The “careful blindness” cultivated in times of 
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 Though it seems clear that the narrator is male from the use of masculine past participles and 
adjectives—“me vi envuelto” (75) and “Deseé estar ciego” (75)—there are indications that problematize 
this conclusion. For example, the narrator mentions walking arm in arm through a crowd, which is not a 
common occurrence for two men to do in public. In addition, Bowles’ English translation does not carry 
any suggestion whatsoever regarding the gender of the narrator. Nevertheless, in order to be faithful to Rey 
Rosa’s use of the masculine form, I have decided to use masculine pronouns when referring to the narrator. 
After all, it is possible that they are brothers, or father and son (or son and father). 
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atrocity allowed people not to see the spectacles of power (Taylor 122). The fear of being 
caught seeing forced people to look away. This “production of denial” (124) created a 
situation in which “[t]he passersby, the neighbors, could not bear witness; they closed the 
door, shut the curtains, turned off the light” (124). Those who did see the violence denied 
it because they too feared being disappeared and/or tortured. Thus the lack of sight 
experienced by the narrator is not truly blindness. It is “percepticide,” a false blindness.  
 The most immediate danger of the narrator’s feigned blindness is that it can 
produce a fragmentation within the psyche. We see indications of this split in the above 
quotation: “me dije en silencio, con una voz que no era mía: ‘Que me convierta en esto’” 
(“I said to myself in silence, in a voice that was not mine: ‘If only I could be like this’” 
[75, 94]). What does it mean to speak to oneself in a voice that is other? Has the recent 
experience of “percepticide” somehow fragmented the narrator? Do we see here a 
separation of self and voice, which is described by Scarry as one of the effects of torture 
(Scarry 49), and which Agamben refers to as the “supreme ambition” of biopower” 
(Remnants 156)? Clearly, the narrator has begun to question his selfhood. His envy not 
only reveals his current desire to be other, but also suggests an underlying doubt 
regarding his own identity, which is then questioned further with the appearance of the 
“other” voice. What is it about the experience that the narrator finds so freeing and thus 
so desirable? Is it this experience of otherness? These questions remain unanswered in 
the text, leaving only a feeling of uneasiness with the narrator’s desire. What is 
undeniable, however, is that the narrator has experienced a crisis of selfhood, and he 
answers the question “Who am I?” not with an “I am…” but with an “I want to be other.”  
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The fragmentation within the narrator’s psyche reveals a further danger of feigned 
blindness. The risk of continually practicing “percepticide” is that we forget its falseness. 
We forget that this skewed perception of reality is a condition produced in us by the state 
and its spectacles of horror. Though we cannot be certain that the narrator’s struggle is 
anything more than a general psychological rupture, the context of the story implies 
otherwise—especially the presence of “una medalla, una estrella de seis puntas” (“a 
medal in the form of a six-pointed star” [76, 94]), which suggest a military honor and 
thus a connection with the state and the horror of the war. The danger, therefore, is that 
we forget what it was like to see. Indeed, we become entrapped by the luminosity of our 
golden unseeing and begin to desire its permanence. Thus the continued production of 
feigned blindness can lead to a permanently skewed vision. What this story seems to 
propose is that in order to learn to see again—to become “videntes”—we must be 
blinded; we must train ourselves to see anew. Only by altering our vision can we learn to 
see again. We see this played out at the end of “El vidente.” The destabilization and 
dissolution of the narrator’s selfhood culminates in the final paragraph of the story with 
the narrator’s act of self-blinding:  
Sobre la chimenea colgaba una medalla, una estrella de seis puntas. Fui a 
descolgarla, y recuerdo, siempre lo recordaré, que tembló en mi mano. Salí al 
jardín. Las nubes estaban cargadas de lluvia. Fui a sentarme al banco de piedra, 
cerda de la fuente. Vi la noche por última vez. Moví los párpados, y con el filo de 
la estrella me abrí las pupilas. No sentí dolor. Sentía que caía; una corriente tibia 
bajó por mis mejillas. Sacudí las manos delante de mi cara y no las vi. A mis 
espaldas oí su voz que me llamaba. (76)
204
 
  
                                                 
204
 “Above the mantelpiece there hung a medal in the form of a six-pointed star. I took it down, and I 
remember, and shall always remember, that it trembled in my hand. I went out into the garden. The clouds 
were heavy with rain. I went to the stone bench near the fountain and sat down. For the last time I saw the 
night. I moved my eyelids, and with the sharp edge of the star I slashed my eyes. There was no pain. I 
seemed to be falling; a tepid current ran down my cheeks. I moved my hands in front of my face and did 
not see them. From behind me I heard him calling out to me” (94). 
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The effect of this self-blinding is undescribed, neutral, and silenced. The narrator does 
not experience the golden luminescence this time around. This time, he sees nothing, not 
even his hands in front of his face. Yet he is not surprised by the darkness. The story ends 
with a parenthetical note: “(No me sorprende la soledad, ni la oscuridad, ni pensar que 
ahora vivo en mi propio infierno. A veces me sorprende mi pasado, y el recuerdo que 
tengo de su voz.)” (“I am not astonished by the solitude or the darkness there is in the air, 
and much less by the thought that I am in a hell of my own creation. Sometimes my past 
surprises me, and the memory I have of his voice” [76, 95]). We can see clearly that the 
narrator’s life is difficult, as suggested by the references to his solitude, darkness, and the 
“hell of [his] own creation.”
205
 Thus on a more immediate level, we can suggest that the 
story points out the dangers of willfully not seeing the reality around one, and that acts of 
self-blinding carry weighty consequences. 
Yet it is also possible to suggest that there are benefits to self-blinding. That is, it 
is possible to argue that the narrator can now see something we do not. The title “El 
vidente” literally means “The clairvoyant” or “The sighted person.” (and is translated by 
Bowles as “The Seeing Eye”). Hence the title seems to suggest that the narrator, though 
now blinded, retains the capacity to see. In fact, in the Spanish version the narrator’s act 
of self-blinding carries a suggestion that is not present in Bowles’ translation. Rather than 
slashing his eyes, the narrator opens them: “me abrí las pupilas” (“I opened my pupils” 
[76, my translation]). The fact that his act of self-blinding is described as an opening 
rather than a closing is significant. Unlike his previous experience—in which he closed 
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 Yet these experiences do not surprise him. What does surprise him, however, is his past, specifically the 
memory of a voice. But whose voice is it? Is it the blind man whom he was attempting to imitate? Is it his 
own “other” voice that spoke to him when he closed his eyes? Even though he had been searching for his 
blind friend just previous to his act of self-blinding, there is no way to know with certainty whose voice it 
is.  
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his eyes and saw luminous, golden clouds—this blinding seems to provide him with a 
new vision or an alternative perception of reality, albeit a reality that is dark and solitary. 
Though there is no suggestion within the text to indicate precisely what he sees, one 
effect of his self-blinding is that he is now surprised by his past: specifically, “el recuerdo 
que tengo de su voz” (76). Though this could be the memory of the blind man’s voice, 
the “su” is unclear and opens up other possibilities, including his own voice that he 
experienced as “other” upon closing his eyes. As readers, we simply do not know what to 
make of his self-blinding or how to think about his newfound characterization as vidente.  
Clearly, the story resists easy or satisfactory explanation. The impasse 
experienced by readers requires a “suspension of rational understanding” (Loevlie 85) 
that stretches the imagination. As Loevlie argues, however, such aporias can be “fruitful” 
(Loevlie 85) and often give rise to “experiences, insights, meanings that are non-rational, 
non-linguistic and immediate in nature” (Loevlie 2). Indeed, on a meta-critical level, I 
would like to suggest that this final story provides a possible key to approaching and re-
reading other stories in the collection. As I will argue, Rey Rosa actually writes similar 
acts of self-blinding into other stories in the collection. In addition to “El vidente,” 
notions of seeing—including blinding, opening or closing one’s eyes, etc.—occur often 
in the collection (see, for example, the following stories: “La viuda de don Juan Manuel,” 
“El monasterio,” and “El cuarto umbroso”). Like the blind vidente, readers must “open” 
their pupils and re-focus their gaze in order to see what is “in-between” the language of 
the text.  
I will refer to these textual acts of blinding or unseeing as the “masking” of 
torture. As I suggested above, acts of “percepticide” were common throughout the war in 
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Guatemala. The public nature of massacre as collective torture made the displays of 
tortured bodies unavoidably visible throughout the country. Yet the people had been 
trained to look away and to ignore the spectacle. Thus their response to the torture can be 
called a feigned blindness. But the risk of continually practicing “percepticide” is that we 
forget its falseness. We forget that this skewed perception of reality is a condition 
produced in us by the state. The most immediate danger, therefore, is a permanent loss of 
vision. That loss of vision does not negate the presence of torture; nor does it erase its 
effects on those who have been witnesses to such atrocities. This loss of vision merely 
numbs the senses of individual citizens and nullifies their ability to resist the state’s 
hegemonic control. As I suggested in Chapter One, under these conditions in Guatemala, 
torture becomes a masked presence that permeates the deepest recesses of both society 
and the individual psyche. In a certain sense, the spectacle of torture is itself 
“disappeared.” Yet its presence continues to be felt. In order to understand the dynamics 
of this masking, readers must experience “percepticide” firsthand. This experience can 
reveal the fact that our gaze needs to be re-focused, perhaps even blinded, in order to 
open our pupils and allow us to become a species of vidente capable of seeing that which 
the state has disappeared. To do so, however, we must learn to allow ourselves to rest 
uncomfortably in those in-between spaces where the visible and the invisible come 
together. To employ Loevlie’s terminology, the aporia of complex repetition can still be a 
“fruitful” moment (85). By pushing readers to exist within this in-between moment—in-
between seeing and blindness, in-between past and future—Rey Rosa opens up the 
possibility for encountering a “language that does not speak” (Loevlie 85).  
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As I will argue throughout this chapter, Rey Rosa attempts to “repeat” or re-stage 
the state’s disappearing of torture in the stories of El cuchillo del mendigo. As I suggested 
above, torture never appears as fully present in his stories, as it does in testimonio. There 
are no clear descriptions of torture scenes, and thus readers might even doubt its 
“presence.” Yet precisely because of its apparent absence, we cannot suggest that the 
non-symbolic of torture is fully absent either, as we saw in the new novel. Rather than 
push the silent non-symbolic of torture beyond the text, Rey Rosa has masked it within 
language itself, allowing it to exist in the aporetical in-between. Therefore, in El cuchillo 
del mendigo, torture is experienced as both a “seething absence” and a “muted presence” 
(Gordon 21).  
The masking of torture recreates for the reader the impossibility of witnessing 
torture. To employ Agamben’s terminology, Rey Rosa’s stories bear witness to the 
“impossibility of bearing witness” (Agamben Remnants 39). There is a sense in which the 
stories silence and/or blind the reader. More abstractly considered, the masking of torture 
is “the movement through which the border between the text and the non-symbolic is 
momentarily suspended” (Loevlie 78). To put the matter more simply, in many of Rey 
Rosa’s stories, readers encounter a moment where something is not quite right. The 
reader can either stop reading, or she can continue to rest uncomfortably with the 
uneasiness of the text. Other critics have drawn attention to this uneasiness in his writing. 
Roberto Bolaño, for example, has drawn attention to the sinister nature of Rey Rosa’s 
stories, calling him a master of “sombra, una raya que atraviesa veloz el espacio de la 
normalidad” (“shadow, a line that swiftly crosses the space of normality” [141]) and 
suggesting that he is an author who “cree en la vida como sólo creen los niños y los que 
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han sentido la presencia de la muerte” (“believes in life the way that only children do and 
those who have felt the presence of death” [200]). Unfortunately, the majority of such 
comments come from reviews of Rey Rosa’s books and occasional interviews. While 
these critics have drawn attention to this uneasiness, very few have developed a sustained 
treatment of it, and thus have not explored the specific dynamics and rhetorical strategies 
within the stories that create such unease.
206
 Clearly, there exists “something” within Rey 
Rosa’s narrative that resists explanation. Whether it is a feeling or what Rey Rosa himself 
calls the “sabor de la pieza” (“flavor of the piece” [Solares n. pag.]), it is a sensation that 
Rey Rosa says he works diligently to produce. No matter what we call it, it is an effect 
that “slips away from rational analysis” (Loevlie 87). In El cuchillo del mendigo, for 
example, this displacement occurs primarily through fear. Indeed, there are several stories 
in this collection that, to be honest, completely escape the reader’s understanding. They 
do not make rational sense, yet nevertheless continue to terrify. It is an irrational fear, to 
be sure, but that does not make the experience any less horrifying. The effect on the 
reader is immediate, for the reader “must accept to stand in the unthinkable, must accept 
a text that continues while it derails, that continues while it is silence” (Loevlie 87). 
Loevlie calls this literary phenomenon an “implosion”: “An implosion ‘sucks’ space 
together and causes it to ‘cave in.’ It is this sense of collapsing and bursting inwards that 
provides such adequate and powerful descriptions of the experience of reading literary 
silence” (87). Normally, readers experience a certain “distance” with the text that allows 
the text to remain an “object” that can be read. However, when we consider literary 
silence, “this distance collapses and the text is no longer a separate object facing the 
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 As I suggested above, Loevlie’s treatment of Beckett provides a framework that allows us to approach 
Rey Rosa’s stories and better understand the dynamics involved. For that reason, in what follows, I will 
draw heavily on Loevlie’s work.  
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reader, but rather the two ‘merge’ together. We can recognize literary silence because it 
invites this implosion, this transformation in the traditional analytical relationship 
between text and reader” (Loevlie 88). Literary silence therefore creates a certain 
destabilization or dissolution that escapes rational explanation. Because the “not quite 
right” quality of the text is never resolved, Rey Rosa’s texts force a hesitation or 
suspension of belief in the reader. As Loevlie explains, such implosions require the 
reader to abandon reason: 
The implosion is therefore also a movement that is not primarily thought, but 
rather experienced. To think the implosion is to lose it and re-enter the realm of 
reflection and control. Literary silence is the dynamic that invites the reader to 
perform a certain unmediated ‘jump’ away from the firm ground of reason, and 
into the free fall, scary or relieving, of non-rational control. (89) 
 
By resisting rational thought, Rey Rosa’s stories impede reflection and therefore re-create 
an uneasiness that repeats—in complex form—the state’s project of blurring the 
boundaries between the real and the unreal. Because literary silence requires that the 
readers approach the text in a different way, it forces them to suspend momentarily their 
previous understanding and accept their inability to discern between what is certain and 
what is uncertain. If there is something masked within his narrative, it is torture itself, and 
Rey Rosa challenges readers to see it. More than anything else, what see in these stories 
is an attempt to narrate life through the eyes of the tortured, or from the perspective of 
those who have witnessed torture and thus experienced the fragmentation firsthand. This 
suspension of understanding can produce lasting effects: “the implosion relies upon the 
willingness of the reader to change not only the relationship to the text as an object, but 
also to him- or herself as an interpreting, reflecting, rational reader” (Loevlie 89). If 
reading challenges the ways in which we conceive of ourselves as rational beings and 
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therefore as interpretive agents, it can fundamentally destabilize our sense of self and our 
conception of reality.
207
 To understand the dynamics of this destabilization, we can now 
turn to the use of dreams and nightmares in El cuchillo del mendigo.  
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  According to Loevlie, “Reader and text merge together, mixing, so to speak, their voices. The 
implosion is intrinsic to this view of reading. It is the moment through which the subject-object 
constellation actually collapses. It is a moment of a certain ‘trembling’ between text and reader, a 
dissolution of roles as the reader is no longer the interpreting subject and the text no longer the object to be 
interpreted” (88). 
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“Entre sueño y vela”: The Masking of Torture
208
 
Y un poco de paranoia no hace mal en la 
literatura. (Rodrigo Rey Rosa)
209
 
 
La historia se repetía sistemáticamente 
hasta un punto en que era difícil reconocer 
qué era realidad y qué pesadilla.
210
  
 
In El cuchillo del mendigo the primary method of dissolving the boundaries 
between the real and the unreal—and therefore of masking torture—occurs through the 
use of dreams and nightmares. Rey Rosa has admitted that his early stories were “dream-
inspired” and that much of the action occurs “inside the head of someone.”
211
 Yet when 
Rey Rosa claims that “[s]ome of the stories—for example, in The Beggar’s Knife—are 
dreams,” such a statement can be misinterpreted and over-generalized.
212
 Though it could 
certainly be argued that some of the stories are dreams, it would be more appropriate and 
precise to suggest that the collection as a whole explores the liminality of dreams. That is, 
though some stories certainly appear to remain within the dream itself, in most cases the 
stories probe and test the boundaries between the dream and reality. Characters enter and 
exit the dreamworld fluidly, and in several instances, the reader is uncertain where the 
line between the two is, or if it even exists at all. Rey Rosa challenges readers to question 
to what extent dreams are in fact “real.” And thus the central question throughout the 
collection appears to focus upon how we differentiate between what is real and what is 
not. To that purpose, in this section I will be exploring this psychical dimension of his 
characters in the stories, specifically regarding their probing of the unconscious. Though 
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 The title of this section is taken from the story “El monasterio” (El cuchillo del mendigo 21). 
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 Interview Solares 
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 Ramón Díaz Eterovic, Nadie sabe más que los muertos 80. 
211
 Interview with Gray 167. 
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 Interview with Gray 167. 
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Rey Rosa employs the term “dreams” in the interview with Gray, I have chosen for 
various reasons to employ the term “nightmare” throughout this chapter. First of all, it is 
a term employed by Rey Rosa himself in several of the stories (e.g. “Un gato amarillo”), 
and thus its use is not without warrant. Second, “nightmare” captures more precisely the 
uneasiness of the stories, as well as the lingering emotional trauma produced by the act of 
reading. Finally, as I noted in Chapter 1 of the present study, the real-life experience of 
torture was itself a nightmare. Or rather, in torture pain was repeated and reproduced 
“sistemáticamente hasta un punto en que era difícil reconocer qué era realidad y qué 
pesadilla” (“systematically to the point in which it was difficult to recognize what was 
reality and what was a nightmare”).
213
 As already noted, Scarry refers to this process as 
the “objectification of the prisoner’s world dissolution” (38). And thus the primary 
feature of torture is the destabilization of the boundaries between the real and the unreal. 
We see this destabilizing aspect of torture repeated in many of the stories in El cuchillo 
del mendigo through the use of nightmares.  
Nightmares are practically omnipresent in El cuchillo del mendigo.
214
 In fact, as I 
noted in the previous section, the opening story “La entrega” includes numerous attempts 
to dissolve the boundaries between the character’s conscious and unconscious states, 
thereby blurring the lines between nightmare and reality. We see this dissolution just as 
prominently in “La señal” (“The Sign”). In this story, a man awakens one morning to find 
a scratch just below his eye, but he cannot remember how he could have been injured: 
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 Of the 26 stories in the collection, at least eleven directly mention dreams or nightmares (“La señal,” “El 
monasterio,” “La herencia,” “El hijo y el padre,” “El cuchillo del mendigo,” “Un gato amarillo,” “Nueve 
ocasiones,” “Sueños repetidos,” “Una versión de mi muerte,” “El animal,” “Un prisionero”); at least four 
others include characters who either awaken or fall asleep (“La entrega,” “La viuda de don Juan Manuel,” 
“El lecho del río,” “La lluvia y otros niños”); two appear to be full-fledged dreams (“El camino se dobla,” 
“Informes de Cahoabón,”); and two more have main characters who are blind and thus cannot “see” what is 
real and what is not (“El cuarto umbroso,” “El vidente”). 
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“Quise hacer memoria, pero no recordaba haberme herido la noche anterior, y si lo había 
hecho durante algún sueño, el sueño se había borrado por completo” (“I thought a 
moment, but could not recall having hurt myself the previous evening; if I had done it 
during a dream in the night, I had completely forgotten the dream” [6, 7]). Yet even 
though he cannot remember the dream itself, neither can he discount the possibility that 
the cut is the result of a dream. Thus from the very beginning, the reader is alerted to the 
potential fluidity between the man’s reality and his dreams. The man’s faulty memory 
raises uncertainty regarding the stability of that boundary. The scratch remains on his 
face for two days. A week later, it happens again, once again “sin el más débil recuerdo 
de un accidente o sueño alguno que lo explicara” (“without the faintest memory of any 
accident or dream which might explain it” [6, 7]). He becomes determined to understand 
the origin of these wounds. His first thought is that the injuries are a result of nightmares: 
“Comencé por imaginar que yo mismo, en medio de una posible pesadilla, pude haberme 
señalado el rostro” (“I began by imagining that in the midst of a possible nightmare I 
might have clawed myself” [6, 7]). Though he is willing to concede the possibility of 
injuring himself during a nightmare—and thus admitting the potential destabilization of 
the boundaries between reality and nightmare—he cannot imagine how he could have 
done so twice, nor now he it could have produced two identical wounds: “una línea que 
comenzaba justo bajo el centro de mi ojo y bajaba, haciéndose más profunda, formando 
una media luna que terminaba junto a la comisura de mis labios” (“a line beginning just 
below the center of my eye and cutting deeper as it described a half-moon that ended near 
the corner of my mouth” [6, 7-8]). This confusion becomes more and more pronounced 
as the story continues.  
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Apart from his confusion regarding the origin of the “sign” and his curiosity 
regarding its cause, the most immediate effect of his experience is actually social 
marginalization: “Así señalado, me resultaba embarazoso hablar con cualquiera, aun con 
los desconocidos” (“Disfigured in this way, I found it embarrassing to have to speak to 
anyone, even someone I did not know” [6, 8]). Having been “señalado” (“disfigured”), 
his emotional response is shame and embarrassment. As I noted in Chapter One, this 
mirrors the reaction experienced by torture victims. Once the prisoner’s immediate 
physical setting has been destroyed and ceases to exist as a possibility for social 
relationships, the torturer is able to “reach out, body forth, and destroy more distant and 
more numerous manifestations of civilization” (42). Thus social isolation is one of the 
primary effects of torture. Indeed, according to Elizabeth Lira and Eugenia Weinstein, 
psychologists who work with victims of torture in Chile, “The most important 
psychosocial damage that torture generates consists in the destruction or deterioration of 
collective links” (qtd in Cavanaugh 44-45). We see the repetition of this alienation in the 
story.  
Despite his embarrassment, he decides to seek help. He invites a friend to stay 
with him in order to keep an eye on him as he sleeps (6, 8). For nine straight days, his 
friend observes nothing, finally leaving the protagonist alone. Then, the second night he 
spends alone, the sign appears again. He once again asks his friend for help: “A lo largo 
de veintisiete noches sin fruto me veló con perseverancia, y al cabo de este período 
ambos nos dimos por vencidos” (“For twenty-seven fruitless nights he watched me 
steadfastly, and at the end of that time we agreed that the thing was beyond us” [7, 8]). 
The friend leaves, but the following night it happens again, this time with a slight 
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variation: “en lugar de la curva descendiente, era una U invertida, justo bajo el ojo” 
(“instead of the descending curve, it was an inverted letter U, just below my eye” [7, 8]). 
His growing confusion and exasperation force him to abandon society: “No salí de la casa 
aquel día; no quería ser visto por nadie, y me encerré en el cuartito que me servía de 
estudio, decidido a resolver el problema” (“I did not go out of the house that day; I did 
not want anyone to see me, and I shut myself into a small room I used as a study, 
determined to solve the puzzle” [7, 8]). It becomes clear to him that he cannot seek help 
from anyone, and he is left alone with his nightmares.  
At this point in the story, just as readers witnessed in the story “El vidente,” we 
once again see a crisis of selfhood. The appearance of the sign, though of primary 
importance, reveals an additional difficulty for the man: he cannot protect himself against 
himself. He proceeds to explore various means for watching himself while sleeping, but 
soon realizes the absurdity of such an attempt (7, 9). His numerous efforts to understand 
what has happened to him are unfruitful until one night when, overcome with exhaustion, 
he has the following nightmare:  
Lo que soñaba, no era sino la prolongación del asedio producto de mi obsesión. 
En el baño había un espejo circular, y soñé que lo descolgaba de la pared para 
llevarlo a mi cuarto. Tomé varios libros de la librera y con ellos levanté una 
columna para apoyar el espejo, de manera que, estando yo tendido en la cama, 
podía ver mi reflejo de cuerpo entero. Luego saqué dos pinzas de una cajita y, no 
sé cómo, las apliqué a cada uno de mis párpados, de suerte que me era imposible 
cerrar los ojos. Me quedé dormido con los ojos abiertos, y me miraba en el 
oblicuo espejo. Entonces oí algo, como el aleteo de un pájaro. Era algo sin forma 
claramente definida, una nubecita con garras, lo que vino a golpearme a cara. 
Inútilmente forcejeé, tratando de juntar los párpados. Y entonces, desesperado de 
mi propia impotencia, me desperté. Mientras reconstruía el sueño, me fui librando 
del miedo. (7-8)
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 “What I dreamed was simply a prolongation of the state of siege resulting from my obsession. In the 
bathroom there was a circular mirror, and I dreamed that I removed it from the wall and carried it into my 
bedroom. I took several books from the shelf and made a pillar against which I leaned the mirror in such a 
way that when I was lying in the bed I could see the reflection of my entire body. Then I took two tweezers 
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The theme of vision and keeping one’s eyes open is here combined with the theme of 
violence. As noted in Chapter One, it was common for citizens to be “marked” during 
torture. Though the physical wounds may have healed, the psychological wounds often 
accompanied the tortured for years after their release from the detention center. Though it 
is far from certain that the character in this story has been tortured, it is clear that he is 
besieged to the point of exhaustion by an indecipherable and unknowable terror. It is a 
fear of something unseen that nonetheless marks him.  
 We see a similar connection between nightmares and violence in “Un gato 
amarillo” (“A Yellow Cat”). This very short story consists of only three succinct 
paragraphs. Despite its brevity, the dissolution of the boundaries between the real and the 
unreal is remarkably disturbing. The first paragraph notes that the main character has 
suffered a “pesadilla” (“nightmare” [54, 68]). He awakens and places his hands over his 
“vientre hinchado” (“swollen stomach” [54, 68]), thinking that the nightmare was the 
result of something he had eaten the night before. He goes into the bathroom, and as he is 
washing his face, “comenzó a hacer memoria” (“he began to remember” [54, 68]). Rey 
Rosa’s use of language is significant. He does not write that the man remembered, which 
is possible in Spanish, but that he began to “make memory” (“hacer memoria”), thus 
highlighting the possible imaginative nature of our memories. The second paragraph, 
which begins with verbs in the past perfect, presumably describes the nightmare itself. In 
the dream, he enters a house and meets two men dressed in black. Without speaking, they 
                                                                                                                                                 
from a little box, and somehow affixed them to my eyelids in such a way that it was impossible for me to 
shut my eyes. I remained asleep with my eyes open, and watched myself in the slanting mirror. I heard then 
what sounded like the fluttering of wings. What came to strike my face was something without a clearly 
defined shape, like a little cloud with claws. It opened its black bill, and I made a vain effort to shut my 
eyelids. It was then, made desperate by my helplessness, that I awoke. As I reconstructed the dream I felt 
my fear leaving me” (9). 
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lead him through the rear of the house to the other side of the yard where he sees his dead 
grandfather waiting for him in a boat. After they embrace, a priest appears: “Miró con 
reproche al anciano, que tenía en la mano una botella; éste se excusó con un gesto, y 
ambos desaparecieron tras un enrejado y comenzaron a discutir” (“He cast a reproachful 
glance at the old man, who had a bottle in his hand. The latter made a gesture of excusing 
himself, and they both disappeared from view for a discussion which took place behind a 
grill” [54, 68]). The topic of their argument is never mentioned, and this point, the second 
paragraph ends.  
What is unclear is whether the third paragraph continues the dream or not. At the 
end of the first paragraph, we left the main character standing in the bathroom, washing 
his face, and reconstructing the dream. At the beginning of the third paragraph, the man 
“se dirigió al cuarto donde tenía su cama” (“went to the room where he slept” [54, 69]). 
Does this action continue the dream or do we see a continuation of the post-dream 
action? That is, after hearing the two men argue, does he go back into the house? Or does 
he head toward his bedroom after washing his face? Clearly, the boundaries between the 
real and the unreal have dissolved. Though the paragraph break seems to support the 
latter conclusion, i.e., that he is now awake and returning to his bedroom, the ensuing 
action seems more like a nightmare than reality. I include here the final paragraph in its 
entirety:  
Él se dirigió al cuarto donde tenía su cama. Un gato amarillo estaba acostado 
sobre la almohada. Cuando se hubo desvestido para descansar un rato, el gato le 
saltó encima y le clavó las uñas. El dolor le subió al cuello como un cristal en 
pedazos, y luego bajó al estómago. Tendiéndose en la cama, logró ver las estrellas 
en el cielo a través del tejado. (54)
216
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 “He went to the room where he slept. There was a yellow cat on his pillow. When he took off his clothes 
to rest for a while, the cat sprang at him and dug its claws into him. Pain rose into his throat like shattered 
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This is where the story ends, and the reader still cannot determine whether the action 
occurs in the dream or in real life. The boundary between the two has been destabilized, 
and anything is possible, including seeing the stars “through the tiles of the roof” (54, 
69).  
Though the meaning of the story is far from clear, we must recognize the fact that 
this type of narration—in which reality and nightmare commingle—is a common legacy 
of torture. The fracturing of the psyche post-torture prevents the tortured from 
distinguishing the real from the unreal. The same can be said for those who witness 
torture. In a country like Guatemala, torture—and the terror it produced—corrupted and 
infected society to such a degree that it became “normal.” As it was tolerated, and finally 
normalized by society, torture penetrated the recesses of the Guatemalan psyche and 
fragmented it. Even those citizens who had not experienced torture directly felt its 
“masked” presence. Everything—no matter how unbelievable—became a possibility. 
Through a process that Scarry calls the “objectification of the prisoner’s world 
dissolution” (38), both the objects in the room – bathtubs, refrigerators, tables, etc. – and 
the room itself are converted into objects of pain. The boundaries between the real and 
the unreal fade and blur, and everything becomes a potential weapon (Scarry), even 
yellow housecats. The effect of this blurring on the citizens’ ability to witness to torture 
and other atrocities of the war cannot be underestimated. Masked behind the normalcy of 
everyday life, torture creeps below the surface, “just beyond view.” Torture’s shadowy 
presence haunts the very fabric of Guatemalan society. Whether this story is “about” 
                                                                                                                                                 
glass, then sank to his stomach. He lay down in bed and was able to see the sky and its stars through the 
tiles of the roof” (69). 
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torture or not, its mode of narration repeats the feeling of uncertainty and despair 
common for those who live with the haunting of fear and vulnerability. 
This feeling of uncertainty produced from the destabilization of the boundaries 
between the real and the unreal appears again and again throughout the collection. In 
“Lecciones inciertas” (“Uncertain Readings”), for example, this destabilization is so 
strong that it disrupts the writing itself, as witnessed in the chaotic sentence and 
paragraph structure. In many cases, each sentence begins a new paragraph, and the 
narration is almost impossible to follow, thus requiring what Loevlie calls a “leap of 
logic” and a willingness to succumb to the unthinkable (Loevlie 85). At the end of the 
story, the narrator appears to be abducted, although the precise moment of the abduction 
is uncertain: “Ayer fui llevado a una habitación llena de hombres. / Desde el otro lado de 
la pared llega la voz de las mujeres. / ‘Dicen que los que están allí todos están muertos.’” 
(“They came for me yesterday. / They took me to a room full of men. From the other side 
of the wall comes the sound of women’s voices. ‘They say the ones who are there are all 
dead’” [71, 89]).
217
 It was common practice in detention centers for the victims to be 
segregated by gender. And the suggestion that they are all dead recalls the fact that in 
Guatemala, most who were abducted were either killed or disappeared. The next two 
passages of the story contain the most direct reference to torture in the entire collection: 
“Por la mañana recogen nuestra basura, la comida desechada y el agua sucia. Cada tres 
días se llevan a uno de nosotros, para volverlo tres días después. Cuando regresa, su cara 
es diferente, pero sus ropas son las mismas” (“In the morning they gather up our  trash, 
our leftover food and dirty water. / Every three days they take away one of us, bringing 
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divided into two separate lines in Bowles’ English translation (“They came for me yesterday. / They took 
me to a room full of men”).  
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him back three days later with a different face, but wearing the same clothes” [71, 89]). 
Though we cannot know with any certainty whether those who have been carried off are 
tortured, it is certainly true that torture is an experience that disfigures the victim, perhaps 
to the point of giving him a new face. The final passage re-affirms this possibility:  
Dicen que al salir uno no recuerda haber estado aquí. 
Las voces de las mujeres son el único alivio. Se filtran por la pared y flotan entre 
nosotros. Entre nuestros dedos y piernas, calentándonos. 
A veces entran por los oídos y se meten en la cabeza. Entonces son un martirio. 
(71)
218
  
 
Once again, we cannot be entirely certain as to the “meaning” of these passages. Unlike 
the previous literary modes examined (testimonio and the new novel), Rey Rosa has 
chosen to mask the violence behind the language of the text, thereby making it 
impossible for the reader to extrapolate any easy interpretations. Rather, the reader is 
asked to rest uncomfortably in the presence of the text’s uncertainty. As the boundaries 
between the real and the unreal destabilize, the resulting irrationality—or to borrow 
Loevlie’s terminology, the “in-between movement of the aporia” (84)—establishes a 
“complex repetition” of the experience of torture. Rather than recollect or symbolize that 
experience, Rey Rosa chooses to repeat the experience itself by re-staging the traumatic 
uncertainty of torture. Thus his narrative presents torture spectrally and silently, 
occupying that “zone of indistinction” where one can bear witness only to the 
“impossibility of bearing witness” (Agamben Remnants 39).  
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 “They say that once you are outside you no longer remember having been here. / The voices of the 
women are the only relief. / They filter through the wall and float among us. Between our fingers and legs, 
warming them. / Sometimes they go in through the ears and enter the head. Then one suffers” (89). 
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A Non-Localizable Exteriority  
We need to know where we live in order to 
imagine living elsewhere. We need to 
imagine living elsewhere before we can live 
there. (Gordon 5) 
 
By accentuating dreams in his stories, Rey Rosa not only destabilizes the 
boundaries between the real and the unreal; he also destabilizes the reader’s conception 
and experience of space. Indeed, we see in Rey Rosa’s stories a conception of space that 
Loevlie would refer to as a “non-localizable exteriority” (191) and what Agamben might 
deem the “non-place of articulation” (Remnants 130).
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 That is, the mode of spatial 
production in these stories remains difficult to ascertain. This feeling that the stories 
always seem to take place somewhere else further contributes to the reader’s unease. By 
enhancing this sense of otherness, space is another element of Rey Rosa’s stories that 
accentuates the uncertainty of the non-symbolic.  
Recent approaches to theories of space tell us that in literature and in life, places 
are important because, quite simply, everything happens somewhere. In recent years, 
theorists have explored more precisely how the places we inhabit form us politically, 
socially, and culturally, and also how they limit our ability to challenge, transgress, and 
perhaps even subvert the powers that be. In other words, space is no longer conceived as 
pure “innocent backdrop to position” (Keith and Pile 4). Rather it is vital in 
understanding the complexity of human relationships, and can be a weapon of either 
hegemony or resistance. According to such theories, space—whether expressed 
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 Regarding the “non-localizable exteriority” of the voice in Beckett’s L’Innommable, Loevlie writes, “his 
voice arises from a position that is neither inside nor outside—but au milieu. The voice from this middle 
ground addresses from a place that is both outside and in between the dualism and that cannot be defined 
according to it. It is a voice that arises from the aporetic locus, neither inside nor outside, a place with no 
such borders” (191). 
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consciously as such by the author or not—is determined by political ideology. As Edward 
Soja so eloquently writes, “We must be insistently aware of how space can be made to 
hide consequences from us, how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the 
apparently innocent spatiality of social life, how human geographies become filled with 
politics and ideology” (7). Space determines its inhabitants by limiting the places they 
inhabit. Certain places can only be occupied by certain people. For that reason, space 
becomes an “active constitutive component of hegemonic power: an element in the 
fragmentation, dislocation and weakening of class power, both the medium and message 
of domination and subordination” (Keith and Pile 37). This spatial construction of 
hegemonic power is stabilizing in that it produces—to greater and lesser degrees—grids 
of discipline through which citizens can be governed, and possibly controlled.
220
  
Yet as I have suggested above and in previous chapters (see especially Chapter 1), 
torture problematizes many conceptions of spatial production. As a social practice, 
torture is both present and absent; it exists permanently in-between. The stories of El 
cuchillo del mendigo clearly do not take place in the “here”; but it would also be 
theoretically imprecise to claim that they take place nowhere. Rather, we might suggest 
that they are always seemingly taking place somewhere else. This “somewhere else” is 
what Blanchot calls l’espace poétique (qtd. in Loevlie 191). This poetic space is “a place 
that is both outside and in between the dualism and that cannot be defined according to 
it” (Loevlie 191). In fact, to suggest that these stories function as poetry would not be off 
the mark. In a recent interview, Rey Rosa once suggested that his early work—including 
El cuchillo del mendigo—was incredibly “abstract” and that he began by trying to write 
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 My terminology here draws heavily on Foucault’s conception of space and its relationship to 
constructions of power. Though the Panopticon was a concept imagined by Bentham, its theorization in 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1979) remains the most widely cited.  
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“lo que podríamos llamar ‘poemas en prosa’” (“what we might call ‘poems in prose’” [n. 
pag.]). This concern for the abstract can be seen in the fact that his stories do not occur in 
real space. In an interview with Gray, he states, “My early stories are more abstract as far 
as place is concerned; […] There’s hardly any description of landscape” (167). As we 
have just seen, however, this use of abstract space does not mean that his stories occur in 
dream space. They somehow occupy an in-between space, what Loevlie calls “an 
aporetic locus, neither inside nor outside, a place with no such borders” (191). Rey 
Rosa’s complex repetition, as a mode of spatial production, prevents the reader from 
locating the stories in real space. In an interview with Solares, Rey Rosa suggests that 
this was intentional, stating that his early work incorporated “temas que podrían ocurrir 
en cualquier ciudad latinoamericana, pero no estaban ligados al entorno ni al paisaje 
inmediato” (“themes that could occur in any Latin American city, but were not tied to the 
immediate environment or landscape” [n. pag.]). Readers might possibly deduce that the 
action occurs in Latin America—either because of specific objects or clothing—but “no 
se sabe nunca de dónde son exactamente porque era un poco vago y no incluía nombres 
de lugares” (“you do not know where they are exactly because it was a little vague and 
did not include place names” [n. pag.]). This feeling that the stories always seem to take 
place somewhere else contributes to the reader’s unease and feeling of being permanently 
in-between. 
As noted above, the only major exception to this “non-localizable exteriority” 
(Loevlie) is the initial story “La entrega.” The remaining stories often seem to drift in and 
out of real space. In “El camino se dobla” (“The Path Doubles Back”), for example, there 
are strange shifts in the geography of the story. First of all, the story is divided into four 
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sections, each of which jumps to different locations. Furthermore, the geographical 
destabilization causes the spaces themselves to shift in and out of focus: “Por un 
momento desconoció la puerta y las gradas de la casa, pero pronto volvieron a verse 
como antes” (“For an instant he failed to recognize the door and the iron grillwork, but 
then they returned to looking as they had” [9, 10]). As I have suggested throughout this 
study, torture victims are often incapable of relating to the spaces around them. The 
restriction and enclosure of the victim’s world makes relationality unthinkable, warping 
their sense of space and geography. As Scarry notes, space itself becomes a potential 
weapon (Scarry 38). Thus when the man is later stabbed, we should not be surprised that 
the initial suspect is nature. Though we cannot discount the possibility that he is attacked 
by an unknown assailant, the most likely culprit is the wind itself, since the path is empty 
and the man seen earlier had already disappeared. The attack is described as follows: 
Primero entró el viento, compacto y frío. En lugar de la sonrisa que esperaba, sin 
sentir dolor, recibió una puñalada. La hoja le abrió la piel en el ombligo, y subió, 
dejando una estela roja casi hasta la garganta. Afuera, las estrellas brillaban. El 
cielo se rasgó en dos mientras el hombre caía. Siguió cayendo durante mucho 
tiempo. (10)
221
 
 
The attacker is never mentioned, and we see a striking parallel with the haunting 
vulnerability witnessed in “El gato amarillo.” As noted above, as torture became tolerated 
in Guatemala, and finally normalized by society, it penetrated the recesses of the 
Guatemalan psyche and fragmented it. Even those citizens who had not experienced 
torture directly felt its “masked” presence. As the boundaries between the real and the 
unreal dissolved, everything—no matter how unbelievable—became a possibility. This 
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 “First the wind entered, compact and cold. In place of seeing the expected smile, and without feeling 
any pain, he was stabbed. The blade opened the flesh at the navel and swept upward, leaving a red furrow, 
almost to the throat. Outside the stars flared. The sky tore in half before his eyes as he fell. For a long time 
he went on falling” (11-12). 
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produced an increased vulnerability, leading to situations in which even the geography 
seems violent. We see this geographical violence in “El camino se dobla.” Immediately 
after the man is wounded, we witness another spatial transformation: “La casa comenzó a 
convertirse en una nube que luego se alejó; la colina de enfrente se convirtió en una ola; 
las gradas eran un elefante, y el camino un túnel invisible” (“The house began to change 
into a cloud and then to be moving farther away; the hill opposite became a wave; the 
steps were an elephant, and the path an invisible tunnel” [10, 12]). Thus the mode of 
spatial production becomes very destabilizing.
222
 Because the mode of spatial production 
in these stories remains difficult to ascertain, the unease experienced by the reader is 
further heightened. By enhancing this sense of otherness, space is another element of Rey 
Rosa’s stories that accentuates the uncertainty of the non-symbolic. Therefore, these 
stories occupy what Agamben might deem a “non-place of articulation” (Remnants 130), 
where it becomes possible to bear witness to the “impossibility of bearing witness” 
(Remnants 39). 
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 For other examples of this spatial destabilization, see “Sueños repetidos” and “Lecciones inciertas.” 
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Trembling in the Uncertainty of the Instant 
…que la historia, que es una puta sencilla, 
no tiene momentos determinantes sino que 
es una proliferación de instantes, de 
brevedades, que compiten entre sí en 
monstruosidad.
223
 
 
[W]e are other, no longer what we were.
224
 
 
The dissolution of the real/unreal dichotomy not only produces an altered 
conception of space; it also destabilizes the reader’s conception of time. Recalling my 
treatment of torture in Chapter One, we must once again draw attention to the ways in 
which torture breaks down the tortured’s experience of time. For the tortured, there is no 
past or future, only the immediate instant and the presence of the body in pain (Scarry 
35). The restriction and enclosure of the victim’s world allows the imagining of a “now 
of torture,” in which the prisoner ceases to exist relationally with his past and future. In 
order to understand the relationship between the “now of torture” and Rey Rosa’s stories, 
we must again turn to Loevlie. Though Loevlie does not specifically address the now of 
torture, she does nevertheless provide a theoretical means of talking about this back-and-
forth movement of torture, and a method for assessing how it might be depicted in 
literature. Loevlie refers to this back-and-forth movement as the repetition of the 
“instant.” She writes,  
In order for something to be repeated it must have been. But in the actual 
repetition it becomes new. This is the temporal understanding of repetition. 
Repetition is the transition from old to new, it is the movement by which the past 
transforms into present existence. It is the coming ‘into existence’, the producer of 
existence. […] So repetition is the category of becoming and as such it refers both 
backwards and forwards. It relates backwards to what is repeated, and forwards to 
the new becoming of this past. Repetition, one might say, trembles between past 
and future. It is the suspension of temporal sequence, the mark of the paradoxical 
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 Roberto Bolaño, 2666 993.  
224
 Beckett 1965: 11, qtd in Loevlie 216. 
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re-versal of the past into the future. In linear sequence the present becomes the 
past, but through repetition the past becomes the present. Repetition corresponds 
to the instant of becoming and hence relates to the temporal category of the 
instant, or the ‘now’, the actual moment when time advances, transforms the past 
into the future. Repetition is the topos of the ‘now.’ (Loevlie 66-67) 
 
In terms of violence and torture, we might say that the “instant now” reflects the 
tortured’s constant “trembling” between the ever-present past memory of what has come 
before but is always continually present, and the fear of an ever-present future over which 
they do not have any control.
225
 Following Scarry, we know that the victim of torture 
exists perpetually in the impossibility of the instant. This back-and-forth movement of the 
instant is always in-between and thus supremely unstable; it is perhaps best described as a 
“constant evaporation and constant becoming” (Loevlie 67). In constant flux, the instant 
now of torture destabilizes into “a forever shifting place to which it must constantly 
return only to constantly flee” (Loevlie 67). As a “suspension of temporal sequence,” this 
“trembling” escapes standard conceptions of linear or teleological time.
226
 As a practice 
of complex repetition, torture disrupts the forward movement of standard causality. In 
such situations, the only conceivable telos is the “constant ‘now’” (Loevlie 67). Hence 
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 Loevlie’s use of the verb “tremble” is a clear reference to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, which she 
examines at length in her study of literary silence (see especially pp. 70-75). 
226
 Yet the instant is not somehow outside of time, nor is it to be “equated with a metaphysical ideal of 
presence” (68). In the words of Loevlie: 
Although the ‘now’ is silent and although it is not reducible to linear time, it is actually not outside 
or beyond time. Rather it is an intense ‘being in’ time. The experience of the øieblikk [Danish for 
“the blink of the eye”] is the result of the rather dizzying back-and-forth of repetition, the highly 
accelerated movement between a ‘has been’ and a ‘will be’. It is therefore quite the opposite of the 
plenitude and wholeness postulated by the dream of presence. Repetition rather negates the 
presence it suggests because it radically precludes rest or standstill. It is always movement—
kinesis. So although the ‘now’, and its inverse relation to eternity, is seemingly outside time, it is 
always the result of repetition. It is haunted by repetition’s buzz of minuscule back-and-forth. A 
potential image is that of an electric current accelerating between two poles. It is by remaining in 
this (rather unbearable) movement of back-and-forth that we might experience the ‘now’. In other 
words the ‘now’ is a result, one might say, of daring to remain inside the temporal sequence of 
repetition, whereas the metaphysical presence was postulated as a beyond time. (68) 
Conceptualizing the instant is clearly difficult. Indeed, according to Loevlie, it escapes language. 
Therefore, “[t]he moment it is stated in words, or measured, it is lost. As such it might be defined as an 
experience of the non-symbolic” (Loevlie 69). Yet despite the fact that the instant is “a silent experience 
that always slips away from articulation” (68), it can nevertheless be explored in literature.  
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Loevlie’s conceptualization of the instant parallels quite fittingly Scarry’s description of 
the experience of the tortured.  
With this conception of the “instant ‘now’” in mind, we can now examine the 
ways in which Rey Rosa’s stories appear to be narrations from the perspective of those 
haunted by torture.
227
 In addition to the numerous spatial displacements noted above—
which in many cases entailed corresponding temporal disruptions as well—the most 
obvious point of departure for exploring the aporetic movement of the instant as a 
temporal in-between is the dissolution of a concept of “Self” in the text. As noted in 
Chapter One, torture creates a destabilizing fragmentation in the victim, which ultimately 
leads to the experience of the self as other. The conversion of the prisoner’s own body 
into an agent of pain creates a division between “self” and “body” (Scarry 49), which 
then forces the tortured to become “other.” The ontological split into self and body often 
forces the prisoner to “renounce her psychological integrity as a coping mechanism, such 
that her words become those of another, dissociated from her self” (Cavanaugh 40). This 
coping strategy—in which “death, the very negation of ego, becomes desirable” 
(Cavanaugh 40)—reveals the profundity of the fragmentation of the tortured. Indeed, 
many victims dissolve the ego (Cavanaugh 40) and create an alternate “self” in order to 
deal with the experience. As Cavanaugh notes, “The experiences are remembered 
vaguely, as those of another, repressed into a hidden corner of the fragmented self” 
(Cavanaugh 40). Because the experiences are repressed and rendered unspeakable, 
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 The connection between repetition and narration is explored by Melberg in a study on theories of 
mimesis. Melberg writes, “The temporal dialectics of ‘repetition’ suspends temporal sequence: the now that 
is always an after actually comes before—it is the now of the instant, the sudden intervention in sequential 
time, the cesura that defines what has been, makes it possible to tell its story and makes way for the ‘new’” 
(Melberg 1995: 137, qtd in Loevlie 67). Thus repetition avoids the metaphsycial difficulties of “true 
presence” and the problems inherent in attempts to “recollect” violence (see Chapter 2 of the present 
study).  
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witnessing to those experiences becomes highly problematized. Therefore, any 
witnessing to this aspect of torture must plumb the depths of the “aporetic position of a 
constant in-between” (Loevlie 84). In many of Rey Rosa’s stories, we can see this 
“aporetic position” as the moment of psychological split in between self and other.  
These coping mechanisms figure prominently, for example, in his story “El 
animal” (“The Animal”). In this text, a man awakens from a dream he has forgotten. But 
in place of the dream, he repeats a nightmare from his childhood: “volvió a su memoria 
una pesadilla que había tenido cuando niño” (“he recalled a nightmare from his 
childhood” [67, 83]). The resurgence of the repressed dream, however, leads to a 
psychological break. The nightmare is of an animal “que nunca había visto” (“the like of 
which he had never seen” [67, 83]). Yet even though he had never seen the monstrous 
animal before, he realizes that “su horrible rostro era su propia cara. Se veía débil y triste 
y sangraba lentamente por la boca” (“its ghastly face was his own, weak and sad, and 
bleeding slowly at the mouth” [67, 83]). He asks the animal, “¿Quién eres?” (“Who are 
you?” [67, 83]), but the animal does not respond. The horror of the nightmare forces him 
awake. But it is not the animal itself that has frightened him, but rather his inability to 
identify the animal, and the confusion of that animal with his own face. The confusion 
between self and other reveals the true horror of the remembered nightmare. But though 
the man has been forced awake, time has fragmented. Is the man in the “now” or in the 
“past”? If this is simply the memory of a nightmare, why does he feel confused as to 
whether he is now awake? The shift within the story from preterit (simple past tense) to 
past perfect and then back to preterit confuses the temporal sequence of the text. What 
began as the memory of a nightmare from his youth (past perfect) has become part of the 
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preterit narration of his own reality: “Tenía lágrimas en las mejillas, y esto le había hecho 
pensar que todavía soñaba. ‘Sueño,’ se había dicho a sí mismo. ‘Cuando me despierte, yo 
seré animal’” (“There had been tears on his cheeks, and this made him think that he was 
still dreaming. ‘I’m asleep,’ he had told himself. ‘When I wake up, I’ll be the animal’” 
[67, 83]). The repetition of the past nightmare creates a rupture, an aporia that cannot be 
comprehended. This confusion between his past and his present is accompanied by a 
corresponding confusion between himself and the animal. Drawing on Loevlie’s 
discussion of the instant, we know that the constant repetition of the “now” destabilizes 
temporal sequence, and the possibility emerges that we are paradoxically both always and 
never who we were. Or to be more precise, existing in the instant, we are in constant flux 
between our past and our future. In an interview, Rey Rosa once remarked that this back-
and-forth between past and future gives reality a fictive character that is not unlike 
literature, and states, “Esa es la pregunta: ¿cuándo no es la vida una construcción 
imaginada?” (“That is the question: when is life not an imagined construction?”).
228
  
In “El animal,” we see the ways in which this uncertainty regarding past and 
future selves can lead to a crisis of selfhood. Because of the confusion between self and 
other, when the man asks the animal, “Who are you?”, he is asking himself, “Who am I?” 
But there is no answer to the question. According to Loevlie, these moments of 
misidentification, when combined with the complex repetition of the instant, signal that 
“the only answer to ‘Who now?’ is ‘Who now?’, ‘Who now?’, etc. Any attempt to reflect 
and answer is caught in the arrival of the new maintenant” (Loevlie 217). The repetition 
of the instant now of the nightmare interrupts forward motion and the sense of duration. 
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 A video excerpt of this interview can be found at the following site: http://losbucbuc.blogspot.com 
(accessed April 26, 2012). 
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Thus readers are left with “a potentially infinite propelling of more instants” (Loevlie 
217). As readers enter into the text and accept an interaction with its characters, they are 
presented with a repetition that offers no possible synthesis or resolution. The same is 
true in Rey Rosa’s stories, particularly “El animal.” To interact with the man in this story 
to accept the possibility of a continual and continuous repetition ad infinitum: “who now, 
who now, who now, who now, who now…” (Loevlie 217). By disrupting linear 
conceptions of time and destabilizing the divisions between self and other, these stories 
repeat and re-stage the dissolution experienced by the tortured and the haunted.  
 This temporal and psychical dissolution is repeated again and again throughout El 
cuchillo del mendigo.
229
 In the story “Nueve ocasiones” (“Nine Occasions”), for example, 
time is fragmented into “nine occasions.” In the penultimate occasion, we see the same 
uncertainty of self witnessed in the above story:  
Lo que la atormentaba era la incertidumbre. Porque nunca sabía si obraba bien o 
mal. Su conciencia no le parecía un instrumento fiel; ya se había equivocado 
muchas veces. Dudaba de sí misma; dudaba de todo. Quería descansar, pero fue a 
mirarse al espejo. No comprendía lo que eran sus ojos, sus labios, o su afilada 
nariz. (59)
230
 
 
The voices of these characters attempt to witness to the fragmentation of the psyche 
within the arrival of the instant now. Drawing on Loevlie, we might suggest that they 
bear witness to 
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 Such a conception of time is not foreign to Rey Rosa. In addition to referencing philosophers and 
literary theorists in his interviews, Rey Rosa often includes intertextual references in his novels and short 
stories. In one of his most recent publications, he references this notion of the “instant” by including the 
following quote, which the narrator attributes to Schnitzler:  
Toda verdad tiene su momento—su revelación—que suele durar muy poco, de modo que, como la 
existencia misma, es un destello, o sólo una chispa, entre la nada o la mentira que le precede y la 
que le sigue, entre el momento en que parece paradójica y el momento en que comienza a parecer 
trivial. (El material humano 116) 
230
 “What tormented her was uncertainty. Because she never knew whether what she was doing was the 
right thing or not. Her conscience did not seem to her a trustworthy instrument; many times she had been 
wrong. She doubted herself; she doubted everything. She wanted to rest, but she went to look at herself in 
the glass. She did not understand her eyes, her lips, or her pointed nose” (75). 
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the experience of the instant, to an experience that cannot be thought, that escapes 
consciousness, but that defines all experience and that is therefore not congruent 
with an unconscious state. To speak from within this arrival of the instant is to 
speak a voice that is in between, not conscious, not unconscious, not able to 
speak, yet not silent. (218)  
 
As witnesses to an aporetic movement between past and future, their voices are 
necessarily fragmented and destabilizing. They are voices that testify to the aporia of the 
instant. As such, these voices bear witness to the “impossibility of bearing witness” 
(Agamben Remnants 39). Their psychical fragmentation into self and other is a “monstre 
incompréhensible” (Loevlie 218) that repeats and thus re-stages the uneasiness of the 
experience of torture for the reader. The constantly arriving “now” dissolves the certainty 
of the narration. These characters thus live in the uncertain in-between; their voices occur 
at the “limits of the sayable” (Butler xvii).
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 In the story “La salida del sol” (“Sunrise”), readers witness a similar connection between temporal and 
psychical fragmentation. The story is divided into two parts. In the first part, a man and a woman sit 
together and discuss her “dolores” (“pain” [16, 20]). We do not know the origin of her pain, only that it 
appears to be the cause of their unhappiness. In the second part, the man experiences some sort of dream or 
out-of-body experience:  
Dio unos pasos atrás y se dejó caer en el sillón que miraba al fuego. Al caer oyó un crujido, y 
sintió un dolor intenso en la columna. ‘Me he roto en dos’, se dijo, y lo asustó el sondo ronco de 
su voz. Quedó ahí sentado; sus muslos estaban lánguidos. Pero al mismo tiempo se vio que se 
ponía de pie, pasó frente a la lumbre, salió al pasillo y salió de la casa.  
 
He took a few steps backward and sat down heavily in a chair facing the fire. As he sank down, 
there was a cracking sound, and he felt an intense pain in his spine. ‘I’ve broken in half,’ he said 
aloud; the hoarse sound of his voice frightened him. He remained sitting there. His leg muscles 
were languid. But at the same time he saw himself rise and pass in front of the fireplace into the 
hall and out of the house [17, 21]).  
He is fragmented and we see the connection with Loevlie’s concept of living “in-between.” 
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Living in the In-Between: The Specters of Torture  
It is not a case of dead or missing persons 
sui generis, but of the ghost as a social 
figure. It is often a case of inarticulate 
experiences, of symptoms and screen 
memories, of spiraling affects, of more than 
one story at a time, of the traffic in domains 
of experience that are anything but 
transparent and referential. (Gordon 25) 
 
 As I have argued, the destabilization of the boundaries between the real and the 
unreal takes several forms in El cuchillo del mendigo. One final example of the blurring 
of these boundaries occurs in the story “La viuda de don Juan Manuel” (“The Widow of 
Don Juan Manuel”), which describes the appearance of a specter: the ghost of don Juan 
Manuel. At the beginning of the story, Jaun Manuel dies. We do not know the reason for 
his death, only that he dies in his home with his wife present. The only information we 
have about his death is that his widow “no lloró su muerte” (“did not bewail his death” 
[26, 30]). This suggests numerous possible interpretations about her state of mind, but it 
does not provide us with any details regarding the cause of his death. Thus it is 
impossible to know with certainty whether his death can be connected to the violence in 
Guatemala, although given the recurring themes in the overall collection, it is a distinct 
possibility. What we do know with certainty, however, is that one week later, his specter 
appears and speaks to his widow:  
Su rostro estaba tranquilo; sin embargo, lloraba. No temas, mujer—dijo a su 
esposa—soy yo. Ella se serenó y escuchó con atención. Él, que se había sentado a 
los pies de la cama, le decía: “Uno vive esperando el descanso, muere, y se 
encuentra igual que al principio: ignorante. Como quien se ha drogado, no sabe 
uno dónde se halla. Todo está hecho de luz. Luego, sin darse cuenta cómo, se 
despierta; la luz pesa; quisiera estar ciego. (26)
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 “The face held no threat; at the same time, he was weeping. Don’t be afraid, woman, he said. It’s I. She 
became calmer and listened attentively. He had sat down at the foot of the bed and he told her: ‘A man 
spends his life hoping to rest finally, and when he dies he finds that he’s just as he was at the beginning: 
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The widow’s reaction to the specter merits particular attention. She does not flee, nor 
does she attempt to ignore him or make him go away. Rather, she “listens attentively.” 
This capacity to rest uncomfortably in the ghost’s presence is explored by Avery Gordon 
in her sociological study Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination 
(1997). According to Gordon, the appearance of a ghost demands our attention. She 
writes,   
These specters or ghosts appear when the trouble they represent and symptomize 
is no longer being contained or repressed or blocked from view. The ghost, as I 
understand it, is not the invisible or some ineffable excess. The whole essence, if 
you can use that word, of a ghost is that it has a real presence and demands its 
due, your attention. Haunting and the appearance of specters or ghosts is one way, 
I tried to suggest, we are notified that what’s been concealed is very much alive 
and present, interfering precisely with those always incomplete forms of 
containment and repression ceaselessly directed toward us. (xvi) 
 
By listening attentively to the ghost, the widow opens herself up to that which had been 
previously ignored.  
Of course, listening to the specter of her dead husband creates a profound sense of 
unease in the story. So many aspects of this story are disquieting. For example, as they 
are talking, they are interrupted by a knock on the door. But when she goes to open the 
door, “[e]l viento y una sombra cruzaron el umbral. No había nadie” (“[t]he wind and a 
shadow came in. There was no one” [26, 30]). When she returns, her husband’s ghost has 
disappeared. But then she hears a loud noise coming from the dining room. She remains 
on her bed, not daring to move. When she hears the sound a second time, she sees her 
husband’s face at the window. But the noise had come from a different direction. She 
stays where she is. After the sun goes down, she finally gets out of bed and discovers that 
                                                                                                                                                 
ignorant. He’s like someone who’s taken drugs: he doesn’t know where he is. Everything is made out of 
light. Without noticing how, he wakes up; the light is heavy, and he wishes he were blind” (30). 
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the door to her bedroom is ajar (“ligeramente abierta”). Why is it ajar? Is there a 
particular reason why it is not shut or fully open? Is it simply because Rey Rosa believed 
that a door slightly ajar produces greater unease in the reader? If not, is there some reason 
why—if her husband is dead and no other characters are mentioned—she seems to be 
hiding in her own house, only risking an occasional peek through the crack (“rendija”) of 
the door? Can we conclude that perhaps she is not alone, and that she is scared of 
whoever else is in the house with her? Would that explain the strange light that she sees 
on the other side of the house (27)? Is she scared? Or is there another explanation? If she 
is not scared, why does she attempt to be silent as she leaves the bedroom: “[p]rocurando 
no hacer ruido, atravesó el pasadizo” (“[t]aking care to make no sound” [27, 31])? At 
first, we assume she is leaving the bedroom either to find the ghost or to investigate the 
odd sounds. She does neither. As soon as she exits the bedroom, she reaches for the 
phone, marks a number, and sits down in the hallway on “el oscuro banquito” (“the dark 
wooden stool” [27, 31]). She has called the Reverend: “‘Reverendo’, dijo, ‘venga, por 
favor’” (“‘Reverend,’ she said, ‘please come’” [27, 31]). We do not know why she called, 
nor do we know exactly why she wants him to come. Their conversation, even if it had 
been made known to readers, is interrupted: “En ese momento, un pájaro azul y amarillo 
que se había escondido en la lámpara sobre la mesa del comedor salió volando, y se 
estrelló contra el ventanal” (“At the same moment, a blue and yellow bird that had been 
hiding in the lamp which hung above the dining room table, flew out of it and broke its 
neck against the windowpane” [27, 31]). This is where the story ends. Only at this point 
does the reader realize that the noise heard by the widow was most likely the bird hiding 
in the dining room. Despite that knowledge, however, the reader’s unease and, more 
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importantly, the uncertainty created by the story do not vanish. There are no guarantees 
that she is alone in the house. In a country like Guatemala, which continues to be haunted 
by the specters of torture, nothing can be taken for granted.  
Without a doubt, the appearance of her husband’s specter creates a disruption in 
the story, destabilizing our perceptions of her situation. According to Gordon, this is 
precisely the function of the ghost. Because they describe “how that which appears to be 
not there is often a seething presence” (Gordon 8), hauntings often alert us of the 
presence of abusive systems of power, “especially when they are supposedly over and 
done with […] or when their oppressive nature is denied” (xvi). Understanding Gordon’s 
conception of the term “haunting” merits an extended quote:  
I used the term haunting to describe those singular yet repetitive instances when 
home becomes unfamiliar, when your bearings on the world lose direction, when 
the over-and-done-with comes alive, when what’s been in your blind spot comes 
into view. Haunting raises specters, and it alters the experience of being in time, 
the way we separate the past, the present, and the future.  
 
Gordon’s description of haunting summarizes quite fittingly my previous arguments 
concerning the “in-between” nature of Rey Rosa’s stories.
233
 As it is fundamentally an 
exercise in mediation, haunting exists in those in-between spaces that challenge how we 
narrate trauma and violence. The presence of the ghost in the story and the widow’s 
reaction to the haunting reveal a fundamental truth about living life during the armed 
conflict: nothing was ever truly what it seemed. To follow the ghost and to listen 
attentively to what it has to say is a risk. It may produce more unease than calm. The 
state’s blurring of the real and the unreal had unhinged the citizens’ ability to make sense 
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 Throughout her exploration of haunting, Gordon continually returns to the question of the “in between,” 
noting that we must learn “to move analytically between that sad and sunken couch that sags in just that 
place where an unremarkable past and an unimaginable future force us to sit day after day” and those 
“conceptual abstractions” that name the “monumental social architecture” (4). Torture, as I have argued 
throughout this project, is one concept that is often discussed as if it were such an abstraction. 
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of their situation. In order to narrate that dissolution, Rey Rosa incorporates the presence 
of a specter in his story. Narrating haunting and the destabilization of the lines between 
the certain and the uncertain allow him to repeat the conditions under which many 
citizens lived during the Armed Conflict. Because ghosts alert us to the fact that “the gap 
between the personal and the social, public and private, objective and subjective is 
misleading in the first place” (Gordon 98), learning to rest easily in their presence can 
retrain our vision and teach us to see the state’s dissolution and destabilization of the 
boundaries between the certain and the uncertain, the real and the unreal. In Rey Rosa, 
we see an attempt to narrate the “in-between” nature of such hauntings. 
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Conclusions: A Non-Signifying Language 
Even if I had been there I could not have 
told their story. (Ariel Dorfman)
234
 
 
 […] you know that I could not tell them the 
full truth of what is being done to our 
people, for fear no one would believe me. 
(Perera xv)  
 
Narrating the seemingly “unsayable” nature of torture requires a new conception 
of witness, specifically concerning the complex relationship between language and 
silence. As I suggested in previous chapters, the testimonios and nueva novela are both 
confronted by a void: a seemingly impassable breach that they found to exist between 
their texts and the horrific reality of the war. In order to challenge the state’s narrative, 
the authors of testimonios and the nueva novela play with the relationship between torture 
and witness—between language and representation, presence and absence—in order to 
attempt to fill in the void by producing either political responsibility or the desire for it. 
As I have suggested throughout this chapter, however, learning to narrate torture—as it 
exists on the continuum of state-sponsored violence and its goal of social domination—
can often involve the recognition that our language and our stories often fail us. In his El 
cuchillo del mendigo, Rey Rosa recognizes this failure. In terms of “complex repetition,” 
Rey Rosa’s stories explore the relation between language and silence, showing the ways 
in which the boundary between the two “desolidifies,” revealing itself to be “porous, 
thereby causing a certain ‘flooding’ between the text and its beyond” (Loevlie 78). Rather 
than the continual backwards movement of recollection that attempts to re-create or 
document a full presence; or the continual forward movement of simple repetition that 
pushes the desired lost object (the non-symbolic) into a space that is the other of 
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 Qtd in Sanford 12. 
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language; Rey Rosa’s complex repetition creates a continual backward-and-forward 
movement that destabilizes the boundaries between the real and the unreal. The stories of 
El cuchillo del mendigo do not pretend immediacy, as we saw with Menchú, nor do they 
mediate an absent or lost reality, as in the case of the Flores and Arias. Rather, his stories 
seek to find a poetic language—a “strange tongue” that speaks silence. His is a non-
signifying language that, even as it reveals the difficulties inherent in narrating torture 
and violence, “disorganizes” and “destabilizes” the dualistic repetition of the non-
symbolic as beyond the text. This confusion prevents the non-symbolic from being 
relegated to some place outside the text. By refusing to define the “unsayable” as the 
other of language, Rey Rosa’s complex repetition allows the stories to speak about torture 
“without speaking” (Loevlie 73). In El cuchillo del mendigo, Rey Rosa probes the in-
between, seeking what Agamben calls the “non-place of articulation” that can bear 
witness to the “impossibility of bearing witness” (Agamben Remnants 39). 
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Chapter Six: “A Way In”: Silence and the Specters of Torture 
En alguna parte del pasado han de estar 
ahora, en alguna quebrada vivirán ocultos 
como monstruos de ensueño.
235
 
 
All societies live by fictions taken as real.  
(Taussig, Shamanism 121) 
 
This study has attempted to highlight the contributions of authors during the most 
violent years of the Internal Armed Conflict. The struggle to name the violence, however, 
continues and remains a central concern in contemporary Guatemala. Even today, more 
than fifteen years after the signing of the Peace Accords and roughly three decades after 
the end of La Violencia, Guatemala continues to be haunted by the specters of its 
traumatized past. Current attempts to seek justice and work through the violence of the 
war take many forms, but all in some way or another continue to struggle with naming 
that violence, groping for an adequate means of narrating, and thus confronting, what 
happened.
236
 The rhetoric of “silence” still has a seductive appeal, and the country still 
finds it difficult to pass “del silencio a la memoria” [“from silence to memory” (AHPN)].  
As I have argued throughout this project, the difficulty of naming and narrating 
the “truth” of what happened during the armed conflict reveals the extent to which in 
Guatemala the lines between the real and the unreal have become so blurred that 
understanding what happened necessitates a masking—a confusion between the certain 
and the uncertain. Narrating violence and torture often requires a willingness to bring 
those “zones of indistinction” (Agamben Remnants) into the narration, and to mask 
                                                 
235
 Graffiti painted on wall in Guatemala City (June 30, 2010).  
236
 Consider, for example, Ronald Flores’ Último silencio (2005). This text narrates the story of an exiled 
Guatemalan living and working in the United States who returns to his native country after the end of the 
war to work as a psychologist treating torture victims. A key theme of the novel is the “unspeakability” of 
the violence and the difficulties—if not impossibilities—of working through the legacy of torture.   
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torture within language itself. Sometimes, the best we can hope for is a narration that 
witnesses to the impossibility of witness.  
Therefore, following the specters of torture means we must learn to narrate in new 
ways. Avery Gordon suggests that to describe a “ghostly haunt” requires “sympathetic 
magic” (Gordon 20-21).
237
 A “sympathetic magic” will not reject empirical observation 
per se, but it would perhaps rely more heavily on “the making and making up of social 
worlds” (21). As I have described the matter, narrating the specters of the unspeakable 
requires a blending of certainty and uncertainty in literature—a confusion between the 
two that is masked within language itself. Because a haunting exists in that in-between 
space where fact and fiction mingle, following the specters of torture often entails the 
search for a new language for narrating. Indeed, it also implies the recognition that what 
we take as “fact” and “fiction” is questionable in the first place.
238
 All our narrations 
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 Gordon borrows this terminology of “sympathetic magic” from Michael Taussig. Such a magic is 
necessary, she claims, because “in the world and between us as analysts and the worlds we encounter to 
translate into world-making words are haunting, ghosts and gaps, seething absences, and muted presences” 
(21). This blurring of fact and fiction will also rely heavily upon what Gordon calls “conjuring,” which 
“merges the analytical, the procedural, the imaginative, and the effervescent” (Gordon 22). Conjuring is a 
necessary element in the ghostly haunt “not only because it is more exact” (Gordon 22), but also because in 
order “to convince others that what we know is important” and change their minds, we must realize that 
“we do not experience things, nor are affects produced, in the rational and objective ways our terms tend to 
portray them” (Gordon 22). 
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 Slavoj Zizek suggests that, when confronted with the horrors of the 20
th
 century, we must look at the 
problem of violence from an “awry” perspective, permitting ourselves only “sideways glances” (4). In the 
introduction to Violence (2008) he suggests that narrations of violence must contain an element of 
irrationality. Here Zizek is reacting to Adorno, who in a famous quote asserts that poetry is no longer 
possible after Auschwitz. His statement is controversial and has received much critical attention, but the 
essential premise is that we must question our ability to represent the violent horrors of the 20
th
 century. 
Instead, Zizek posits that “Adorno’s famous saying, it seems, needs correction: it is not poetry that is 
impossible after Auschwitz, but rather prose. … poetry is always, by definition, ‘about’ something that 
cannot be addressed directly, only alluded to” (5). If we are no longer capable of narrating a violent reality 
coherently, “representations” of that reality must give up any hope of a factual mimesis. Any “truthful” 
narration must in many ways render itself “false.” He writes that a rational, “dispassionate” analysis of 
violence must ignore its “traumatic impact” yet “there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence 
somehow reproduces and participates in its horror” (4). In considering treatments of violence, he suggests 
that a distinction must be made “between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped 
woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its 
inconsistency” (5). He claims that “factual deficiencies” in the narration of the trauma “bear witness to the 
truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content ‘contaminated’ the manner of reporting 
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constantly struggle against the “fictive” (Gordon 25). This is not only true in literature, 
but also in social life and its numerous complications: “the ensemble of cultural 
imaginings, affective experiences, animated objects, marginal voices, narrative densities, 
and eccentric traces of power’s presence” (Gordon 25). We are never only who we are; 
we are also who we imagine and who we describe ourselves to be. As I have noted 
throughout this study, however, torture is most fundamentally “a crime committed 
against the imagination” (Dorfman 8). As such, torture and its specters constantly 
challenge “the distinctions between the fictive and the factual, and between the imaginary 
and the real” (Gordon 14). And thus in Guatemala, as the violence elevated during the 
1970s and 1980s, several authors began to experiment with language and writing in order 
to purse a new vision, a different way of seeing that would take into account the gaps and 
disjunctures at the heart of social life (Gordon 24). To rest uncomfortably in the presence 
of the ghost and to listen attentively to what it has to say allows one to see the impacts of 
those abusive systems and to learn how to name them—perhaps even when they might 
initially seem indecipherable or unspeakable.  
Consider, for example, the case of Oscar Alfredo Ramírez Castañeda and the 
massacre at Dos Erres. In 1982, a group of elite army commandos, the Kaibiles, attacked 
the village of Dos Erres in northern Guatemala, slaughtering more than 250 men, women 
and children (Rotella and Arana). As was the case in most massacres, some managed to 
survive. In this instance, one of those survivors was a three-year old boy, who was taken 
by Lt. Oscar Ovidio Ramírez Ramos— the most experienced and highly trained of the 
Kaibiles—back to his hometown of Zacapa and raised as his son. Lt. Ramírez was not 
                                                                                                                                                 
it” (4). Because there is “something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation” with violence, literary 
representations of that violence must be equally “mystifying” (4). 
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married, and died in a car accident approximately eight months after the massacre 
(Rotella and Arana). Oscar was raised by his grandmother Rosalina, whom he always 
considered his mother (Rotella and Arana). He never knew anything about the massacre 
or his “true” identity until 2011, nearly thirty years after the massacre, when he was 
found by prosecutors who were tracing information about the massacre. Oscar, whose 
real name was Alfredo Castañeda, had lived his entire life believing that Lt. Ramírez was 
a war hero. When confronted with the truth about Dos Erres, Oscar “found it hard to 
believe. He could summon no mental picture of Dos Erres. The people he knew as blood 
relatives in Zacapa had treated him as a full-fledged member of the family” (Rotella and 
Arana). Oscar’s “memory” of the massacre no longer existed; it was replaced with an 
alternative fiction. In many cases, children abducted during massacres were treated 
poorly, almost like slaves, by the families with whom they lived. That was not the case 
with Oscar, however: “Where I was raised, I was raised well. […] I wasn’t treated 
differently than any other kid” (Rotella and Arana).  
How do we narrate the “truth” of a story such as this? How do we go about 
seeking “justice”? In Dos Erres, more than 250 men, women, and children were tortured 
and killed by the military. Some of the acts were so terrible that they defy the 
imagination. Most of the victims were killed and then thrown into a dry well in the center 
of town. Some of them were hit on the heads with sledgehammers (Rotella and Arana). 
Several young girls were raped in front of their family members and then strangled. 
Numerous young children were killed and thrown into the well. Some were thrown into 
the well while they were still alive. One of the commandos, Gilberto Jordán, killed a 
small baby and then threw its body into the well (Rotella and Arana). Lt. Ramírez 
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oversaw the entire operation. Despite the brutality of the crime, however, Oscar—whose 
family members were among those thrown in the well—still has strong affection for his 
adoptive father and family: “He’s still a hero for me […] I see him the same way I did 
before” (Rotella and Arana). Despite learning what had happened to his biological 
family, Oscar states, “He was in the army. And in the army they tell you things, and you 
have to do things. Especially in times of war. Even if someone doesn’t want to” (Rotella 
and Arana). In such situations, how does one fight for justice when the victim not only 
has no memory of the crime, but also still idolizes the violators? In such situations, there 
may not be a way out of the in-between. Perhaps the only option is to find “a way in” 
(Secor). This “way in” would penetrate language itself in order to mask the violence and 
torture within, just as the Guatemalan state sought to do during the armed conflict.
239
  
As I have shown in this project, in Guatemala, where millions of people continue 
to struggle with the specters of torture, several authors have struggled to produce a 
“poetry that crackles” (Secor 51), a new kind of language that refuses to distinguish 
between fact and fiction, between the real and the unreal, or between the certain and the 
uncertain. Oscar is one of countless victims in Guatemala who will continue to struggle 
with the legacy of torture and massacre. The ghosts of the past will continue to haunt 
society for years to come. Refusing to talk about the torture and genocide, however, is 
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 I borrow the phrase “a way in” from Anna Secor. In her article on violence in the police state of Turkey, 
she concludes,  
I would like to find a way out of the endless hall of mirrors that the state of exception sets up, the 
endless division of outside from inside, chaos form order, and the swallowing of each new 
‘exception’ within the rule, the absorption of all within a permanently cross-hatched space of 
violence, guilt and abandonment. I cannot propose a route out, but I can pronounce the poetry that 
crackles in the voices of those […] who have suffered and who have considered their suffering, at 
the threshold of the pure force of the law. It is not, of course, enough. Poetry is not a way out; it is, 
perhaps, a way in. (51) 
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simply not an option. Despite the seductive appeal of silence, to remain silent completely 
forecloses the possibility of witnessing to the violence.  
As I have argued throughout this project, certain forms of writing (and speaking) 
also render that experience unspeakable. The authors explored in this dissertation have 
sought to explore ways to manipulate language in such a way that they might re-negotiate 
the presumed boundaries between fact and fiction—the real and the unreal—so as to bear 
witness to the gaps and disjunctures that define a life haunted by the specters of the 
unspeakable. As Gordon reminds us, 
The willingness to follow ghosts, neither to memorialize nor to slay, but to follow 
where they lead, in the present, head turned backwards and forwards at the same 
time. To be haunted in the name of a will to heal is to allow the ghost to help you 
imagine what was lost that never even existed, really. (Gordon 57) 
 
In such situations, justice may be impossible. Yet hauntings will bring about what 
Gordon calls a “transformative recognition” (8). Understanding those specters and talking 
about them will require a maimed language, to be sure, but it will be a language that 
speaks from within the silence, in order to bear witness to the impossibility of bearing 
witness (Agamben Remnants). Counter-narrating the violence and torture of the war must 
itself be structured around a traumatic impossibility. My hope is to continue to pursue 
discussions about the diverse ways of narrating torture in literature. Despite its universal 
ban by international law, torture—and its legacy in the individual and collective 
psyche—continues to be of major significance, not only in Guatemala, but also across the 
globe.  
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Fall 2006 – Certificate, “Bridging the Gap,” 40 Hours of Training in Medical 
Interpreting, The Cross Cultural Health Care Program. St. Joseph Hospital. 
Lexington, Kentucky. Led by Ernest D. Romero. 
 
ACADEMIC SERVICE 
 
Reviewer, Nomenclatura: aproximaciones a estudios hispánicos. University of Kentucky 
Fall 2011. 
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Undergraduate Studies Committee. Hispanic Studies, University of Kentucky. 
August 2010-May 2011. 
 
Elementary Language Instruction Committee. Hispanic Studies, University of Kentucky. 
August 2010-May 2011. 
 
President, Hispanic Studies Graduate Student Association, University of Kentucky. 
August 2010-May 2011. 
 
Session Organizer, Kentucky Foreign Language Conference, University of Kentucky.  
April 2011. 
 
Representative, Graduate Student Congress, University of Kentucky. 
August 2009-May 2010. 
 
Session Organizer, Kentucky Foreign Language Conference, University of Kentucky.  
April 2009. 
 
Course Leader (SPA 102), University of Kentucky.  
Spring 2008. 
 
President, Sigma Delta Pi (Spanish Honor Society), Centre College. 
August 1998-May 1999. 
 
Treasurer, Sigma Delta Pi (Spanish Honor Society), Centre College. 
August 1997-May 1998. 
 
 
AWARDS AND HONORS 
 
Fall 2011 – Travel Grant for Conference Presentation, The University of the South 
 
Fall 2011 – Travel Grant for Conference Presentation, University of Kentucky 
 
Spring 2011 – Travel Grant for Dissertation Research, Department of Hispanic Studies, 
University of Kentucky 
 
Fall 2010 – Travel Grant for Conference Presentation, University of Kentucky 
 
Summer 2010 – Latin American Studies Travel Grant, University of Kentucky  
 
Fall 2009 – Travel Grant for Conference Presentation, University of Kentucky  
 
2001-2004 – Ph.D. Fellowship, University of Notre Dame  
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2000 – Board of Higher Education and Ministry’s Award, Duke Divinity School 
 
1999 – Phi Beta Kappa, Centre College 
 
1998 – American Bible Society Scholarly Achievement Award, Centre College  
 
1998 – Phi Sigma Iota, International Foreign Language Honor Society, Centre College  
 
1998 – Gamma Sigma Alpha, National Academic Greek Honor Society, Centre College 
 
1998 – Sigma Delta Pi, National Honor Society, Centre College 
 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
 
Spring 2011 – Soccer Coach, YMCA. Lexington, Kentucky. 
 
Spring 2007 – Baseball Coach, YMCA. Lexington, Kentucky. 
 
2006-present – Volunteer Translator, Adopt-A-Village. Guatemala.  
 
2006-2007 – Soccer Coach, Lexington Youth Soccer Association. Lexington, Kentucky. 
 
2005-2008 – Volunteer Interpreter/Translator, Children of the Americas. Translated e-
mail communications between the Board President, Executive Director and 
Guatemalan Director. Translated numerous medical documents. Served as 
medical interpreter in Guatemala in January 2006 and January 2007.  
